



Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Yemen 2002-12

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the European Commission*

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Evaluation of EU Cooperation with Yemen 2002-12

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Due to the prevailing security situation in 2014,
this evaluation was undertaken without a field phase on the ground in Yemen

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Acronyms

3Cs	Coordination, Complementarity, Coherence
ALA	Asia and Latin America
CBO	Community-based Organisations
CCI	Cross-Cutting Issue
CFP	Call for Proposals
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DCI-MIGR	Migration and Asylum Thematic Programme
DCI-NSAPVD	Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development Thematic Programme
DDH	Democracy and Human Rights (EU financial instrument)
DEVCO	Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPPR	Development Plan for Poverty Reduction
EAMR	External Assistance Management Reports
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIF	Enhanced Integrated Framework
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EOP	Economic Opportunities Programme
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERASMUS	European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students
EU	European Union
EUD	Delegation of the EU
FCA	Finance, Contracts and Audit
FDC	Final Date of Contracting
FOOD/DCI-FOOD	Regulation under which the FSTP is financed
FSTP	Food Security Thematic Programme
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GFP	Gender Focal Person
GNA	Global Needs Assessment
HOS	Head of Section
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture Development
IFI	International Financial Institution
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IIP	Investing In People
IL	Intervention Logic
IO	International Organization
JC	Judgement Criteria
JSEA	Joint Social and Economic Assessment
LA	Local Authorities
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAF	Mutual Accountability Framework
MAP	De-mining
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MED	Legal instrument for development cooperation in the Mediterranean Region
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOLA	Ministry of Local Administration

MOPHP	Ministry of Public Health and Population
MOPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MoSAL	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour
MS	Member State
MSE	Micro Small Enterprises
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NDC	National Dialogue Conference
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NRA	National Reform Agenda
NSA	Non-State Actor
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
PCNA	Post-Crisis Needs Assessments
PDCI	Partners Yemen and Partners for Democratic Change International
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PFM	Public Financial Management
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PMU	Project Management Unit
PO	Programme Officer
PPP	People's Peace-making Perspectives
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
REH	Rehabilitation (EU financial instrument)
RELEX	Directorate-General for External Relations
RG	Reference Group
RoL	Rule of Law
ROM	Results-Oriented Monitoring
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SAR	Support for Administrative Reform
SFD	Social Fund for Development
SFYP	Second Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
SMMEs	Small, Micro and Medium-sized Enterprises
SSN	Social Safety Net
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SWF	Social Welfare Fund
TA	Technical Assistance
TDA	Tihama Development Authority
TOC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TPSD	Transitional Program for Stabilisation and Development
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNDAF	United National Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organization
Y-CCM	Community-Based Conflict Mitigation Program
YESP	Yemen Economic Support Programme
YFSP	Yemen Fisheries Support Programme
YNCW	Yemeni National Committee for Women
YSV	Yemen's Strategic Vision 2025
YWU	Yemeni Women Union

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This Final Report presents the findings of the Evaluation of European Union Cooperation with Yemen during the period 2002 to 2012. The evaluation period covers two Country Strategy Papers (2002-06 and 2007-13), four National Indicative Programmes (NIPs)/Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) (2002-04, 2005-06, 2007-10 and 2011-13), and encompasses all main areas of EU development support (governance, economic development, food security, etc.) as well as coherence with other domains (EU humanitarian aid, for instance). This evaluation explores the EU's overall strategic direction and objectives, emphasising the linkages and interplay between political dialogue and development cooperation with particular attention to resilience, responsiveness and state-building in a context of fragility and conflict.

Context of the evaluation

The Republic of Yemen is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the Arab World. Yemen comprises a formal state characterised by political pluralism, elections, a relatively free press and extensive civil society; and an informal state based on patronage and a network of alliances that link tribal sheikhs, government officials, business families and the armed forces, as well as wider regional interests. These factors have contributed to conflict being a major part of Yemen's story. The challenge for government remains reform of the country's governing institutions through combating entrenched corruption and nepotism while maintaining support among tribes and other networks of influence that are accustomed to working within a system of patronage, all the while addressing major socio-economic challenges such as the high population growth rate, declining oil production and revenues, and a high degree of water scarcity.

EU cooperation in Yemen since 2002 has evolved against the backdrop of major EU institutional and organisational changes and a growing EU presence in Yemen. 2011 stands out as a watershed year for this evaluation and the events of that year illustrate several broader issues evident throughout the evaluation period: the influence exerted by personalities; the EU's role as one player among many international actors; the EU's identity as a multilateral actor; the extent to which the EU is properly equipped to perform an effective leadership and coordination role for EU Member States (MS); the relationship between formal and informal channels of influence; and the trade-offs between best practice and pragmatism.

Methodology

We have applied a theory-based approach to the evaluation, using an intervention logic analysis to consolidate all elements of EU cooperation in a single framework that links rationale to strategy, programmes and results. Under each of the Evaluation Question (EQ) headings, we have presented evidence of the contributions that EU cooperation has made in Yemen. We have based our approach on two main building blocks – an analysis of strategy (what was planned, what was realised) and an analysis of programmes (the specific contribution of EU interventions on the ground). The planned field mission to Yemen did not take place due to the prevailing security situation in Yemen in 2014. Nevertheless, in June, July and August the team was able to conduct face-to-face and telephone interviews with a wide range of key informants including EU staff, senior Yemeni government officials, MS representatives, other international agencies, civil society and informed individuals. A particular challenge has been the EU's poor attention to monitoring and evaluation, providing this evaluation with only very limited availability of secondary sources of evidence of the performance and achievements of EU-funded programmes and political engagement.

Summary responses

EU strategic choices on development cooperation strategy have been consistent with the formal strategies and policies of the Government of Yemen. However the EU's comparative advantages have not always been apparent in these choices; and relevance to national priorities and needs has been undermined by a number of weaknesses. These include limited engagement with intended beneficiaries, limited EU understanding of the underlying political settlement, and the lack of contextual analysis at the national, sector and problem levels. Together these factors have facilitated a reliance on unrealistic assumptions about the capabilities and reform intentions of the Government of Yemen and how programmes would contribute to wider strategic and national objectives. Notwithstanding the 2009 recommendations *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen*, there is still no comprehensive strategy that underpins

EU decision making; nor indeed is there any consensus across DEVCO and the EEAS on whether the EU needs one.

EU cooperation has been developed in compliance with contemporaneous EU development policies and Council Regulations, but policy coherence in practice has been weak. This relates largely to weaknesses in EU policy coherence on security, fragility and development and to changes in how Yemen was located in EU policy architecture and organisational arrangements over the evaluation period. This has affected its profile and visibility, prevented access to major funding channels, inhibited strategic planning, and has contributed to poor portfolio management. All CSPs were formulated in close consultation with MS who have recognised EU efforts to encourage cooperation in its focal sectors. Nonetheless, overall donor coordination remains weak, although coordination of political dialogue and diplomacy has improved progressively since 2009. While there is no comprehensive EU strategy, the recent increased emphasis on joint programming signals greater attention to this principle of the Agenda for Change, albeit early experiences on resilience programming have proven challenging.

Since agreement on the OECD-DAC fragile states principles in 2007, EU cooperation has contributed to state-building objectives but not promoted and supported state-building processes in a coherent and consistent manner in relation to international norms. Development cooperation prior to 2009 was not framed by an overarching state-building strategy and it is only in support to the health sector that a state-building approach and results are visible. The 2009 recommendations *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen* were consistent with international norms and recognised the vital relationship between political dialogue and development cooperation. Factors supporting EU promotion and support to state-building have been the gradual though informal percolation of fragility thinking into strategy and programming processes; the commitment and tenacity of staff in the Sana'a Delegation in seeking to address Yemen's fragility; and the leadership provided by the Head of Delegation from 2009 and through the 2011 crisis. Hindering factors relate to weaknesses in organisational coherence on security, fragility and development within and between DEVCO and EEAS; and to contested views within the EU over responsibilities for, and the utility of, political economy analysis.

The EU itself assesses its historical 'resilience portfolio' as having achieved limited impact and with weak sustainability. Resilience as a formal concept is now prominent in plans for future development cooperation in Yemen, but it has arrived formally in EU strategy and programming only very recently and quite suddenly. The EU has actively sought to coordinate its resilience-enhancing interventions and dialogue with MS, currently illustrated by its joint programming of resilience interventions. However, the historical portfolio of resilience-enhancing interventions has been under-evaluated; EUR 54 million of support to food security between 2002 and 2012 has barely been evaluated at all. Attempts to develop a shared understanding and definition of the root causes of fragility and vulnerability have been limited and short-lived. The continued inadequate attention to political economy analysis at sector and problem level means resilience interventions are not designed from an understanding of commodity value chains. There is no clear evidence of a systematic approach to coordination with DG ECHO and treatment of the principles of LRRD during the period, although there are some examples of good practice and coordination improved markedly once both had opened offices in Sana'a.

EU engagement with regional actors and donors has strengthened its cooperation in Yemen, but engagement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia needs to be deepened further. The EU identified the Gulf States as important interlocutors in Yemen at the start of the evaluation period, in particular Saudi Arabia. However, fostering more effective EU engagement has taken nearly a decade, in parallel with coordinated efforts by MS. Regular contact between EU, MS and Gulf officials during 2010 formed the basis for more explicit political dialogue the following year, leading to the GCC's crucial role in mediating Yemen's transition agreement with support from the UN, the US, the EU and MS, and to the subsequent creation of the MAF. The EU's regional political engagement is helped by the fact that Yemen and the Gulf States are managed together within the EEAS, but for obvious reasons DEVCO has no aid programme in the Gulf region. Diplomacy and aid pledges that work through formal channels, such as the Friends of Yemen, run in parallel with substantial networks of transnational patronage with which the EU has little or no interface. The Saudis' likely preferences should be central to any future EU analysis relating to resilience and state building, in the context of Yemen's transition to a post-oil economy. In light of the current dynamic situation in Yemen, it remains unclear whether the EU's recent leverage on state-building can be maintained.

The treatment of cross-cutting issues (gender, environment, and civil society) has been patchy, with some issue-specific actions but little evidence of mainstreaming or contribution to results. While the EU

can claim some successes with regard to specific gender actions, it lacks formal cooperation mechanisms or structured cooperation on gender in Yemen. While environmental issues have been prominent in strategy, no specific environmental activities have been programmed and there is no evidence of a mainstreaming approach. Civil society has received prominent attention throughout the evaluation period, particularly in relation to the promotion of good governance, democracy and human rights, but such support has not been provided within the framework of a broader strategy for national capacity development in line with fragile states principles. Guidance and support from DEVCO in Brussels on technical aspects of the CCIs is available from the relevant technical departments, but its use tends more towards procedural compliance than to adding value. The EU has been an active advocate on human rights issues, in which gender issues and civil society engagement have been prominent, particularly during the National Dialogue process. However, this support has not been sufficiently strategic, consistent or coherent to contribute adequately to state-building.

Responsiveness has been significantly enhanced by the presence of a full Delegation in Sana'a, by investment in contextual analysis and by the Delegation's proactivity in pursuing a comprehensive approach. 2009 was a watershed year – the MacDonald/Khalil study predicted regime instability and successive MIPs adopted relevant recommendations; and the 2009 recommendations *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen* provided an explicit mandate for the EU to deepen its political engagement and for development cooperation to focus on basic needs that would be most relevant during acute crisis. However, throughout most of the period of this evaluation, the absence of a clear and shared overarching strategy, underpinned by a theory of change, against which choices can be assessed and evaluated has meant that the complex interplay between formal strategy processes and the exigencies of political engagement have rendered the EU's strategic choices riskier than they might otherwise have been. Further, the majority of programmes and projects have been initiated without any political economy analysis or conflict analysis. Thus, while the choice of programmes has been increasingly responsive and relevant, their detailed design has been less so. The absence of a consistent approach to contextual analysis since 2009, the lack of progress in formalising a comprehensive approach and the current remote location of the Delegation seriously hinder the EU's current and future ability to be responsive.

The EU has been seen historically as out of touch with key regional actors and with the political realities of Yemen, but its standing and political influence increased substantially during 2011 and 2012 due to the Head of Delegation's activist diplomacy in helping to secure the GCC initiative. While the EU was well placed to respond to the political opportunity created by the 2011 youth-led protests and the subsequent political crisis, its institutional readiness was constrained. The EU's reliance on formal politics and formal institutions over much of the evaluation period in part explains the lack of expertise on the dynamics of the informal political settlement, while time-consuming procedures and institutional differences between DEVCO and EEAS have meant that development cooperation has struggled to keep pace with political engagement.

Yemeni officials tend to see the EU as being more neutral than MS and other donors, with a clear comparative advantage in support for human rights. The EU is seen regionally as the most trustworthy of the G10 members, and as having played a helpful role in supporting the transition process, the signing of the GCC initiative, and the National Dialogue process. However, some Yemeni activists see the EU's investment in the GCC initiative, which left all the key regime players in place, as privileging short-term stability at the expense of more radical change.

The overall ambition of EU development cooperation, delivered through the project modality, has exceeded the absorptive capacity of Yemeni authorities over the period of the evaluation. The scoping and calibration of the scale and composition of EU cooperation has not been strategically managed for much of the evaluation period. The range of instruments has been used expediently rather than strategically. Greater synergies between the instruments would have aided complementarity and sequencing. The historical model for project design and the recent shift from decentralised management to partial decentralisation and centralisation or joint management is still unfit for purpose. Weak absorption capacity in government departments and agencies through which EU cooperation has been channelled over long periods points to design processes which have not taken sufficient account of a longer-term capacity building perspective.

The deployment and management of human resources have been inadequate to deliver to the EU's strategic objectives in Yemen. Efficiency and effectiveness have been undermined by complexities and inflexibilities of EU development cooperation procedures, insufficient attention to the impact of Yemen's

fragility on staff and programmes, such as the staffing and workload required to build and maintain effective relationships; insufficient investment in evaluation, knowledge management and institutional memory; and the absence of a strategic approach to capacity development and technical assistance. Nonetheless we note the impact of several highly committed individuals in the Delegation who have worked hard to understand local needs, build relevance, satisfy internal demands, overcome EU inconsistencies and achieve coherence. The presence since 2009 of a fully staffed Delegation in Sana'a delivered immediate benefits, allowing the EU to intensify dialogue with the government beyond just projects. The challenge to support active engagement and learning looks more intimidating in the context of current remote management arrangements and the scaling up DEVCO's portfolio.

Conclusions

C1. EU cooperation has contributed to state-building and resilience with some success in a very challenging context, but overall results have been mixed and sustainability has in many instances been weak. Longstanding support in the health sector offers a successful example of state-building work at the local level and has contributed to resilience through access to basic services. EU political engagement was instrumental in mediating Yemen's transition agreement and in supporting the National Dialogue. EU support for social protection and food security has contributed to greater resilience of poor households and to strengthened capacity for delivery, but these achievements have been undermined by aspects of weak programme design and by beneficiary-targeting problems. Support to private sector development has delivered some impact to direct beneficiaries, but links to strategic objectives for economic growth and poverty reduction have been weak and sustainability has been generally poor. Across all sectors, the absence of a strategic approach to capacity development has weakened sustainability. Recent improvements in programme design quality strengthen prospects for results and sustainability, but the deteriorating security situation presents major risks.

C2. Strategy design and its implementation has been weak for much of the period of this evaluation, with limited evidence of shared strategic thinking (within and between DEVCO and the EEAS) to build and manage coherence and be responsive to context. Under the first CSP (2002-06) strategy and programmes were based on unrealistic assumptions and insufficient analysis, while the strategic coherence and consistency of the portfolio was not actively designed or managed. Programmes were not adequately monitored or evaluated, poor performance was not adequately addressed and EU cooperation strategy as a whole has never been independently or rigorously evaluated. Although the quality of strategy improved from 2007, and a much more reflective and responsive strategic stance is evident from 2009, the lag between strategy and programming has meant that many of the weaknesses of strategy implementation under the 2002-06 CSP were carried forward into the second strategy period. The significant improvement in the quality of programming since 2010, with its sharper focus on state-building and resilience, has yet to feed through substantially into strategy implementation.

C3. At both strategy and programming levels there has been a de facto lack of senior management engagement with results and accountability. This has allowed EU cooperation in Yemen to be significantly under-evaluated and has led to a lack of clarity and transparency in the rationale for programming decisions. The absence of a shared understanding and narrative between the Delegation, DEVCO and the EEAS about the strengths, weaknesses and lessons of EU cooperation has undermined effectiveness, impact and sustainability as well as value for money. This country evaluation and the increased number of programme evaluations ongoing or recently completed together signal a revived interest in results; but DEVCO and the EEAS will need to strengthen accountability and learning loops if this is to translate into improved results-based-management of EU cooperation in Yemen.

C4. The EU has not invested sufficiently in contextual analysis and this deficit continues to expose EU cooperation to significant risks. The 2009 McDonald/Khalil study demonstrated the importance and utility of contextual analysis; the study has been influential in guiding strategic thinking and programming since then. However, historically insufficient attention to, and investment in, contextual analysis (including political economy analysis, conflict analysis and fragility assessment), has undermined relevance and responsiveness. In particular, fragility thinking has percolated only slowly into strategy and programming processes. Although the importance of such analysis is now recognised, confusion between DEVCO and EEAS over responsibility for its conduct and inconsistent application across the development cooperation portfolio continues to undermine the EU's ability to be relevant, responsive and effective. The continued

lack of attention to sector- and problem-level analysis presents risks to the relevance and feasibility of the resilience and security sector-reform programmes currently in the pipeline.

C5. When equipped with the basis of a comprehensive strategy, the EU has been more influential, responsive and effective in Yemen. For most of the period of this evaluation – and currently – there has not been a comprehensive strategy that links the political, development and regional dimensions of EU cooperation in Yemen. The 2009 document *Towards a Comprehensive Approach* formed the basis of a coherent strategy, underpinning diplomacy during 2011 and strengthening EU profile, influence and responsiveness. It provided a strong example of emergent strategy in the field of EU political dialogue, much of which remains relevant today – despite the fact that it has not since been updated. Current initiatives could be better framed within the context of such a comprehensive strategy.

C6. EU Co-operation with Yemen has suffered from the institutional disconnects within and between DEVCO and the EEAS and by the well-documented inflexibilities of EU instruments and programming processes and practices that have in general been poorly suited to the particular context of Yemen and the capabilities present there. Despite the priority given to fragile states in the Agenda for Change, Yemen has had a low profile and priority in Brussels. Its isolation within the EU system has inhibited effective oversight, and affected the coherence of the EU's response. Taken together, Yemen's multiple problems – a declining resource base, a growing population, an unstable government and a deteriorating security environment – pose a formidable policy challenge with few easy solutions. Yet this is precisely why sustained high-level engagement in Brussels is necessary.

C7. An effective Delegation is vital to the effectiveness of EU cooperation; its resourcing, location and organisational strength has not been effectively calibrated to the ambitions and realities of EU cooperation in Yemen. The Delegation functions as a network node and is the only piece of the EU institutional jigsaw that is able to understand local needs, build relevance, satisfy internal demands, overcome any EU inconsistencies and achieve coherence. Over the period of this evaluation, the EU has not adequately resourced, directed or supported its Delegation to fulfil this necessary role. Neither has it engaged sufficiently in scenario planning or business continuity planning as part of the strategy formulation process. The EU's reliance on a predominantly international team has exacerbated the negative impacts of insecurity on operations and relationships, more than would have been the case with a stronger and more senior cadre of national staff.

Recommendations

These recommendations are presented as a package and flow in a logical sequence. If the package as a whole is not implemented, then the top three priorities should be, in order, R2, R3 and R6.

R1. The senior management of DEVCO and EEAS should agree and communicate a clear leadership position on the shared priority that they accord to Yemen. This leadership position should clarify expectations with regard to the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive approach by the EU and MS; should include a decision on Yemen's location within EU organisational and funding structures in a manner that better reflects its needs and priority. Recognising the grave implications of Yemen's transition to a post-oil economy within the context of an increasingly polarised Middle East, consideration should be given to putting Yemen under 'special measures' within EU structures, bypassing in the short term the complications inherent in relocating Yemen in the EU's legal framework for cooperation. Senior management should be proactive in following up on progress in delivering to this leadership position.

R2. The senior management of DEVCO and EEAS should require and support the development of a comprehensive strategy for EU and MS in Yemen, consistent with the 2013 Joint Communication on the EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises. In the first instance the Delegation should revisit and update the 2009 recommendations on moving towards a comprehensive EU approach to Yemen. The updated recommendations should include a plan for formulating a comprehensive strategy by 2016, within which there should be greater emphasis on joint programming with MS and other donors. DEVCO and EEAS should actively track progress and achievements against these recommendations through the EAMRs.

R3. The senior management of DEVCO and EEAS should ensure a significantly increased investment in, and use of, contextual analysis and evaluation at national, sector and problem levels. Initially they should provide a clear statement on their shared expectations for contextual analysis and evaluation, clarifying organisational arrangements for the commissioning and use of both. These

arrangements should allow for the outsourcing of contextual analysis studies but should ensure its systematic use by EU officials as an integral part of their respective roles in political engagement and development cooperation. Within the parameters set by senior management, the Delegation should invest further in these areas, building up a body of analysis and evidence to strengthen the relevance, responsiveness and accountability of EU cooperation and to contribute to more sustainable institutional expertise in fragility. The approach should include the pooling of analysis and the conduct of joint evaluations with MS. Where possible, it should seek to draw on and build national capacity for the same. It should also explore the scope for strengthening beneficiary feedback in contextual analysis and evaluation, to better inform analysis and findings and to strengthen downwards accountability.

R4. The Delegation, with the support of EEAS and DEVCO services in Brussels, should develop an organisational strategy to strengthen the Delegation's capability to play its central role in delivering and coordinating EU dialogue, action and support. This should include concrete proposals on the Delegation's interim location pending its return to Sana'a. Co-location in a regional Delegation should be considered, possibly within a GCC member country. The strategy should also include plans for team-building, skills development and knowledge management within the Delegation and with relevant services in Brussels. The approach to knowledge management should recognise Delegation staff knowledge as an institutional resource, and strengthen contact management across the range of political engagement and development cooperation activities. The Delegation should adopt a strategic approach to the recruitment of senior national staff in Yemen (whether in a Sana'a-based Delegation or technical office under a regionally-based Delegation) so that operations and relationships can be managed more consistently even under the kind of conditions which currently prevail. DEVCO and EEAS should actively track progress and achievements against the strategy through the EAMRs, paying particular attention to the adequacy of Delegation resources and capability to deliver to the full range of demands of a comprehensive approach.

R5. The Delegation should develop a set of principles for national capacity development consistent with the New Deal. The principles should inform strategy, programming and ensure that the choice of management arrangements is explicitly framed by state-building considerations, with an emphasis on the evolving dynamics of the political settlement. The principles should require explicit recognition of the trade-offs between long-term state-building considerations and the shorter-term imperative to meet human needs. National capacity development should become a cross-cutting issue for systematic treatment in all Results-Oriented Monitoring missions and in all strategy and programme evaluations. The principles should be endorsed by DEVCO senior management. The Delegation should review the principles and their application as part of country evaluations and strategy mid-term reviews.

The strategy should include: a clear position on the most appropriate mix of international and national Delegation staff; a long-term plan for building capacity in government to facilitate and coordinate EU support; a long-term plan for building capacity in local NGOs to design and manage EU-funded projects, including through partnerships with international NGOs; and explicit treatment of the trade-offs between the exigencies of meeting basic human needs in the short term and building national capacity in the longer term in line with fragile states principles.

R6. Current development programmes, including those under preparation, should each be reviewed for their conflict sensitivity. Where design weaknesses are identified as a result, these should be addressed by mitigation measures in the case of current programmes, or re-design in the case of programmes under preparation. Assessments of conflict sensitivity should include attention to commodity value chains and procurement channels. In order to capture the interaction between project and context, conflict sensitivity should also be built into the monitoring and evaluation arrangements for all development cooperation programmes, drawing on the experience and tools that already exist in global best practice and among EU implementing partners.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY IN ARABIC

الملخص التنفيذي

مقدمة

يعرض هذا التقرير النهائي نتائج تقييم تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي مع اليمن أثناء الفترة من عام 2002 وحتى 2012. تُغطي فترة التقييم أوراق إستراتيجية الدولة (2002-06 و 2007-13) وأربعة من البرامج الإرشادية الوطنية/البرامج الإرشادية متعددة السنوات (2002-04، 2005-06، 2007-10، 2011-13)، وتشمل جميع المجالات الرئيسية لدعم الاتحاد الأوروبي للتنمية (النظام الإداري، والتنمية الاقتصادية، والأمن الغذائي، .. إلخ)، إلى جانب التماسك مع المجالات الأخرى (المساعدات الإنسانية للاتحاد الأوروبي على سبيل المثال). يستكشف هذا التقييم التوجه والأهداف الإستراتيجية العامة للاتحاد الأوروبي، ويُرَكِّز على الارتباط والتفاعل بين الحوار السياسي والتعاون في التنمية مع إيلاء اهتمام خاص للمرونة، والاستجابة، وبناء الدولة في سياق الهشاشة والصراع.

سياق التقييم

جمهورية اليمن هي واحدة من أفقر الدول وأقلها في التنمية من بين العالم العربي. تتألف اليمن من دولة رسمية تتسم بالتعددية السياسية، والانتخابات، والحرية النسبية للصحافة والمجتمع المدني واسع النطاق؛ ودولة غير رسمية تعتمد على المحسوبية وشبكة من التحالفات تربط شيوخ القبائل، والمسؤولين الحكوميين، وأسر الأعمال والقوات المسلحة، إلى جانب المصالح الإقليمية الأوسع نطاقاً. ساهمت هذه العوامل في نشوب النزاع كونها جزءاً رئيسياً من قصة اليمن. ظل التحدي الذي يواجه الحكومة هو إصلاح المؤسسات الحاكمة للدولة من خلال مكافحة الفساد الراسخ والمحسوبية مع الحفاظ على الدعم بين القبائل وشبكات التأثير الأخرى التي اعتادت على العمل داخل نظام المحسوبية، ذلك إلى جانب تناول التحديات الاقتصادية-الاجتماعية الرئيسية مثل ارتفاع معدل نمو السكان، وانخفاض إنتاج وعوائد النفط، وارتفاع درجة الفقر المائي.

نشأ تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي مع اليمن منذ العام 2002 على خلفية التغيرات الرئيسية الكبرى المؤسسية والتنظيمية بالاتحاد الأوروبي ومع تنامي وجود الاتحاد الأوروبي باليمن. يُمثل العام 2011 نقطة تحول لهذا التقييم وتوضح أحداث هذا العام العديد من القضايا الأوسع نطاقاً التي تتضح خلال فترة التقييم: التأثير الذي تمارسه بعض الشخصيات؛ ودور الاتحاد الأوروبي كأحد اللاعبين من بين العديد من الجهات الفاعلة الدولية؛ وهوية الاتحاد الأوروبي كجهة فاعلة متعددة الأطراف؛ والمدى الذي تم تجهيز الاتحاد الأوروبي من خلاله للقيام بدور القيادة والتنسيق الفعال للدول الأعضاء بالاتحاد الأوروبي؛ والعلاقة بين قنوات التأثير الرسمية وغير الرسمية؛ والمقايضات بين أفضل الممارسات والبرامج.

المنهجية

قمنا بتطبيق منهج نظري بالتقييم، باستخدام تحليل منطق التدخل لتوحيد جميع عناصر تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي في إطار عمل واحد يربط العقلانية بالإستراتيجية، والبرامج بالنتائج. تحت كل من عناوين أسئلة التقييم، قدمنا شاهد على المساهمات التي قام بها الاتحاد الأوروبي في اليمن. اعتمد منهجنا على اثنان من اللبنات الأساسية – تحليل الإستراتيجية (ما تم التخطيط له، وما تم تحقيقه). وتحليل للبرامج (المساهمات المحددة لتدخلات الاتحاد الأوروبي على الأرض). لم يتم تكوين البعثة الميدانية إلى اليمن بسبب الوضع الأمني السائد في اليمن في العام 2014. ومع ذلك، ففي يونيو، وبوليو، وأغسطس استطاع الفريق القيام بمقابلات شخصية وجهاً لوجه ومن خلال الهاتف مع مجموعة عريضة من المراسلين الرئيسيين بما يشمل بعض موظفي الاتحاد الأوروبي، وكبار المسؤولين الحكوميين اليمنيين، وممثلي الدول الأعضاء، والوكالات الدولية الأخرى، والمجتمع المدني، والأفراد ذوي المعرفة والإطلاع. كان التحدي الدائم هو ضعف انتباه الاتحاد الأوروبي المستمر تجاه المراقبة والتقييم، مع عدم تقديم سوى صلاحية وصول محدودة للمصادر الثانوية من أدلة الأداء والإنجاز للبرامج الممولة من الاتحاد الأوروبي.

ملخص الإجابات

اتسقت الخيارات الإستراتيجية للاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن إستراتيجية التعاون في التنمية مع الإستراتيجيات والسياسات الرسمية لحكومة اليمن. ومع ذلك، لم تكن المزايا النسبية للاتحاد الأوروبي ظاهرة في هذه الخيارات؛ كما أدى وجود عدد من نقاط الضعف مستمرة إلى تفويض الأولويات والحاجات الوطنية. شمل ذلك مشاركة محدودة مع المستفيدين المستهدفين، مما أدى للحد من فهم الاتحاد الأوروبي للتسوية السياسية الأساسية، وعدم وجود تحليل سياقي على الأصعدة الوطنية، والقطاعية، وعلى صعيد المشكلات. شاركت هذه العوامل معاً في تسهيل الاعتماد المستمر على افتراضات غير واقعية بشأن قدرات ونوايا الإصلاح لحكومة اليمن وكيف من شأن هذه البرامج المساهمة في الأهداف الإستراتيجية والوطنية الأكبر. على الرغم من توصيات عام 2009 **تجاه منهج شامل للاتحاد الأوروبي تجاه اليمن**، فلا يزال لا توجد إستراتيجية شاملة تعزز اتخاذ القرار بالاتحاد الأوروبي؛ وبالطبع لا يوجد أي إجماع في DEVCO و EEAS بشأن ما إذا كان الاتحاد الأوروبي بحاجة لهذه الإستراتيجية.

تطور تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي بما يتوافق مع سياسات التنمية ولوائح المجالس المعاصرة بالاتحاد الأوروبي، ولكن كان اتساق السياسات في الممارسة ضعيفاً. ارتبط ذلك إلى حد كبير بنقاط الضعف العامة في تماسك سياسة الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن الأمن، والضعف، والتنمية، وتجاه الوضع الغامض تجاه اليمن في تغيير الترتيبات الهيكلية والتنظيمية لسياسة الاتحاد الأوروبي خلال فترة التقييم. كان لذلك تأثير مستمر على النمط والرؤية، مما منع الوصول إلى قنوات التمويل الرئيسية، ومنع التخطيط الإستراتيجي،

وساهم في ضعف إدارة الملف. صيغت جميع أوراق إستراتيجية الدولة بالتشاور الوثيق مع الدول الأعضاء الذين قدروا جهود الاتحاد الأوروبي لتشجيع التعاون في القطاعات المحورية. ومع ذلك، ظل تنسيق الجهات المانحة بصفة عامة ضعيفاً، ذلك بالرغم من التحسن التدريجي لتنسيق الحوار السياسي والدبلوماسية منذ العام 2009. بينما لا توجد إستراتيجية شاملة للاتحاد الأوروبي، إلا أن التركيز الزائد مؤخراً على وضع البرامج على نحو مشترك يشير إلى إيلاء انتباه أكبر لهذا المبدأ في جدول أعمال التغيير، وإن كانت التجارب المبكرة على مرونة البرامج قد ثبتت مواجهتها للتحديات.

منذ الاتفاق على مبادئ OECD-DAC للدول الضعيفة في عام 2007، ساهم تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي في أهداف بناء الدولة ولكن لم يعزز أو يدعم عمليات بناء الدولة بصورة متماسكة ومتسقة فيما يتعلق بالمعايير الدولية. لم يكن التعاون الإنمائي قبل عام 2009 في إطار إستراتيجية بناء الدولة الشاملة وكان فقط في دعم قطاع الصحة بحيث كان منهج بناء الدولة والنتائج واضحين للغاية. اتسقت توصيات 2009 **تجاه منهج شامل للاتحاد الأوروبي تجاه اليمن** مع المعايير الدولية واعترفت بالعلاقة الحيوية بين الحوار السياسي والتعاون الإنمائي. وكانت العوامل الداعمة لتعزيز ودعم الاتحاد الأوروبي لبناء الدولة تدريجية على الرغم من الفترة غير الرسمية لهشاشة التفكير لاستخراج عمليات وبرامج إستراتيجية؛ والتزام وإصرار العاملين في وفد صنعاء في البحث عن تناول ضعف اليمن؛ والقيادة التي تقدمها رئاسة الوفد خلال الأزمة بالفترة من 2009 وحتى 2011. ومثلت عوامل الإعاقة المتعلقة بالضعف المستمر في التماسك التنظيمي بشأن الأمن، والضعف، والتنمية في إطار وبين DEVCO و EEAS؛ وتجاه وجهات النظر المتنازع عليها بين الاتحاد الأوروبي على المسؤوليات عن، والاستعانة بـ، تحليل الاقتصاد السياسي.

كان للاتحاد الأوروبي نفسه تقييم "المرونة المجموعة" بعد تحقيق تأثير محدود ومع ضعف الاستدامة. أصبحت المرونة كمفهوم رسمي مسيطر على خطط التعاون بشأن التنمية المستقبلية في اليمن، ولكنه لم يصل رسمياً إلى إستراتيجية وبرامج الاتحاد الأوروبي سوى في وقت متأخر للغاية وجاءت على نحو فجائي تماماً. سعى الاتحاد الأوروبي بنشاط لتنسيق تدخلات ومحاورات تحسين المرونة مع الدول الأعضاء، والتي تمثلها حالياً البرامج المشتركة لتدخلات المرونة. ومع ذلك، تم التقليل من شأن المجموعة التاريخية للتدخلات المعززة للمرونة؛ وبالكاد تم تقييم 54 مليون يورو من الدعم للأمن الغذائي في الفترة بين 2002 و 2012. كما كانت محاولات وضع تفاهم ومفاهيم مشتركة للأسباب الجذرية للهشاشة والضعف محدودة وقصيرة الحياة. يعني استمرار عدم منح الاهتمام الكافي لتحليل الاقتصاد السياسي على مستويات القطاعات ومستويات المشكلات بأن تدخلات المرونة غير مصممة عن فهم لسلاسل قيم السلع. كما لا يوجد دليل واضح على إتباع منهج منظم للتنسيق مع DG ECHO وعلاج مبادئ LRRD أثناء تلك الفترة، بالرغم من وجود بعض أمثلة الممارسات الجيدة والتنسيق الذي تحسن بشكل ملحوظ بمجرد فتح كلا منهما لمكاتب لهم في صنعاء.

عززت مشاركة الاتحاد الأوروبي مع الجهات الفاعلة الإقليمية والمانحين التعاون في اليمن، ولكن كانت هناك حاجة لتعميق المشاركة مع المملكة العربية السعودية على نحو أكبر. حدد الاتحاد الأوروبي دول الخليج كمحاورين ذوي أهمية باليمن في بداية فترة التقييم، وبخاصة المملكة العربية السعودية. ومع ذلك، فتبني مشاركة أكثر فعالية للاتحاد الأوروبي قد استغرقت قرابة العقد من الزمن، وذلك بالتوازي مع جهود التنسيق من الدول الأعضاء. فيما شكل الاتصال المنتظم بين الاتحاد الأوروبي والدول الأعضاء ومسؤولي الخليج أثناء عام 2010 الأساس لحوار سياسي أكثر وضوحاً في العام التالي، مما أدى إلى ظهور الدور الحيوي لدول مجلس التعاون الخليجي في الوساطة باتفاقية تحول اليمن بدعم من الأمم المتحدة، والولايات المتحدة، والاتحاد الأوروبي، والدول الأعضاء، وتجاه الإنشاء اللاحق لـ MAF. جاءت حقيقة أن دول اليمن والخليج تُدار معاً في EEAS كمُساعدة للمشاركة السياسية الإقليمية للاتحاد الأوروبي، ولكن لأسباب واضحة لم يكن لدى DEVCO برامج مُساعدات في منطقة الخليج. تُدار تعهدات الدبلوماسية والمساعدات بالعمل من خلال القنوات الرسمية، مثل أصدقاء اليمن، بالتوازي مع شبكات كبيرة من المحسوبة العابرة للحدود والتي ينخفض أو ينعقد تدخل الاتحاد الأوروبي بها. لا بد وأن تكون التفضيلات السعودية المُرجحة أمراً مركزياً لأي تحليل مستقبلي للاتحاد الأوروبي يتعلق بالمرونة وبناء الدولة، في سياق تحول اليمن إلى اقتصاد ما بعد النفط. وفي ضوء الموقف الديناميكي الحالي في اليمن، يظل من غير الواضح ما إذا كان الاتحاد الأوروبي يُعول مؤخراً على إمكانية الحفاظ على بناء الدولة.

كان علاج القضايا الشاملة (مثل الجنس، والبيئة، والمجتمع المدني) غير مكتملاً، مع اتخاذ بعض الإجراءات المحددة الخاصة ولكن تنخفض أدلة التعميم أو المساهمة للنتائج. بينما يمكن للاتحاد الأوروبي الادعاء ببعض النجاح فيما يتعلق بإجراءات محددة للجنسين، إلا أنه يفتقر لآليات التعاون الرسمية أو التعاون المنظم بشأن الجنس في اليمن. بينما سيطرت القضايا البيئية على الإستراتيجية، لم يتم برمجة أنشطة بيئية محددة وليس هناك دليل على نهج تعميمي. تلقى المجتمع المدني اهتمام بارز خلال فترة التقييم، وبصفة خاصة فيما يتعلق بتعزيز الحكم الرشيد، والديمقراطية، وحقوق الإنسان، ولكن لم يتم توفير هذا الدعم في إطار عمل إستراتيجية أكبر للتنمية القدرات الوطنية بما يتماشى مع مبادئ الدول الضعيفة. كما يُتاح التوجيه والدعم من DEVCO في بروكسل بشأن الجوانب الفنية لـ CCI من القطاعات الفنية ذات الصلة، ولكن يميل استخدامه بشكل أكبر تجاه الامتثال الإجرائي عن إضافة القيمة. أصبحت الأمم المتحدة مُدافعة نشطة عن قضايا حقوق الإنسان، والتي تسيطر عليها قضايا الجنس ومشاركة المجتمع المدني، وبصفة خاصة أثناء عملية الحوار الوطني. ومع ذلك، ومن حيث النتائج العامة، تحتل اليمن المرتبة الدنيا من بين 136 دولة في التقرير العالمي للفجوة بين الجنسين لعام 2013، بينما لم يكن الدعم المقدم للمجتمع المدني كاف إستراتيجياً، أو متسق أو متماسك للمساهمة على النحو الكاف لبناء الدولة.

تحسنت الاستجابة بدرجة كبيرة بوجود وفد كامل في صنعاء، وذلك بسبب الاستثمار في التحليل السياقي من خلال روح المبادرة لدى الوفد بإتباع منهج شامل. كان عام 2009 عام تحول – تنبأت دراسة ماكدونالد/خليل بعدم استقرار نظام الحكم والبرامج الإرشادية متعددة السنوات اللاحقة التي تبنت التوصيات ذات الصلة؛ كما وفرت توصيات عام 2009 تجاه منهج شامل للاتحاد

الأوروبي تجاه اليمن تفويض صريح للاتحاد الأوروبي بتعميق مشاركته السياسية والتعاون الإنمائي للتركيز على الاحتياجات الأساسية التي من شأنها أن تكون أكثر ارتباطاً أثناء الأزمة الحادة. ومع ذلك، وخلال معظم فترة التقييم هذه، ظهر غياب الإستراتيجية الواضحة المشتركة، إلى جانب دعم نظرية التغيير، أمام الخيارات التي يمكن تقييمها مما أدى إلى تعقيد التعاون بين عمليات الإستراتيجية الرسمية وضرورات المشاركة السياسية التي قدمت خيارات إستراتيجية للاتحاد الأوروبي أكثر مخاطرة عما كانت لتكون عليه بخلاف ذلك. علاوة على ذلك، بدأت غالبية البرامج والمشروعات بدون أي تحليل اقتصادي سياسي أو تحليل للنزاعات. ومن ثم، بينما كان اختيار البرامج ذو استجابة وصلة بصورة متزايدة، إلا أن تصميمها المفصل كان أقل من ذلك. كما أن غياب النهج المتسق للتحليل السياقي منذ العام 2009، والافتقار إلى التقدم في إضفاء الطابع الرسمي على المنهج الشامل والموقع الحالي البعيد للوفد أدى إلى الإعاقة الشديدة لقدرة الاتحاد الأوروبي الحالية والمستقبلية على الاستجابة.

كان يتم النظر إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي تاريخياً أنه فقد الصلة مع جهات فاعلة إقليمية ذات حقائق سياسية تجاه اليمن، ولكن تزايد مكانته ونفوذه السياسي بشدة أثناء عام 2011 و 2012 بسبب دبلوماسية ناشطي رؤساء الوفد في المساعدة لتأمين مبادرة دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي. بينما كان الاتحاد الأوروبي في وضع الاستجابة للفرصة السياسية التي خلقها المتظاهرون بقيادة الشباب عام 2011 والأزمة السياسية اللاحقة لذلك، تقيد استعداده المؤسسي. كما يوضح اعتماد الاتحاد الأوروبي الكبير على السياسات الرسمية والمؤسسات الرسمية جزئياً الافتقار إلى الخبرة بشأن ديناميكيات التسوية السياسية، بينما تعني الإجراءات المستهلكة للوقت والسلوكيات المؤسسية الراسخة أن التعاون من أجل التنمية قد كافح للحفاظ على وتيرته بشأن المشاركة السياسية.

يميل المسؤولون اليمنيون للنظر إلى الاتحاد الأوروبي بأنه أكثر حياداً عن الدول الأعضاء والجهات المانحة الأخرى، مع ميزة نسبية واضحة في دعم حقوق الإنسان. فيما يعتبر الاتحاد الأوروبي إقليمياً من أكثر دول G10 الجديرة بالثقة، ذلك حيث أنه لعب دوراً مفيداً في دعم عملية التحول، وتوقيع مبادرة دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي، وعملية الحوار الوطني. ومع ذلك، يرى بعض النشطاء اليمنيون بأن استثمار الاتحاد الأوروبي في مبادرة دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي، والتي خلفت جميع لاعبي النظام في أماكنهم، لتفضيل الاستقرار على المدى القريب على حساب المزيد من التغيير الجذري.

تجاوز الطموح العام للتعاون الإنمائي للاتحاد الأوروبي، والمُقدم من خلال نمذجة المشاريع، باستمرار القدرة الامتصاصية للسلطات اليمنية خلال فترة التقييم. لم تتم إدارة الفحص والمُعيرة لنطاق وتكوين تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي إستراتيجياً لغالب فترة التقييم. وتم استخدام نطاق الأدوات على نحو عاجل وليس إستراتيجي. وقد ساعدت عمليات التأزر الأكبر بين الأدوات على التكامل والتسلسل. لا يزال النموذج التاريخي لتصميم المشروعات والتحول الأخير من الإدارة الغير المركزية إلى الإدارة الغير المركزية جزئياً والمركزية أو الإدارة المشتركة غير مناسباً لهذا الغرض. استمرار ضعف نقاط قدرة حكومة اليمن على الامتصاص تجاه عمليات التصميم التي لم تؤخذ في الحسبان على نحو كاف في إطار منظور بناء القدرات على المدى الطويل.

لم يكن نشر وإدارة الموارد البشرية كافياً لتقديم الأهداف الإستراتيجية للاتحاد الأوروبي في اليمن. تم تفويض الكفاءة والفعالية بالتعقيدات وانعدام المرونة لإجراءات التعاون الإنمائية للاتحاد الأوروبي، وعدم كفاية الانتباه لتأثير ضعف اليمن على فريق العمل والبرامج، مثل تعيين فريق العمل وتعيين عبء العمل المطلوب لبناء والحفاظ على العلاقات الفعالة؛ وعدم كفاية الاستثمار في التقييم، وإدارة المعرفة والذاكرة المؤسسية؛ وغياب المنهج الإستراتيجي لتنمية القدرات والمساعدة الفنية. ومع ذلك نلاحظ تأثير العديد من الأفراد الملزمين للغاية في الوفد والذين عملوا بجد لفهم الاحتياجات المحلية، وبناء الملائمة، والوفاء بالطلبات الداخلية، والتغلب على تناقضات الاتحاد الأوروبي، وتحقيق التماسك. وفر وجود وفد كامل في صنعاء منذ عام 2009 مزايا فورية، مما سمح للاتحاد الأوروبي بتكثيف الحوار مع الحكومة بما يتجاوز فقط المشروعات. كما بدا تحدي دعم المشاركة النشطة والتعلم أكبر تأثيراً في سياق ترتيبات الإدارة الحالية عن بعد وتوسيع نطاق مجموعة DEVCO.

الاستنتاجات

C1. ساهم تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي في بناء الدولة والمرونة مع بعض النجاح في السياقات الصعبة للغاية، ولكن اختلقت النتائج العامة وكانت الاستدامة ضعيفة في العديد من الحالات. وفر الدعم طويل الأمد في قطاع الصحة نموذجاً ناجحاً لأعمال بناء الدولة على المستوى المحلي وساهم في المرونة من خلال الوصول إلى الخدمات الأساسية. كان للمشاركة السياسية للاتحاد الأوروبي دور أساسي في الوساطة باتفاقية تحول اليمن وفي دعم الحوار الوطني. كما ساهم دعم الاتحاد الأوروبي للحماية الاجتماعية والأمن الغذائي في مرونة أكبر للأسر الفقيرة وعزز من قدرات التقديم، ولكن تم تفويض هذه الإنجازات بسبب جوانب ضعف تصميم البرنامج ومن خلال المشكلات التي تستهدف المستفيدين. وفر الدعم لتنمية القطاع الخاص بعض التأثير للمستفيدين المباشرين، ولكن كانت ارتباطاته بالأهداف الإستراتيجية للنمو الاقتصادي وتخفيض الفقر ضعيفة وكانت الاستدامة ضعيفة بصفة عامة. ومن بين جميع القطاعات، أدى غياب المنهج الإستراتيجي في تنمية القدرات، والمتجسد في المنهج غير المتسق في الترتيبات الإدارية، إلى ضعف الاستدامة. عززت التحسينات الأخيرة في جودة تصميم البرامج في آفاق النتائج والاستدامة، ولكن مثل تدهور الوضع الأمني مخاطر كبرى.

C2. كان تصميم الإستراتيجية وتنفيذها ضعيفاً لفترة كبيرة من فترة هذا التقييم، مع وجود أدلة محدودة على مشاركة التفكير الإستراتيجي (في وبين DEVCO و EEAS) لبناء وإدارة التماسك والاستجابة للمحتوى. تحت أول أوراق إستراتيجية الدولة (2002-06) اعتمدت الإستراتيجية والبرامج على افتراضات غير واقعية وتحليل غير كاف، بينما لم يكن التماسك الإستراتيجي والاتساق في المجموعة مصمماً أو مُداراً بفعالية. لم تتم المراقبة أو التقييم الكاف للبرامج، ولكن يتم تناول ضعف الأداء على النحو الكاف، كما لم يتم تقييم إستراتيجية تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي ككل على نحو كاف أو صارم. وبالرغم من تحسن

جودة الإستراتيجية من العام 2007، ومع ظهور موقف إستراتيجي أكثر تعبيراً واستجابة منذ العام 2009، يعني الفارق بين الإستراتيجية والبرامج وجود العديد من نقاط الضعف في تنفيذ الإستراتيجية وفقاً لأوراق إستراتيجية الدولة 2002-2006 والتي تم ترحيلها لفترة الإستراتيجية الثانية. كما لم يكن للتحسن الكبير في جودة البرامج منذ العام 2010، مع التركيز الأكبر على بناء الدولة والمرونة، أي تغذية كبيرة في تنفيذ الإستراتيجية.

C3. على كلاً من مستويات الإستراتيجية والبرامج كان هناك افتقار واقعي لمشاركة الإدارة العليا مع النتائج والمحاسبة. سمح ذلك بخفض تقييم تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي في اليمن بشدة مما أدى إلى الافتقار إلى الشفافية والوضوح في الأساس المنطقي لقرارات البرامج. ومع غياب التفاهم المشترك والسردي بين الوفد، و DEVCO و EEAS بشأن نقاط القوة ونقاط الضعف والدروس المستفادة من تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي أدى ذلك إلى تقويض الفعالية، والتأثير، والاستدامة، إلى جانب قيمة المال. لذا أشار تقييمي الدولة هذا وتزايد عدد تقييمات البرامج الجارية أو التي تم إتمامها إلى إحياء الاهتمام بالنتائج؛ ولكن ستحتاج DEVCO و EEAS لتعزيز المحاسبة وحلقات التعلم إذا كان سيتم ترجمة ذلك إلى الإدارة المحسنة التي تعتمد على النتائج لتعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي باليمن.

C4. لم يستثمر الاتحاد الأوروبي على النحو الكافي في التحليل السياقي واستمر هذا العجز في تعريض تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى مخاطر كبرى. أثبتت دراسة مكدونالد/خليل لعام 2009 أهمية وفائدة التحليل السياقي؛ كانت الدراسة ذات تأثير في توجيه التفكير الإستراتيجي والبرامج منذ ذلك الحين. ومع ذلك، فمع عدم كفاية الاهتمام التاريخي والاستثمار في التحليل السياقي (بما يشمل تحليل الاقتصاد السياسي، وتحليل النزاعات، وتقييم الضعف)، أدى ذلك إلى تقويض الملائمة والاستجابة. وبصفة خاصة، لم ينتشر التفكير بالضعف سوى على نحو بطيء للغاية في عمليات الإستراتيجية والبرامج. وبالرغم من الإعراف بأهمية مثل هذا التحليل الآن، إلا أن الارتباك بين DEVCO و EEAS بشأن المسؤولية عن السلوك والتطبيق غير المناسب في مجموعة تعاون التنمية يستمر في تقويض قدرة الاتحاد الأوروبي بأن يكون ملائماً، ومستجيباً، وفعالاً. ومع استمرار الافتقار إلى الانتباه للتحليل على مستوى القطاعات والقضايا يمثل خطراً على الملائمة وقابلية التنفيذ لبرامج إصلاح قطاعات المرونة والأمن الجارية حالياً.

C5. عند تجهيزه بأساس الإستراتيجية الشاملة، كان للاتحاد الأوروبي دوراً أكثر تأثيراً، واستجابة، وفعالية باليمن. بالنسبة لمعظم فترة هذا التقييم – وحالياً – لم تكن هناك إستراتيجية شاملة تربط الأبعاد السياسية، والتنمية، والأبعاد الإقليمية لتعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي باليمن. كما شكلت وثيقة عام 2009 **تجاه منهج شامل** أساساً لإستراتيجية متماسكة، مما يدعم الدبلوماسية أثناء العام 2011 ويعزز من نمط الاتحاد الأوروبي، وتأثيره، واستجابته. كما وفر مثلاً قوياً على الإستراتيجية الناشئة في ميدان الحوار السياسي للاتحاد الأوروبي، والتي يظل أغلبها ملائماً اليوم – بالرغم من حقيقة أنها ليست كذلك منذ تحديثها. يُمكن تأطير المبادرات الحالية في الإطار السياقي لإستراتيجية شاملة مماثلة.

C6. واجه تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي مع اليمن صعوبات جراء عدم ترابط المؤسسات في وبين DEVCO و EEAS ومن انعدام المرونة الموثق لعمليات وممارسات أدوات وبرامج الاتحاد الأوروبي والتي يضعف تناسبها بصفة عامة تجاه سياق اليمن المحدد والقدرات الموجودة هناك. بالرغم من منح الأولوية للدول الضعيفة في جدول أعمال التغيير، كان لليمن اهتمام وأولوية منخفضة في بروكسل. فأنعزلها في إطار نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي قد حد باستمرار من الرقابة الفعالة، وأثر على التماسك والاتساق لاستجابة الاتحاد الأوروبي. وبالنظر لجميع مشكلات اليمن المتعددة معاً – انخفاض قاعدة الموارد، وتزايد السكان، وعدم استقرار الحكومة، وتدهور البيئة الأمنية – يمثل ذلك تحدي سياسي هائل مع محدودية الحلول السهلة. وهذا هو بالضبط سبب ضرورة المشاركة العالية المستوى في بروكسل.

C7. الوفد الفعال أمر حيوي لفعالية تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي؛ حيث لم تتم المعايرة الفعالة لاستقطابه للموارد، وتحديد نقاط قوة الموقع والتنظيم تجاه طموحات وحقائق تعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي باليمن. يعمل الوفد كنقطة اللقاء الشبكات وهو الجزء الوحيد من البانوراما المؤسسية للاتحاد الأوروبي والتي تستطيع فهم الاحتياجات المحلية، وبناء الملائمة، والوفاء بالطلبات الداخلية، والتغلب على التناقضات وتحقيق التماسك. خلال فترة هذا التقييم، لم يوفر الاتحاد الأوروبي الموارد الكافية، أو التوجيه، أو الدعم للوفد الخاص به للوفاء بدوره الضروري. ولم يُشارك على النحو الكافي في تخطيط السيناريو أو تخطيط استمرار الأعمال كجزء من عملية تشكيل الإستراتيجية. نتج عن اعتماد الاتحاد الأوروبي على الفريق الدولي المُسيطر تأثيرات سلبية من انعدام الأمن في العمليات والعلاقات، بصورة أكبر بكثير عما كانت لتكون عليه في حالة الكادر الأقوى والأكبر من العاملين الوطنيين.

التوصيات

تم عرض هذه التوصيات كحزمة وتدفع للتسلسل المنطقي. وإذا لم يتم تنفيذ الحزمة ككل، فعندها يجب أن تكون الأولويات الثلاثة الرئيسية هي R2، و R3، و R6.

R1. على الإدارة العليا لـ DEVCO و EEAS الاتفاق والتواصل بشأن وضع قيادة واضحة على الأولوية المشتركة الممنوحة لليمن. يجب أن يوضح موقف القيادة التوقعات بشأن صياغة وتنفيذ منهج شامل من خلال الاتحاد الأوروبي والدول الأعضاء؛ وأن يشمل قرار بشأن موقع اليمن في الهياكل التنظيمية والتمويلية للاتحاد الأوروبي بطريقة تعكس احتياجاته وأولوياته على نحو أفضل. وبالإعتراف بالآثار الخطيرة لتحول اليمن إلى اقتصاد ما بعد النفط في سياق زيادة استقطاب الشرق الأوسط، يجب أن يولي اهتمام خاص لوضع اليمن تحت "تدابير خاصة" في هياكل الاتحاد الأوروبي، لتجاوز التعقيدات المتأصلة في نقل

اليمن في إطار العمل القانوني للتعاون للاتحاد الأوروبي على المدى القصير. ويجب أن تكون لدى الإدارة العليا روح المبادرة في متابعة التقدم للوصول إلى هذا الوضع القيادي.

R2. على الإدارة العليا لـ DEVCO و EEAS طلب ودعم وضع إستراتيجية شاملة للاتحاد الأوروبي والدول الأعضاء باليمن، بما يتوافق مع الاتصالات المشتركة لعام 2013 بشأن منهج شامل للاتحاد الأوروبي تجاه النزاعات والالتزامات الخارجية. في أول فرصة على الوفد إعادة الزيارة وتحديث توصيات عام 2009 بشأن الحركة تجاه منهج شامل للاتحاد الأوروبي تجاه اليمن. ويجب أن تشمل التوصيات المُحدثة خطة لصياغة إستراتيجية شاملة بحلول العام 2016، والتي يجب أن يكون بها تركيز أكبر على وضع البرامج المشتركة بين الدول الأعضاء والجهات المانحة الأخرى. كما يجب على الإدارة العليا لـ DEVCO و EEAS العمل بفعالية لمتابعة التقدم والإنجازات مقابل التوصيات من خلال EAMR.

R3. على الإدارة العليا في DEVCO و EEAS ضمان زيادة كبيرة في الاستثمار في، واستخدام التحليل السياقي والتقييم على المستويات الوطنية، والقطاعية، وعلى مستوى المشكلات. في البداية عليهم توفير بيان واضح بشأن توقعاتهم المشتركة للتحليل السياقي والتقييم، وذلك لتوضيح الترتيبات التنظيمية لتعيين واستخدام كليهما. كما لا بد وأن تسمح هذه الترتيبات بالاستعانة بمصادر خارجية للدراسات التحليلية وعليها ضمان استخدامها المنهجي من مسؤولي الاتحاد الأوروبي كجزء لا يتجزأ من أدوارهم ذات الصلة في المشاركة السياسية وتعاون التنمية. في إطار العوامل المحددة من الإدارة العليا، على الوفد الاستثمار بشكل أكبر في هذه المجالات، لبناء مجموعة من التحليلات والأدلة لتعزيز الملائمة، والاستجابة، والمساءلة لتعاون الاتحاد الأوروبي والمساهمة بخبرات مؤسسية أكثر استدامة لحالات الضعف. كما لا بد وأن يشمل المنهج مجموعة من التحليلات مع إجراء تقييمات مشتركة مع الدول الأعضاء عند الإمكان، كما يجب أن تسعى إلى اجتذاب وبناء القدرات الوطنية لذلك. كما يجب أيضاً اكتشاف نطاق تعزيز ملاحظات المستفيدين في التحليل السياقي والتقييم، وذلك للوصول إلى تحليل ونتائج أفضل، ولتعزيز الآليات والعمليات لمساءلة أكبر.

R4. على الوفد بدعم من خدمات EEAS و DEVCO في بروكسل، وضع إستراتيجية تنظيمية لتعزيز قدرات الوفد على أداء دوره المركزي في تقديم وتنسيق حوار، وعمل، ودعم الاتحاد الأوروبي. لا بد وأن يشمل ذلك عروض متناغمة بشأن موقع الوفد المؤقت في انتظار عودته إلى صنعاء. كما يجب وضع الموقع المشترك للوفد الإقليمي في الحسبان، ربما من خلال الدول الأعضاء بمجلس التعاون الخليجي. كما لا بد وأن تشمل الإستراتيجية أيضاً خطط لبناء القدرات، وتطوير المهارات، وإدارة المعرفة في إطار الوفد ومع الخدمات ذات الصلة في بروكسل. كما يجب على منهج إدارة المعرفة إدراك معرفة فريق عمل الوفد كمورد مؤسسية، مع تعزيز إدارة الاتصال في نطاق المشاركات السياسية وأنشطة التعاون بالتنمية. على الوفد تبني منهج أكثر إستراتيجية لتعيين كبار العاملين الوطنيين في اليمن (سواءً في الوفد بصنعاء أو في المكتب الفني التابع للوفد الإقليمي) بحيث يمكن إدارة العمليات والعلاقات على نحو أكثر اتساقاً في ظل مجموعة من الحالات السائدة حالياً. كما يجب على الإدارة العليا في DEVCO و EEAS العمل بفعالية لمتابعة التقدم والإنجازات مقابل الإستراتيجية من خلال EAMR، مع إيلاء انتباه خاص لكفاية موارد الوفد وقدراته على تقديم مجموعة كاملة من الطلبات لمنهج شامل.

R5. على الوفد وضع مجموعة من المبادئ لتنمية القدرات الوطنية بما يتسق مع الصيغة الجديدة. لا بد وأن تحدد المبادئ الإستراتيجية، والبرامج وتضمن تأطير اختيار ترتيبات الإدارة على نحو صريح باعتبارات بناء الدولة، مع التركيز على الديناميات المتطورة للتسوية السياسية. لا بد وأن تتطلب المبادئ اعتراف صريح بالمقايضات بين اعتبارات بناء الدولة على المستوى البعيد وواجب الوفاء بالاحتياجات البشرية على المدى القصير. كما لا بد وأن يصبح بناء القدرات الوطنية قضية شاملة للعلاج المنهجي في جميع بعثات المراقبة التي تُركز على النتائج وفي جميع تقييمات الإستراتيجية والبرامج. كما يجب تأييد هذه المبادئ من الإدارة العليا لـ DEVCO. وعلى الوفد مراجعة المبادئ وتطبيقها كجزء من تقييمات الدولة ومراجعات الإستراتيجية على المدى المتوسط.

لا بد وأن تشمل الإستراتيجية: موقف واضح بشأن معظم الخليل المناسب للعاملين الوطنيين والدوليين بالوفد؛ وخطة طويلة الأجل لبناء القدرات في الحكومة لتسهيل وتنسيق دعم الاتحاد الأوروبي؛ وخطة طويلة الأجل لبناء القدرات في المنظمات المحلية غير الحكومية لتصميم وإدارة المشروعات الممولة من الاتحاد الأوروبي بما يشمل القيام بذلك من خلال الشراكات مع المنظمات الدولية غير الحكومية؛ والعلاج الصريح للمقايضات بين ضرورات الوفاء بالاحتياجات البشرية الأساسية على المدى القصير وبناء القدرات الوطنية على المدى الأطول بما يتماشى مع مبادئ الدول الضعيفة.

برامج التنمية الحالية، بما يشمل تلك قيد الإعداد، لا بد من مراجعتها مقابل حساسيتها تجاه الصراع. عند تحديد وجود نقاط ضعف في التصميم كنتيجة لذلك، يجب مواجهة ذلك من خلال تدابير التخفيف في حالة البرامج الحالية، أو إعادة التصميم في حالة البرامج قيد الإعداد. لا بد وأن تشمل تقييمات حساسية النزاع الانتباه تجاه سلاسل القيمة السلعية وقنوات التوريد. ومن أجل الإطلاع على التفاعل بين المشروع والسياق، يجب أيضاً أن تتبني حساسية النزاع على ترتيبات المراقبة والتقييم لجميع برامج تعاون التنمية، بالاعتماد على الخبرات والأدوات الموجودة بالفعل في أفضل الممارسات العالمية بين شركاء الاتحاد الأوروبي في التنفيذ.

التقرير الرسمي المُعتمد هي الإصدار باللغة الإنجليزية.

1. INTRODUCTION

This Final Report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation of the European Union (EU)'s cooperation with Yemen covering the period 2002 to 2012. The evaluation was commissioned by the Evaluation Unit of the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), hereafter referred to as the Evaluation Unit. The Evaluation Unit is responsible for the management and supervision of the evaluation. The Evaluation Manager chairs the process of the evaluation that is closely followed by a Reference Group (RG) comprising members of concerned services in the Commission and European External Action Service (EEAS), as well as the EU Delegation in Yemen (hereafter referred to as the Delegation). The Embassy of Yemen in Belgium has observer status on the Reference Group.

1.1. Mandate and scope of the evaluation

The Terms of Reference (ToR) specify two objectives for the evaluation:

- To provide the relevant external cooperation services of the European Union and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the European Union's past and current cooperation and partnership relations with Yemen.
- To identify key lessons and to provide recommendations in order to improve the current and future strategies, programmes and actions of the European Union.

The evaluand is 'EU cooperation strategy and implementation with Yemen, 2002-2012', encompassing development cooperation, political engagement and the interface with humanitarian assistance. The emphasis of the evaluation, then, is not only on the relevance, effectiveness and results of individual EU actions, but also on linkages and interplay between these actions. The non-spending activities (political and policy dialogue) are important because of the influence and leverage they give to the aid programme as a whole. Since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the subsequent establishment of the EEAS in July 2010, the 'whole-of-EU' approach entails a common foreign and security policy. Although the evaluation formally covers the period 2002-2012, our analysis incorporates more recent events that illustrate broader themes running throughout the evaluation period.

1.2. An overview of the evaluation process

The evaluation is structured following DEVCO Evaluation Guidelines, with desk, field and synthesis phases. Due to security situation prevailing in 2014 a remote field phase was conducted in place of a field mission. This involved more than 70 interviews, face-to-face with EU officials in Brussels (including Delegation staff) and by telephone with Yemeni and other stakeholders.

At each key stage of the evaluation – Inception, Desk Report, Field phase debriefing and Final Draft Report – key findings were presented to the RG in Brussels. This final report responds to written RG comments on the draft final report, further comments received following a presentation and discussion of the draft final report in Brussels in October 2014, and a final round of comments from stakeholders based in Yemen.

1.3. Evaluation questions

The evaluation was designed to answer ten Evaluation Questions (EQs) that are pitched very much at the strategic aspects of the EU's cooperation with Yemen (see Table 1). A more detailed elaboration of the evaluation questions, judgement criteria, indicators and methods is presented in Annex 2.

Table 1: Overview of the Evaluation Questions

EQ1	To what extent have the strategic choices made by the EU on the focus and composition of its cooperation with Yemen ensured its relevance to national priorities and needs?
EQ2	To what extent has EU cooperation been designed and implemented in coherence with all relevant policies of the EU, EU Member States and other donors?
EQ3	To what extent has EU cooperation promoted and supported state-building processes in relation to international norms? What has helped or hindered effectiveness?
EQ4	To what extent has EU cooperation contributed to greater resilience in Yemen? What has helped or hindered effectiveness?
EQ5	In what ways has the EU engagement with regional actors and donors complemented and strengthened its cooperation in Yemen? Has appropriate emphasis been given to this engagement?
EQ6	To what extent has EU cooperation taken cross-cutting issues into account and how has this contributed to results?
EQ7	In what ways and how effectively has EU cooperation been responsive to changes in the Yemen context? What has helped or hindered responsiveness?
EQ8	To what extent have the EU's standing and achievements in Yemen been regarded as influential to the direction and pace of change in the country?
EQ9	To what extent were the EU's legal instruments, thematic instruments, aid modalities and management modalities applied in the most efficient and effective manner?
EQ10	To what extent has the EU resourced and deployed its services to deliver EU cooperation in an efficient manner?


A number of evaluation criteria are embedded in the EQs. The first five (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact) are standard Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC) criteria, sometimes with slight adaptations in the DEVCO methodology. In addition, the evaluation has covered consistency (between programming and implementation) value-added (choices of focus and instruments/quality of implementation); and the 3Cs (coordination, complementarity, coherence) that are a combined subset.

The EQs aim to address key issues relating to EU engagement in a country that has been seriously affected by fragility and conflict. These issues, namely state-building, resilience and responsiveness, cover the main areas of EU cooperation strategy and support (governance, economic development, food security, etc.); they also address coherence with other domains (EU humanitarian aid, for instance). In our Intervention Logic Analysis in Annex 9, we examine the rationale.

1.4. Structure of the report

Figure 1 below sets out the structure and flow of the main report and explains how the annexes relate to the main report sections. The main report is intended as a stand-alone document and as such it references material in the annexes. To aid the reader in locating the right annex, they are presented in three parts – those that frame the evaluation (ToR, methodology, etc.); those that help to set the scene and provide context; and those that directly contribute to our analysis.

Figure 1: Schematic summary of report structure and link to annexes



1.5. Methodology

We have applied a theory-based approach to the evaluation, using an intervention logic analysis to consolidate all elements of EU cooperation in a single framework that links rationale to strategy to programmes and to results. This is presented in Annex 9. Under each of the EQ headings we have then gathered quantitative and qualitative evidence of the contributions that EU cooperation has made in Yemen. It is important to note that there is in fact no EU document that seeks to represent EU cooperation as a whole, so the intervention logic analysis is our own. Notwithstanding the major constraint of limited availability of evaluative data about the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of EU cooperation, we have been able to triangulate a wide range of sources and derive a contribution story underpinned by a consistent set of challenges, drivers and constraints. These are reflected in our summary of findings and in the conclusions we draw.

We have based our approach on two main building blocks – an **analysis of strategy** (what was planned, what was realised) and an **analysis of programmes** (the specific contribution that EU interventions have made to results on the ground).

Building block 1: Analysis of strategy

At the Inception stage we prepared a reconstructed Intervention Logic (IL) for EU cooperation that identified: the context within which EU cooperation strategy was conceived; the rationale for EU engagement in Yemen; the strategic objectives that flowed from this rationale; the inputs and nature of support envisaged to achieve these objectives; the assumptions that underpinned the choice of inputs; and the intended activities and results of EU cooperation. Through interviews with Delegation staff and other stakeholders (Member States, the Government of Yemen and other donors), the team further examined how strategy had been developed and managed in practice.

To complement the IL a policy timeline was built (Annex 7) that juxtaposed major political and development events in Yemen with identified key points at which EU strategy changed (or should have changed but did not). Where possible the team sought evidence from the earlier years of EU support, but recognised that there would be a bias towards recent years both because of staffing and because of the significance of the 2011 crisis. Given the forward-looking nature of the evaluation and the relevance of looking at the EU strategy response to recent changes in context, this period of the evaluation was given particular emphasis. This involved looking at the assumptions that underpinned strategy and programmes.

A separate step in the analysis of strategy was to examine where in the IL the EU made a difference, by comparing the intended and actual results of EU cooperation. This was approached in two ways. Firstly, through the **analysis of programmes** that looked for evidence of the impact of EU-supported programmes and mapped this evidence against the IL analysis. Secondly, through the **accumulation of opinion and evidence** offered by EU staff in Yemen (past and present), implementing partners, the wider donor community, the Government of Yemen and civil society to determine where in the IL analysis the EU has made its most significant contributions through development cooperation, political dialogue and humanitarian assistance. This involved also an assessment of the extent to which assumptions were realised or not, and how this affected results and sustainability. Thus, through a process of triangulation of evidence the team was able to judge and create a visualisation of strategy ‘as realised’. An illustration of our approach to contribution analysis is presented in table 2 in Annex 3, where we map evidence for EU support in the governance sector against the intervention logic and assumptions in our reconstructed strategic intervention logic analysis as presented in annex 9.

Table 2: Summary of methodology for strategy analysis

Steps	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conduct individual and focus group interviews with Delegation staff. 2. Conduct interviews with other stakeholders to triangulate their perceptions of EU contribution with those of EU staff. 3. Document analysis to gather further evidence to support the storyline. 4. Collate findings from programme analysis that can be mapped against expected results in the reconstructed IL analysis. 5. Conduct validation meeting to review output from step 4; agree adjustments to reconstructed IL analysis that would result in a new diagram of strategy as realised.
Tools	6. Semi-structured interviews; Focus Group Discussions; document analysis.
Analysis	7. Triangulation of views between different stakeholder groups (EU, Government of Yemen, donors, others); synthesis of findings from different sources; validation of findings at field phase debriefing.

Building block 2: Programme analysis

During the Desk phase a thorough appraisal was made of all documentation provided on individual EU projects and programmes. Where previous evaluations have been undertaken, their findings are taken into account, as have reviews undertaken by implementing partners. The Desk Study itself mapped the extent of documentation available and the key findings from this exercise have been integrated into this Final Report.

During the field phase we also analysed in greater depth three **Case Studies** within the priority themes (state-building, resilience, responsiveness). For each case we examined the rationale for EU action, whether it be a programme (e.g. co-financing of the Social Fund for Development (SFD)) or an approach (e.g. political dialogue).

The case studies enable us to explore more than one EQ each. Where possible we used the case studies to drill down from strategy through design and management to results, looking for strategic or operational cross-linkages to other aspects of EU cooperation, before looking back up to assess the relationship between strategy as realised and strategy as planned.

Table 3: Summary of case studies

Case studies	Scope and purpose
1. Evolutions in the EU's approach to state-building.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To explore the role and importance of political dialogue as an effective tool for cooperation in general and to frame the EU's state-building efforts. To explore the impact of the EU's investment in democracy, electoral assistance and human rights, including the 2006 EU Election Observation Mission (EOM). To explore the extent to which increased EU support for CSOs from 2007 onwards has enhanced the endogenous process by which the state and society attempt to reconcile their expectations of one another, and contributed a more diverse political culture.
2. EU contribution to resilience – the cases of the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) and the SFD.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To explore the extent to which the SFD and SWF have been effective vehicles for building resilience at household and community level, state responsiveness to pressing social and economic needs, and to determine the contribution and added value of the EU in this regard. To explore the extent to which EU support to the SFD and SWF has formed part of a wider and integrated strategy addressing needs in Yemen. To explore the extent to which support to these institutions complemented or competed with that of other donors.
3. EU Responsiveness and Private Sector Development in Yemen.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To explore the extent to which the EU's support to private sector development has been responsive to the changing political and development landscape in Yemen. To explore how EU responsiveness has translated into actual funded activities within the country portfolio.

Data limitations

During the conduct of the evaluation we experienced the following data limitations:

- **Remote field phase** – The planned field mission to Yemen did not take place due to the prevailing security in Yemen in 2014. Nevertheless, in June, July and August the team was able to conduct face-to-face and telephone interviews with a wide range of key informants including EU staff, senior Yemeni government officials, MS representatives, other international agencies, civil society and informed individuals.
- **Limited EU information on results and impact** – During the period 2002-12, the EU financed 154 interventions through its NIP/MIPs and 140 interventions through thematic instruments and programmes. We have secured only two programme evaluations – of the Support for Administrative Reforms programme and the Evaluation Study of Health Development Councils, Yemen – and a handful of Results-Oriented Monitoring Reports. Where the EU has co-financed projects also supported by other donors, most notably some food security interventions with IFAD, the SWF and the SFD, evaluations and impact assessments commissioned by others are available and can be used to infer the effectiveness of EU support. This has limited our ability to present findings on the results of EU programmes.
- **Missing documentation** – In the process of developing the inventory we have discovered that a number of documents cannot be located. This seems to be due in large part to the dual location of the Delegation and representative office over the period, in Amman (Jordan) and the capital Sana'a, and to filing inefficiencies. The major gap relates to the complete absence of any documentation relating to 17 Decisions, some as recent as 2010.
- **CRIS document nomenclature and formats** – Documents on CRIS are not systematically and intuitively named, making them difficult to navigate; documents are often PDF versions of poorly scanned photocopies that are often not searchable electronically. It is therefore virtually impossible to search for document titles and contents by key words or phrases, with the risk that the directory of CRIS documents is underutilised for this and future evaluations.

1.6. Context of the evaluation

The Republic of Yemen is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the Arab World.¹ In 2012, it was ranked 160th out of 186 countries in the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index and at the bottom of the 2013 World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report. The population growth rate is

¹ Lackner, Helen (2014), *Why Yemen Matters*, Saqi Books.

high at 3.2%, with a reported maternal mortality rate of 370 and a reported under-5 mortality rate of 60.² Although there has been a steady increase in gross domestic product (GDP) over the last decade, there has been little trickle down to the poor, with much of the growth bypassing the rural areas and economic spaces where the poor are located. A large proportion of the rural population relies heavily on subsistence agriculture that remains highly vulnerable to climate change, floods, and droughts.³ Over 44% of the population is food-insecure and unemployment sits somewhere between 40% and 60%.⁴ Security forces and the civil service employ 1.2 million people, absorbing about 70% of the national budget, with a further 20% being spent on fuel subsidies. This has severely curtailed government expenditure on basic services, state provision of which has been poor.⁵

Yemen comprises a formal state and an informal state. The formal state is characterised by political pluralism, elections, a relatively free press and extensive civil society, all quite unique to the region. The informal state has depended on patronage and a network of alliances that link tribal sheikhs, government officials, business families and the armed forces. Patronage was, until recently, essentially a mechanism for short-term crisis resolution, but it has been arguably the only effective political system in the country. With low tax revenues, a social contract between the government and people in Yemen is slender and oil revenues have provided 'rent' that allows an entrenched elite to retain power.

Conflict has been a major part of Yemen's story over the evaluation period. The conflict in the northern governorate of Saada has been played out in periodic wars since 2004 between government forces and Houthi rebels, who are currently in a commanding position in Sana'a and other parts of Yemen. Meanwhile, particularly since 2008, there has been a critical threat to political stability in the form of the 'Southern Movement'. This has grown out of discontent with the northern-based regime, perceived as having secured its survival through exploitation of southern natural resources and the exclusion of southerners from governing institutions.⁶ The general climate of weakened security, growing social discontent with political institutions and rising youth unemployment in Yemen has provided a fertile breeding ground for recruitment by terrorist groups, including most notably al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The regional dimension and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are also important elements of the context for EU cooperation in Yemen. The EU established bilateral relations with the GCC countries through a 1988 Cooperation Agreement, intended to strengthen stability in a region of strategic importance. Issues of mutual concern to the EU and GCC members include: the economic burden that Yemen could present to neighbouring GCC countries since it is rapidly running out of water and oil (Yemen passed peak oil in 2002⁷); and the potential impacts of it becoming a 'failed state', leading to an unsustainable outflow of Yemenis seeking work in neighbouring countries and an increase in terrorist activity – exacerbating regional insecurity and instability, and disrupting trade routes from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea. The increasing sectarian dimension of the conflicts and its potential interplay with the competing interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran is also a growing factor.

The key challenge for government remains bringing about reform of the country's governing institutions through combating entrenched corruption and nepotism while maintaining support among tribes and other networks of influence that are accustomed to working within a system of patronage, all the while addressing major socio-economic challenges such as high population growth, declining oil production and increasing water scarcity. Understanding these complex and interlinked drivers of insecurity, poverty and vulnerability has long been a challenge for donors including the EU, a challenge that has been met with varying degrees of success over the period of this evaluation.

² UNICEF, 2012.

³ Jon Bennett et al. (2012), *Republic of Yemen: Country Programme Evaluation*, IFAD.

http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public_html/eksyst/doc/country/pn/yemen/cpe-2012_full.pdf

⁴ Sarah Phillips (February 2011), Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State, *Developmental Leadership Programme*, Research Paper 14, p.9. By mid-2011 the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) admitted 52%, while the World Food Programme (WFP) put the figure at 60%.

⁵ Neil MacDonald and Rana Khalil (May 2009), *Report of the assessment towards a 'whole of EU' approach to state building in Yemen: addressing fragility to prevent state failure*.

⁶ Sarah Phillips (2011), *Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis*, Adelphi, , p.26. The situation has changed since 2011: several key cabinet politicians, including the Prime Minister, are from the South.

⁷ Yemen's oil production reached its peak in 2002, with an average production rate of 457,000 barrels a day. By 2013, this had fallen to 161,000. See: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2014.

EU cooperation in Yemen has evolved against the backdrop of major EU institutional and organisational changes, both with regard to the EU as a whole and to cooperation with Yemen in particular. As the timeline in Annex 7 shows, major new policies have been launched, creating new policy imperatives for EU cooperation in Yemen and elsewhere (for example: the European Consensus on Development; the Communication on Fragility; the Agenda for Change; and the Comprehensive Approach); while the legal and financial basis of EU cooperation and the accompanying organisational and institutional arrangements have changed fundamentally following the signing of the Lisbon Treaty and the organisational restructuring that followed. During the same period, EU representation in Yemen evolved from a Technical Assistance Office in Sana'a operating under the authority of the Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX) in Brussels, through a locally-based Chargé d'Affaires under the authority of the Delegation in Jordan from 2004, to a full Delegation from 2009. All of these factors have impacted on the way in which EU cooperation with Yemen has been formulated, financed, resourced and managed.

The history of cooperation between the EU and Yemen stretches back to 1978. Relations were formalised with North Yemen in 1984 through a Development Cooperation Agreement that was extended in 1995 to cover the entire country following unification in 1990. An extended agreement came into force in July 1998, and this continues to frame cooperation. In 2004 EU relations with Yemen were broadened by the launch of the political dialogue and adoption of the EU-Yemen Joint Declaration to enable stability, security and good governance to be dealt with in an integrated manner. That same year, the European Council adopted the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East⁸ that sought to engage countries in the region to advance their political and economic reform processes. Since then, the EU has substantially increased its development assistance to Yemen, with a total spend of EUR 334-343 million (to 2012), and as upgraded its presence to ambassadorial level.

2011 stands out as a watershed year for this evaluation. In Yemen, 'Arab Spring' street protests provoked intra-elite violence that brought an end to President Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime. Proactive diplomacy under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – heavily supported by the US, the UK and the EU, and later the UN – influenced Saleh's decision to sign the GCC initiative that afforded him immunity in return for stepping aside. The Head of Delegation played a prominent role in talks leading to the GCC initiative, but the Delegation itself was evacuated following fighting in Sana'a. The bulk of EU development cooperation in Yemen was suspended, while DEVCO underwent internal restructuring in Brussels.

The events of 2011 illustrate several broader issues evident throughout the evaluation period: the influence exerted by personalities, both in Yemen and within the international community; the EU's role as one player among many international actors in Sana'a, and the scope of its influence; the EU's identity as a multilateral actor; the extent to which the EU is properly equipped to perform an effective leadership and coordination role for MS; the relationship between formal and informal channels of influence; and the trade-offs between best practice and pragmatism. Decisions taken during that year continue to reverberate, and will almost certainly influence the scope of the EU's next programming cycle. Senior EU officials describe the GCC initiative as a 'ray of hope' and a 'window of opportunity'; however, by their own admission, there is no 'plan B'.⁹ Meanwhile, Yemenis contend with a weak power-sharing government, deteriorating security conditions, a shrinking economy and widespread hunger.

⁸ <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/gulf-region/documents/eu-partnership-with-mediterranean-and-middle-east.pdf>

⁹ Interviews, June 2014.

2. FINDINGS

2.1. Coherence with Yemen's national priorities

EQ1: To what extent have the strategic choices made by the EU on the focus and composition of its cooperation with Yemen ensured its relevance to national priorities and needs?

Summary response: EU strategic choices on development cooperation strategy have been consistent with stated national priorities as reflected in the formal strategies and policies of the Government of Yemen; however the EU's comparative advantages have not always been apparent in these choices.

Until 2009 the concept of EU cooperation as a whole did not have any formal expression. While the 2009 recommendations *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen* did go a considerable way to remedying this problem, in a formal sense there is still no comprehensive strategy that underpins EU decision making; nor indeed is there any consensus across DEVCO and the EEAS on whether the EU needs one. The recent choice of security sector reform illustrates the complex interplay between formal strategy processes and the exigencies of political engagement that is rendered more risky by the absence of a clear and shared overarching strategy against which choices can be assessed and evaluated.

The relevance of strategy and programmes has been undermined by limited engagement with intended beneficiaries during formulation processes, by a limited understanding of the underlying political settlement, and by the lack of contextual analysis at the national, sector and problem levels. EU programme choice and design have not consistently followed sound analysis and Delegation staff have not always been aware of the rationale for their predecessors' programming decisions. Together these factors have facilitated a reliance on unrealistic assumptions about the capabilities and reform intentions of the Government of Yemen and how programmes would contribute to wider strategic and national objectives.

JC 1.1 Extent to which EU strategic choices on the overall composition of its cooperation with Yemen were relevant to national priorities and needs.

Yemen's Second Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development 2001-2005 (SFYP) prioritised the establishment of a conducive environment for poverty reduction through empowerment of the poor, emphasising 'the complete conviction that achieving development objectives cannot be reached without empowering local communities ... through their involvement in the preparation of development plans, programs and projects, as well as in the implementation phase and follow up.'¹⁰ Yemen's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) [2003-5] reasserted the government's commitment to poverty alleviation, and proposed a strategy with four main axes: economic growth, development of human resources, improvement of infrastructure and ensuring social protection. It also acknowledged the continuing need for grants and loans in addition to technical assistance.

Consistent with the SFYP and PRSP, the first Country Strategy Paper (CSP) [2002-06] during the evaluation period gave particular emphasis to food security, poverty reduction and the development of a private sector. At the design stage of the CSP, the political and economic turmoil of the coming decade was not anticipated, and in many respects the starting point for EU cooperation strategy was simply the recognition of Yemen as the poorest country in the Middle East. Yet over the ensuing five-year period governance issues increasingly emerged as a prerequisite to effective development. Until mid-decade, though, the EU had concentrated mainly on administrative reform, elections and some support to civil society.

The second CSP (2007-13) presented the two main objectives: i) promoting good governance through supporting democratisation, promoting human rights and civil society as well as government reforms, and; ii) fighting poverty through fostering private sector development and strengthening basic services. The CSP sits alongside two key Government of Yemen strategy documents, both developed through extensive consultation. The Third Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction 2006-10 (DPPR)¹¹ was based on a Millennium Development Goals needs assessment and on a number of key national strategies for achieving Yemen's Strategic Vision 2025 (YSV). Out of the DPPR emerged two key themes: economic growth and employment generation, including promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in

¹⁰ Government of Yemen, *Yemen's Second Five Year Plan for Social and Economic Development 2001-2005 SFYP*, p.4.

¹¹ MOPIC (2006), *The Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction 2006-2010*, p.17.


key productive sectors; and poverty reduction, with a focus on key areas including basic services and expanding Yemen's Social Safety Net (SSN).¹² The DPPR was accompanied by the National Reform Agenda (NRA) that set out a number of key objectives including governance reforms that were intended to address constraints to growth and development. This was followed more recently by a series of further reform documents, including the Government of Yemen's top ten reform priorities in 2009 and the Transitional Program for Stabilisation and Development (TPSD) 2012-14 that outlines the urgent priorities of restoring political and security stability, meeting urgent humanitarian needs and achieving macroeconomic stability.

Since 2004, annual EU-Yemen political dialogue meetings have consistently addressed economic, political and regional issues of mutual interest. This political dialogue has generated some success with regard to human rights issues, but until 2009 the EU's strategic choices have been reflected more in development cooperation than in a broader understanding of EU cooperation as a whole. At a macro-level, then, EU cooperation has been consistent with stated national priorities, as reflected by sub-sector funding outlined in Figure 2.

The question of whether EU cooperation has been relevant to national *needs* is a more complex one. Clearly EU development cooperation has been relevant in principle to real needs in that it has been targeted at real problems. But the EU's strategic intentions, which have emphasised cooperation with the formal state and which have been based on unrealistic assumptions (about the Government of Yemen's willingness and capacity to reform and to support improvements in democracy and human rights), have been at odds with the realities of working in Yemen and with the real underlying political settlement there.¹³ Furthermore, until 2009 the concept of EU cooperation *as a whole* (ie. its different strands of development cooperation, political engagement, trade and economic cooperation, etc.) did not have any formal expression in practice in Yemen. Rather the process of joining the dots across development cooperation, political engagement and wider EU relations with Yemen and relevant regional actors has in large part been left to middle management and below, with differences in interpretation inevitably coming into play between individuals at any given and over time as officials come and go. This is not to question the professionalism of EU officials, but simply to highlight the absence of an overarching strategy.

In 2009, the formulation of recommendations towards a comprehensive approach¹⁴ represented a step towards a coherent EU strategy, effectively combining political engagement with development cooperation. It was only at this point that strategy was framed by a deeper understanding of what is meant by relevance, both in terms of what were the real needs to be addressed (what the document refers to as the 'central

Figure 2: EU funding to Yemen by sub-sector (including proportional allocations to civil society, international organisations, Yemeni authorities and private companies), 2002-2012



¹² Ibid., pp.20-21.

¹³ See for example, *Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State, Developmental Leadership Program Research Paper 14*, Sarah Phillips, February 2011, which states *inter alia* that 'Western donor policy, based on a belief that political instability is a function of government ineffectiveness and lack of capacity, has focused on stabilisation and quick, short term, technical fixes, failing to see that sustaining instability may be a deliberate strategy among the regime's informal elites to maintain international support and, ultimately, to stay in power.'

¹⁴ European Commission (2009), *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen*.

priorities’) and how the EU and MS could best equip themselves to address these needs within a realistic understanding of what contribution they could make.

Unfortunately this opportunity for long-term thinking has, since 2010, been thwarted by a highly politicised, fragile and fast-moving context where the need to be reactive has been, and remains, paramount. According to at least two senior EU officials, previously established internal objectives have been superseded to some extent by the collective goals of the Friends of Yemen (FoY) and the GCC initiative.¹⁵ This phenomenon intensified as Yemen rose up the agenda during 2009 to 2012, largely in response to security concerns, and has twice been thrown into sharp relief by the evacuation of the EU Delegation in 2011 and 2014. The situation on the ground has created something of a strategic ‘drift’, especially since 2011. Consensus over the purpose and content of an EU comprehensive strategy is hard to find, with differing views on the merits of strategic guidance versus flexibility.¹⁶ At the same time development priorities have become more closely related to, and to some extent driven by, political considerations. The absence of a comprehensive, overarching EU strategy means that decision making remains overly reliant on the experience and judgement of Delegation staff acting in a fast-moving and complex context, and on intermittent contact with an otherwise preoccupied Government.¹⁷

JC 1.2 Extent to which EU strategic choices on focal sectors were based on sound analysis, were consistent with EU cooperation strategy and relevant to national priorities and needs.

In order to address the critical economic problems of high population growth and declining oil production and revenues, the EU recognised the importance of diversifying the non-oil economy so as to provide jobs and economic opportunities to an ever-expanding population. One of the key challenges was (and is) the development of a dynamic private sector and a business environment conducive to foreign investment and able to promote pro-poor and sustainable economic growth. EU support to **private sector development** was initially targeted at facilitating business development and private sector investment through technical assistance, training and advisory services to SMEs. In the early years of the evaluation period EU resources were concentrated primarily on supporting Yemen’s negotiating capacity for World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession in response to the immaturity of the private sector. Support for WTO accession continued through to the 2012-14 MIP, broadening into capacity-building support to accelerate regional economic integration and trade and to attracting foreign investment.

The 2007-13 CSP also included a strong focus on private sector development, but with added emphasis on boosting sustainable development in other potential growth sectors such as **agriculture and fisheries**. EU programming supported the ambitions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Industry to develop a strategy for linking the development of the agriculture sector with that of the food processing industry, providing technical assistance at each stage of the process, from production to marketing and export. A two-pronged approach was followed that saw prioritisation of both traditional rain-fed or livestock systems that support the poorest rural households, as well as irrigated systems and the need for stronger water resource management in light of increasing water scarcity. The fishery sector was also identified in the Third DPPR as a key sector for enhancing economic growth and reducing poverty. The EU has supported fisheries sectors in parallel with the World Bank to promote the sustainable exploitation of resources and increasing the income for coastal communities. However, as the monograph on EU Responsiveness and Private Sector Development concludes (see Annex 10), the definition of priorities for Private Sector Development (PSD) interventions has been insufficiently coherent and consistent. At programme level, weak design has undermined relevance in some key instances.

Food security became a core component of EU cooperation in light of an increasingly food-insecure population. Yemen was selected as one of the priority countries for EU food security support and has been receiving assistance since 1996. After a break in activities between 2002 and 2003 due to low disbursement levels of previous programmes, a new programme was developed under the first CSP to provide institutional

¹⁵ Interviews, June 2014

¹⁶ Interviews with DEVCO and EEAS officials, June 2014. For example: ‘We have no written strategy as such that combines EEAS and DEVCO approaches’; ‘At our highest political level there has been no strategic thinking about how to use development money to achieve political objectives’; ‘We react, we don’t have time for strategic thinking... Analysis comes through dialogue with partners’; ‘We do not need a more directive strategy: we need more analysis, and more flexibility’; ‘Flexibility is important, but we haven’t been bold enough to stick to a strategy’.

¹⁷ Interviews, including with Government of Yemen officials, June-July 2014

support for integrating food security measures into government policies, as well as financing for food security-related investment projects at the community level. The 2005-06 NIP included an emphasis on gender-oriented food security projects as well as improving Yemenis' access to food and water resources, especially in rural areas. Support to food security continued into the second CSP period, although after an evaluation of the Food Security programme it was decided to continue programme funding through other development cooperation activities such as the SFD and ongoing work in private sector development. Nevertheless, activities and funding through the Food Facility and Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP) continued. Recent support to the Food Security Sector demonstrates continued dialogue between the Delegation, DG ECHO and the Government of Yemen on issues of prominent national security interest and shows that, in spite of the delays in setting up the national decision-making body on Food Security, the EU has been proactive in finding alternative solutions and learning lessons from previous support that was less focused on dialogue with civil society, private sector and other stakeholders.¹⁸

The EU has played a leading role in various national and regional mechanisms in an attempt to improve dialogue among donors as well as with the Government of Yemen. Weak capacity within the Government of Yemen that in turn hampers progress towards reform is well-recorded by the donor community. At best, international engagement has enabled line ministries to move from a 'shopping list' approach towards more sustainable planning; at worst, it has led to pressure on the Government of Yemen to accommodate agendas driven by external actors, from the World Bank's investment in the PRSP 2003-2005 to the Joint Socio-Economic Assessment (2012). The Strategic Partnership Forum launched by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) in 2012 was intended to push forward implementation of sector strategies, but this too has been hampered by severe delays on the Government of Yemen's side.¹⁹ In 2013, the constraints of disbursing donor funds through the transitional power-sharing government led to the creation of a dedicated Executive Bureau.

While EU aid mechanisms conform broadly to principles of ownership and alignment, there are still cases where inflexible procedures place pressure on the Government of Yemen to consent to proposed activities to avoid excessive delays. One example of this was the EU grant to the SFD that had to be implemented through a World Bank Trust fund due to the complexities of EU procedures.

Policy dialogue is conducted with MOPIC's International Cooperation Sector (Department for International Cooperation with Europe and the Americas) and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, consultation on the part of the EU has been unsystematic, and the Government of Yemen does not yet offer the critical challenge function that it could; instead, the consultation process tends towards technicalities, with insufficient outreach during design and planning stages. Annual joint consultative committee meetings – in Sana'a or in Brussels – have the potential to function as a forum for more long-term strategic dialogue, based on specialist engagement, but to date they have not been used for this purpose.

We find little evidence that CSPs and NIP/MIPs were prepared in consultation with representatives of the intended beneficiaries, and EU strategy documents make scant references to beneficiaries' views and needs. On the other hand, in the larger individual programmes, stakeholder involvement has been good. For example, in the 2012 EU-funded IFAD interventions (the Economic Opportunities Programme and the Fisheries Investment Programme) there were extensive consultations with beneficiaries, at the design and implementation stages involving the Government of Yemen, the private sector, business organisations, women's associations and implementing agencies. The involvement of local stakeholders was also evident in the setting-up of the decentralised Health Sector and Demography Support Programme. The formulation of the Yemen Fisheries support programme involved extensive consultation with beneficiaries, the donor community, and central and local institutions, from which useful learning and analysis was taken on board.²⁰

The EU's choice of key sectors was fairly consistent in the transition from CSP 2002-06 and CSP 2007-11, but new political pressures and internal institutional priorities post-2011, including the more prominent role of EEAS in determining the scope – if not the content – of development cooperation, led to what appears to have been some quite severe trade-offs. For example, in 2012, the Delegation stated its intention to drop health,²¹ its longest-running continual portfolio in Yemen, to comply with new internal guidelines to

¹⁸ European Commission (2009), *Action Fiche for Yemen Food Security Support Programme 2009*, p.2.

¹⁹ European Commission (2012), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2012-31/12/2012, p.3.

²⁰ European Commission (2010), *Action Fiche for Yemen Fisheries Support Programme (YFSP)*.

²¹ It is important to note that two health programmes will nonetheless be funded under the new focus on resilience.

concentrate on a maximum of three sectors,²² despite many years of building a comparative advantage in this area (see 2.1); yet water, which had previously been set aside due to the comparative expertise of other donors, was reinstated under the ‘rural development and water’ umbrella. Meanwhile, the EU also agreed to lead on security sector reform (SSR) at the Ministry of Interior, as part of the division of responsibilities within the G10 – a decision that is reported by some officials and development partners to have been driven largely by EEAS’s strategic and division of labour considerations, rather than distinct comparative advantage or analysis. What these examples illustrate is the complex interplay between formal strategy processes and the exigencies of political engagement that is rendered more risky by the absence of a clear and shared overarching strategy against which choices can be assessed and evaluated.

JC 1.3 Extent to which EU financing decisions on development cooperation programmes were consistent with EU cooperation strategy and relevant to national priorities and needs.

The total EU spend from 2002-12 (approximately USD 280 million) comprised approximately 57% to economic development and livelihoods, including food security, private sector development and development of economic institutions; 25% to social sectors including support to the SWF, SFD and health sector; 14% to state building and governance; and the remaining 4% to various other sectors.²³

In spite of EU alignment with broad Government of Yemen strategic priorities, there is a constant challenge at the sector level with regards to the Government of Yemen’s ownership and capacity to drive forward the reform agenda.²⁴ Moreover, we have not been able to establish that EU programme choice and design always followed sound analysis,²⁵ nor that delegation staff were always aware of the rationale for their predecessors’ decisions – for example, why the decision was made to fund food security through the SWF. In many cases, these decisions were not systematically recorded, meaning that important institutional memory was lost when key individuals moved on. Regarding SSR, we have found no discernible evidence that the decision to focus on police reform followed considered analysis of the alternatives – for example, working with the central security forces or the coastguard, or engaging with justice reform.

It is important to note that for most investments, the EU was not the sole source of support; WTO is an exception as a limited intervention where one funding agency was sufficient. Food security, health, fisheries, private sector development and social safety are all funded by a multiplicity of bi- and multilateral agencies. Moreover, the various decisions to extend funding arrangements were not always related to prior results. For example, the fisheries project was renewed for a third stage, despite poor performance in the first and second phases, while a low performing contractor continued to be used for technical assistance support to the SWF.

Overall EU programming was coordinated with the PRSP development priorities and, other than sole support to WTO, its investments were broadly complementary to those of other funders. An interesting exception was EU support on Food Security that was not strictly aligned to government policy (because there was no extant national Food Security policy) but chosen precisely because of a perceived policy and implementation gap. In this case, the EU was able effectively to address beneficiary needs while to some extent galvanising government response to a deteriorating situation in Yemen. As highlighted by the 2010 Mid-Term Review (MTR) Concept Note, weak government capacity has seriously hampered progress towards reforms, and the Government of Yemen’s poor sequencing and prioritisation of core reforms have impacted on the donor community’s ability to contribute efficiently and effectively.²⁶

²² European Commission (2011), *Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change*.

²³ Figures derived from portfolio presented to evaluation, though we understand this does not represent a comprehensive audit.

²⁴ European Commission (2011), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2011-31/12/2011, p.3.

²⁵ See, for example, T. Bagash et al. (2012), *Transforming Cash Transfers: Beneficiary and community perspectives on the Social Welfare Fund in Yemen*, ODI, <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8181.pdf>. This stated: ‘In addition to the SWF, the EU is funding a conditional CT programme aimed at providing support to those poor most affected by price increases...None of these coordinates explicitly with the SWF, so beneficiaries overlap in some cases and there is very limited coherence in terms for targeting and transfer delivery’.

²⁶ European Commission (2009), *Mid-term Review of the EC-Yemen Development Strategy 2007-13; Preparation of the Multi-Indicative Programme 2011-2013, Concept Note*, p.2.

2.2. Coherence with EU policies, EU Member States and other donors

EQ2: To what extent has EU cooperation been designed and implemented in coherence with all relevant policies of the EU, EU Member States and other donors?

Summary response: EU cooperation has been developed in line with contemporaneous EU development policies and Council Regulations, most notably the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and Middle East (2004), the European Consensus on Development (2005) and the Agenda for Change (2011). Yemen's changing location within the evolving EU policy architecture and organisational arrangements during the evaluation period has impacted negatively on the coherence of EU cooperation. Yemen's isolation within the EU system has consistently affected its profile and visibility, prevented access to major funding channels, inhibited strategic planning, and has contributed to poor portfolio management. This is a systemic failure, and represents one of our key findings.

All CSPs were formulated in close consultation with MS and placed increasing emphasis on donor harmonisation, including sector-level alignment. Nonetheless, overall donor coordination remains weak. Coherence with sector-level activities undertaken by other donors is not always clear and some MS expect the EU to take a stronger lead. Despite this, there is positive recognition of EU efforts to encourage cooperation on food security and nutrition, human rights, public financial management, and rule of law, as well as EU support for Yemen's accession to the WTO.

Coordination in the field of political dialogue and diplomacy has progressively improved since 2009. Multilateral momentum gathered force during 2010 under the Friends of Yemen (FoY) framework, leading to the 2011 GCC initiative in which the EU played a prominent part. The recent increased emphasis on joint programming signals greater attention to this principle of the Agenda for Change, albeit early experiences on resilience programming have proven challenging to date.

JC 2.1 Extent to which EU cooperation addresses the objectives and requirements of relevant EU policies.

As our context analysis (see section 1.6) and timeline show (see Annex 7), EU organisational and institutional arrangements have changed significantly during the evaluation period. The 2002-06 CSP and its associated NIPs were developed in line with contemporaneous EU development policies and Council Regulations. The CSP states that the selected priorities were 'basically the same sectors supported by the EC in the past' and there is little documented evidence at this stage that strategy was particularly responsive to changes in the EU and Yemeni policy landscape. The CSP 2007-2013 refers more explicitly to the formulation of strategy within the evolving framework of EU policy, including the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and Middle East (2004) and the European Consensus on Development (2005). The Agenda for Change (2011) identified a need to improve coordination with MS and to allocate a greater share of EU aid to fragile states and led to an increase in spending levels in Yemen from 2012. Recent research, however, identifies a tension between the top-down and bottom-up logic in the programming process, as well as cases where sector concentration was being enforced through a narrow interpretation of the Agenda for Change.²⁷ These tensions across development cooperation globally are also reflected in correspondence between the Delegation and EU services in Brussels.

Within the Middle East, Yemen occupies an ambiguous position in EU policy-making and this has impacted negatively on the coherence of EU cooperation. Yemen is covered neither by the EMP – which promotes economic integration and democratic reform in north Africa, the Middle East and southeast Europe – nor by the MEDA programme, the principal instrument of economic and financial cooperation under the EMP. For reasons of proximity, Yemen is not included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that seeks to bring partner countries closer to EU standards by encouraging good governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, sustainable development, and social cohesion.²⁸ As a result, Yemen did not benefit from the EU response to the Arab Spring, which was framed through the ENP in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East, with human development indicators matching those of sub-Saharan

²⁷ European Centre for Development Policy Management (2013), *Early experiences in programming EU aid 2014-2020 – Charting the Agenda for Change*, Briefing Note No. 54, September 2013, p.10.

²⁸ 12 countries are already fully participating in the ENP: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Ukraine. Algeria is currently negotiating an ENP action plan. Belarus, Libya and Syria remain outside most of the structures of ENP.

Africa, but it does not benefit from peer-to-peer dialogue or policy representation in parallel with African Least Developed Countries (LDCs).

Yemen's unique geopolitical profile further complicates the EU's response. Not only is it geographically distant from the ENP area, it is also located on the far side of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a trading bloc of prosperous Arab monarchies that do not receive EU development assistance. For a while, Yemen was included in the 'East of Jordan' group with Iran and Iraq, an artificial cluster of Arab states that did not logically fall under any other EU framework, but this approach was quickly dropped. In 2011, Yemen was brought into DEVCO's central Asia group during internal restructuring. While this arrangement made sense from a traditional development perspective, it has complicated efforts to achieve coherence within the EU management architecture as a whole. Firstly, many existing personnel links were broken by the 2011 restructure, affecting the retention and transfer of knowledge and expertise relating to Yemen.²⁹ Secondly, the EEAS remains structured as before, where Yemen belongs to the 'Arab World' along with North Africa and the GCC, complicating efforts to harmonise political engagement with development cooperation between the two organisations.³⁰

Senior officials at both DEVCO and EEAS acknowledge that this organisational structure is illogical, but view it as an internal inconvenience that likely has little impact on the EU's relationship with Yemen.³¹ However, we find that Yemen's isolation within the EU system has consistently affected its profile and visibility, prevented access to major funding channels, inhibited strategic planning, disrupted operational continuity and contributed to poor portfolio management. This is a systemic failure, and represents one of our key findings.

JC 2.2 Extent to which EU cooperation is coherent with and complementary to the development strategies and programmes of Member States and other donors.

Successive CSPs and NIPs/MIPs have emphasised the importance of coordination with MS and other donors, including the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). All CSPs were formulated in close consultation with MS and placed increasing emphasis on donor harmonisation, including sector-level alignment. For example, CSP 2002-2006 includes an extensive annex on interventions of other donors in Yemen, and highlights operational coordination with Germany in the water sector;³² MIP 2011-13 mentions EU support to the development of a comprehensive strategic donor framework in the health sector. Co-financing of the Joint Social and Economic Assessment (JSEA) is another example of coordination and joint work with others.

The EU's coherence with sector activities undertaken by other donors is not always clear. For example, water, which was omitted from MIP 2011-13 on the grounds that other donors were already covering this, was brought back into the strategy in late 2012.³³ This apparent inconsistency might constitute an example of a narrow interpretation of the Agenda for Change.³⁴ However, we found one explanation for this to be increasing efforts to ensure a close match with humanitarian assistance provided by DG ECHO. The 2014-2015 programme will support in particular the enhancement of household and community resilience (water is included under this).

Several MS have expressed appreciation at EU efforts to consult and coordinate on development strategy and programming, citing good personal relations with members of the delegation, improved information sharing and efforts to develop joint policy positions.³⁵

Despite these achievements, overall donor coordination remains weak. Substantial challenges persist, such as the need for more consistent information sharing and sector-level coordination, including joint sector-level strategies and programming – the 2011 Mid-term Review emphasises that 'donor coordination in most

29 Interview with senior DEVCO official, June 2014.

30 Interviews with DEVCO and EEAS officials, June 2014.

31 Interviews with DEVCO and EEAS officials, June 2014.

32 European Commission (2002), Yemen Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, p.19.

33 European Commission (2012), Meeting with Commissioner Piebalgs on DCI programming orientations for Central Asia, Iraq and Yemen, 21 November 2012: Summary of conclusions, p.2.

34 European Centre for Development Policy Management (2013), Early experiences in programming EU aid 2014-2020 – Charting the Agenda for Change, Briefing Note No. 54, September 2013, p.10.

35 Interviews and email comments from member states' officials, July 2014.

sectors is still limited to irregular exchanges of information' and that 'harmonisation of donor approaches...is only becoming effective in a few, though important, sectors,'³⁶ along with improved efforts to minimise project duplication and eliminate parallel management structures. Some MS expect the EU to take a stronger lead, regularly convening MS to discuss the strategic allocation of resources,³⁷ but EU ambitions in this regard continue to be undermined by the status and staffing of its representation in Yemen. In addition, EU efforts to promote broader donor harmonisation are further constrained by weak leadership and problematic working methods at the World Bank and UNDP, although both organisations have become more active since 2011.³⁸

To date, examples of EU joint action with the World Bank and UN agencies include the co-financing of operations, including the SWF, the SFD, and the Tihama Development Authority (TDA). Analysis of EU support to each of these operations implies that a division of labour was agreed in advance, in terms of who funded what, but the basis by which the focus for EU assistance was selected vis-à-vis the contributions of other donors is not stated explicitly in programme documentation, therefore it has not been possible to conclude to what extent financing decisions have reflected the EU's added value. In 2012, the EU took a lead on the livelihoods component of a World Bank-led Joint Social and Economic Assessment (JSEA)³⁹ designed to support the TPSD, but the process was very much World Bank-led, with little exposure to stakeholders at field level.⁴⁰

The Delegation has also taken a leadership role in sector-level policy dialogue in EU focal areas, as well as acting as the main donor facilitator in support of Yemen's accession to the WTO, a project that stretches back to 2002. Cooperation on food security and nutrition has improved in recent years with the development of a joint agenda on malnutrition in partnership between the EU, the World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF); as a result, the Food Security Secretariat was established in the prime minister's office.⁴¹ However, UNICEF considers coordination on nutrition to be unsatisfactory. Coordination in the private sector has been identified as more successful, as well as with International Organisations (IOs) on the Fisheries Support Programme.⁴²

The EU has also tried to ensure a more coordinated approach to human rights, given its recognition by the donor community as a major player in this area.⁴³ We also found positive comments on the EU's involvement and coordination of the working groups on public financial management (PFM) and Rule of Law (RoL).⁴⁴ However, there is a notable lack of donor coordination on SSR, where there is not yet any functioning working group nor any agreement on internationally recognised terminology. The Delegation manages to liaise informally with the UK through the secondment of a UK technical specialist⁴⁵ but closer coordination within this sector is inhibited by the unilateral tendencies of the US, which leads on military restructuring mainly via the Ministry of Defence.⁴⁶

The potential for collaborative intervention with the European Investment Bank (EIB) and relating coordination with other EU institutions appears unlikely, given the rigorous preconditions for EIB engagement, including the EIB's preference for operating in more stable political environments. The Government of Yemen is receiving International Development Association (IDA) loans and grants and is less likely to want to borrow on EIB terms at the moment.⁴⁷

³⁶ European Commission (2011), *EC-Yemen Country Strategy Mid-term Review*, p.10.

³⁷ Interview, July 2014.

³⁸ Interviews with member states and IGOs, June-July 2014.

³⁹ World Bank, United Nations, European Union, Islamic Development Bank in collaboration with the Government of Yemen (2012), *Joint Social and Economic Assessment*.

⁴⁰ European Commission (2012), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2012-31/12/2012, p.2.

⁴¹ Interview with an EU partner organisation, July 2014

⁴² European Commission (2012), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2012-31/12/2012, pp.8-9; European Commission (2012), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2012-30/06/2012, p.6; European Commission (2011) *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2011-31/12/2011, p.7.

⁴³ European Commission (2012), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2012-31/12/2012, pp.8-9; European Commission (2012), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2012-30/06/2012, p.6; European Commission (2011), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2011-31/12/2011, p.7.

⁴⁴ Interview with member state, July 2014.

⁴⁵ Interviews with G10 officials, July 2014.

⁴⁶ Interviews with G10 officials, July 2014.

⁴⁷ Interviews with senior EEAS and DEVCO officials, July 2014.

JC 2.3 Extent to which the EU coordinates its strategy and actions effectively with EU Member States and other donors.

Since the beginning of the evaluation period, MS have demonstrated support for greater EU political engagement in Yemen: in 2003, the Italian Government asked for Yemen to join the ENP dialogue and in 2004; and the UK wrote an internal policy paper arguing for a more active EU presence. The EU's 2006 election observation mission (EU EOM) carried the collective imprimatur of the MS and established firm foundations for future EU political dialogue. In 2009, the EU consulted MS on its recommendations for a comprehensive approach and attempted to consolidate its position as a bilateral and multilateral actor. The Delegation has also taken an active leading role in the Donor Coordination Forum to instigate more frequent meetings that are more focused and interactive, and from 2009 has been chairing the EU Development Counsellors Group with the aim of bringing about greater donor coordination around common actions.⁴⁸

Multilateral momentum gathered throughout 2010 under the FoY framework, leading to the 2011 GCC initiative in which the EU played a prominent part. The EU was not officially included in the G10 from the outset, but swiftly became a member; later, Germany was also included. Among the MS, the UK and France have the strongest national security interests. UK resources exceed those of other MS present in Sana'a, and UK imperatives have tended to dominate the MS policy agenda. However, MS share a common interest in supporting the transition process and there is rarely much substantive difference on joint EU statements.⁴⁹ The Delegation in Sana'a has hosted regular heads of mission meetings and the EEAS coordinates a weekly teleconference with MS representatives in their capitals. With regard to programming, the fact that some sectors – such as water and PFM – were deliberately left out of the 2011-13 MIP as they were already amply covered by other donors is testament to an approach that seeks to ensure complementarity and that the EU's approach adds value.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ European Commission (2009) *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 13 July 2009, p.5.

⁴⁹ Interviews with member states, corroborated by a senior EEAS official, July 2014.

⁵⁰ European Commission (2011), *EC-Yemen Country Strategy Mid-term Review*, p.13.

2.3. State-building

EQ3: To what extent has EU cooperation promoted and supported state-building processes in relation to international norms? What has helped or hindered effectiveness?

Summary response: Current international norms on state-building derive from the 2007 OECD-DAC fragile states principles, which evolved by 2011 into the New Deal. Development cooperation programmes prior to 2009 were not been framed by an overarching state-building strategy and it is only in support to the health sector that a state-building approach and results are visible. The 2009 recommendations *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen* were consistent with international norms and recognised the vital relationship between political dialogue and development cooperation. Prior to 2009, with the exception of human rights issues, mutual reinforcement between development cooperation and political engagement had been weak.

Factors supporting EU promotion and support to state-building are: the gradual though informal percolation of fragility thinking into strategy and programming processes; the commitment and tenacity of staff in the Sana'a Delegation in seeking to address Yemen's fragility; and the leadership provided by the Head of Delegation from 2009 and through the 2011 crisis. Factors hindering effectiveness relate to weaknesses in organisational coherence on security, fragility and development within and between DEVCO and EEAS; to contested views within the EU over responsibilities for, and the utility of, political economy analysis; and to Yemen having signed the New Deal only in 2014. We conclude that the EU has still not yet fully understood the nature of the political settlement, especially at the sector level, nor yet identified effective elite incentives to create the conditions within which the Government of Yemen could rightfully act on national plans and priorities.

JC 3.1 Extent to which EU cooperation has been designed to contribute to state-building objectives, particularly with regard to governance, security and justice, democracy and human rights.

Prior to 2007, there was no formal EU policy imperative to promote and support state building through development cooperation in fragile and conflict-affected states. Unsurprisingly, EU cooperation was therefore not framed with explicit regard to state-building in the 2002-06 CSP. Rather, focal sectors were presented as a list of separate avenues of cooperation, underpinned by a set of assumptions (repeated in subsequent programming documents) about the Government of Yemen's willingness and capacity to reform and to support improvements in democracy and human rights. These assumptions were unsupported by in-depth analysis and were clearly unrealistic.⁵¹

The 2007 EU Communication on Fragility called for the application of 'conflict sensitive approaches' in strategy and programming. Preparation of the 2007-13 CSP also coincided with the arrival of the new Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (both referenced in the CSP), offering a broader set of options for EU cooperation in addressing fragility and state-building considerations. However, while Yemen's fragilities were more clearly described and analysed, the prescription for EU action followed similar lines to the earlier CSP, with cooperation on governance (largely through reform-related interventions with government) being seen as 'an important prerequisite for the policies aimed at fostering economic and social development' rather than as part of a state building package. Reference was made to political dialogue between the EU and the Government of Yemen, but not as part of an overarching strategy on state building. Assumptions about Government's willingness to pursue reforms remained very optimistic.

Our analysis is reflected also in contemporary critiques of EU cooperation in Yemen and the Middle East more widely. An analysis conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies in Jordan criticised EU cooperation in the region for its narrow focus, its over-reliance on unrealistic assumptions about the willingness and capability of government to pursue meaningful reforms and for its treatment of civil society strengthening through a social development rather than state-society relations lens.⁵² Others called on the EU to 'shift its focus towards a long-term commitment to democracy issues, including finding strategies for an inclusive approach and a broader understanding of democracy and its linkages to socio-economic development in the

⁵¹ See also section 4 in Annex 9

⁵² Lorenzo Piras (2010), *Europe in Yemen: Still Much to Do*, Centre for Strategic Studies, Jordan.

region,’⁵³ while commentators on donor support in Yemen criticised government and donors for ‘continu[ing] to operate without finding real solutions to the underlying causes of the dysfunctional system that contributed to [Yemen’s] slow absorptive capacity.’⁵⁴

The lack of a strong Brussels steer to redirect strategy and programming in Yemen towards the requirements of the 2007 Communication on Fragility derives in large part from the protracted organisational restructuring and negotiation process (both formal and informal) that followed the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, the creation of the EEAS and the division of responsibilities between DEVCO and EEAS. The resultant slow pace with which EU services in Brussels were able to translate a series of fragility- and conflict-related policy provisions and initiatives (such as the EU Communication on Fragility, the Comprehensive Approach, the ill-fated draft EU Action Plan on Fragility, the Agenda for Change) into a clearly communicated leadership position accompanied by practical provisions and guidance⁵⁵ meant that EU services responsible for Yemen were left to their own devices to interpret and apply these policy initiatives through the usual bargaining process inherent in strategy formulation and programming.

‘State-building’ formally entered the Delegation’s lexicon and thinking in 2009, when it commissioned an independent study by Neil Macdonald and Rana Khalil entitled: *Report of the assessment towards a ‘whole-of-EU’ approach to state building in Yemen: addressing fragility to prevent state failure*.⁵⁶ This was the Delegation’s first major foray into contextual analysis framed by a state-building perspective. The report highlighted the presence of Yemen’s ‘parallel state’, identified two areas for further research - the causes of social cohesion, and the role of women and youth as potential change agents – and called for the development of a strategic framework. It laid out an OECD-DAC definition of state-building that emphasises the centrality of a social contract between those who govern and those who are governed. It explicitly distinguished the concept from the narrower technical one of institution-building. The state formation was analysed using a framework developed by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) considering political settlements,⁵⁷ survival functions and expected functions. The study was commissioned and delivered in parallel with the Government of Yemen’s decision to postpone the 2009 parliamentary elections, and with renewed sub-national violence (see Annex 6).

Also in 2009, and in response to a joint paper on Yemen prepared by the Commission and European Council,⁵⁸ the Delegation sought to reframe its cooperation under a comprehensive and state-building-led approach.⁵⁹ This represents the first point during the evaluation period when the EU had sought to deploy all of the instruments, policies, programmes, projects under an overarching strategy informed by contextual analysis and which effectively combined political engagement with development cooperation. State building terminology subsequently appears in the 2010 mid-term review of the 2007-13 CSP, where it is introduced as one of the three main areas of EU development cooperation for the 2011-13 MIP that in turn emphasised state building as a key objective in line with the National Reform Agenda and new National Decentralisation Strategy. The External Assistance Management Report (EAMR) 2010 explicitly explains the shift in policy: ‘The State Building agenda (initiated in 2009) is being followed up through a more coherent approach in the Governance sector in particular, while conflict sensitivity is being considered during programming, formulation and implementation phases of most projects’.

As we note under EQ7 on responsiveness, use of the thematic instruments enabled a reasonably rapid response to the fast evolving situation, with a number of projects being approved for engagement with a range of stakeholder groups, particularly women and youth, with the objectives of conflict prevention and increased citizen voice. As we have also noted though, these projects did not appear to be explicitly linked to the broader coherent agenda: for example, exploring the role of the sheikhs and the use of local-level

⁵³ Amor Boukabri and Susanne Lindahl (2009), *The European Union and challenges to democracy building in the Arab world*, IDEA.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ *Let’s Get Comprehensive: European Union Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries*, Mark Furness, German Development Institute, 2014

⁵⁶ Neil MacDonald and Rana Khalil (2009), *Report of the assessment towards a ‘whole of EU’ approach to state building in Yemen: addressing fragility to prevent state failure*.

⁵⁷ A useful reference explaining what is meant by political settlements and its relevance to cooperation strategy is this 2010 paper prepared by the Asia Foundation: <http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/PoliticalSettlementsFINAL.pdf>

⁵⁸ COREU CFSP/SEC/1904/09

⁵⁹ European Commission (2009), *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen*.

resource allocation in the macro-level political economy and the political settlement.

In 2011, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building agreed on the New Deal⁶⁰ for effective engagement in fragile states that set out the parameters for a mutual compact between donors and recipient countries. In that same year, DEVCO established a crisis and fragility unit to take forward the New Deal; however, the Government of Yemen did not sign up until May 2014, preventing the EU from formally applying the principles to Yemen.⁶¹ Despite this, the EU tried to use the approach as much as possible in its interventions in Yemen after 2011, particularly with regard to donor coordination. In 2012, the EU's Agenda for Change prioritised EU engagement in situations of fragility that – along with growing concerns about regional security⁶² – led to the decision to substantially scale up assistance to Yemen (see EQ1&2). In parallel, from the mid-2000s, RELEX tried to promote what is known as the Comprehensive Approach to conflict and crisis management, mirroring a broader Western trend to bring development, diplomacy and defence closer together, partly as a result of lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Yemen, the security-development nexus is intimately connected to patronage politics, and this is precisely where many strategic trade-offs come into play. The 2009 state building study flagged the inherent conflict between donors' short-term security imperatives and longer-term development objectives, noting the impact of external military assistance on the political settlement. It correctly predicted rising poverty, popular unrest and regime instability. This study also underpinned the EU's shift towards a comprehensive approach in Yemen, but it was almost too prescient to be effective.⁶³ By the time its key messages were trickling through to programming, including governance, the youth-led uprising was already under way (see EQ7).⁶⁴ As a priority, youth activists demanded the removal of Saleh's relatives from command posts in the security services; meanwhile, the fragmentation of the military according to factional interest demonstrated that the army was not (and had never been) a state structure in the formal institutional sense. Rather, it had served several purposes inherent to the elite political settlement.⁶⁵

The 2009 study served as the EU's first macro-level political economy analysis (PEA) in Yemen, articulating enmeshed relationships between politics and business, the power of informal networks, and constraints on reform.⁶⁶ In 2011, on instruction by senior management in DEVCO, the EU discontinued the practice of commissioning external consultants to undertake PEA; instead, this task was assigned to the country teams, to be managed on a rolling basis.⁶⁷ However, we have found no evidence of active and consistent macro-level PEA, nor any detailed sector-level analysis. More importantly, we found a lack of consensus in Brussels over the utility of PEA, a disjointed understanding of its purpose – for example, how it can contribute to strategy and programming, mitigate risk, and help to join political imperatives with development objectives – and confusion over which directorate, if any, should take the lead.⁶⁸ Despite this, EU officials expressed surprise that Saleh's power structures had not been more easily dismantled and regret that the transition had not moved as fast as expected; they also admitted a lack of foresight about deteriorating economic and security conditions.⁶⁹

Regarding the extent to which the Government of Yemen has shared the EU's understanding of state-building as a strategic objective, the Yemen Strategic Vision 2025, written in 2002, speaks of 'the struggle of building up a modern state' after unification in 1990, and the transformation from a 'young democracy to a stable and mature democracy, where political pluralism, the peaceful transition of authority and respect for human rights become the society's engrained and strong mechanisms for the management of government'.

⁶⁰ For an overview of the New Deal, see <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/new-deal-snapshot/>

⁶¹ Interview with senior DEVCO official, and other EU officials, June 2014

⁶² Interview with EEAS official, August 2014

⁶³ Interviews with EEAS and DEVCO officials, June 2014

⁶⁴ Interview with DEVCO official, June 2014

⁶⁵ Hill, G., Salisbury, P., Northedge, L., and Kinninmont, J., (2013), *Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict*, Chatham House.

⁶⁶ MacDonald and Khalil (2009), *Report of the assessment towards a 'whole of EU' approach to state building in Yemen: addressing fragility to prevent state failure*.

⁶⁷ Interview with a senior DEVCO manager, corroborated by other DEVCO and EEAS officials, June 2014

⁶⁸ Interviews with officials at several levels in DEVCO and EEAS, June 2014.

⁶⁹ Interviews with officials at several levels in DEVCO and EEAS, June 2014. For example: 'We promoted an inclusive process in the National Dialogue, but meanwhile probably neglected the deteriorating economy and the adverse effect this would have on political stability'; 'None of us could foresee the deteriorating security environment'; 'We had hoped that the GCC initiative would move faster than it did'.

The PRSP 2003-2005 carries a personal introduction from Saleh that states: ‘Our nation cannot move to the future [without] finding appropriate solutions to the livelihood of the people, combating poverty, the expansion of the social safety net... and strengthening plural democracy.’ Within the main body of the paper itself, the institutional structure of the state is listed as one of the country’s main challenges. The DPPR 2006-2010 adopts the language of good governance, highlighting decentralisation, judicial reform and civil service reform. The TPSD 2012-2014 names good governance and state-building as components of the country’s recovery; state-building objectives are also implicit in each top priority and urgent action.

However, as the context to this evaluation notes and as the 2009 recommendations towards a comprehensive approach made clear, power is exercised by both the formal state and informal state in Yemen. While Yemeni ministers might lend rhetorical support to the EU’s state-building goals, they have not always been empowered to deliver those objectives; thus, any effective state-building strategy requires measures that go beyond traditional development cooperation and bilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, the concept of state-building itself has sometimes been exploited for factional purposes, because of the opportunities for resource capture attached to state-building projects, while some grassroots groups (who might themselves be capable of acting as indigenous agents of state-building) have criticised Western-backed state-building efforts as legitimising a failing regime and artificially extending its survival.

JC 3.2 Extent to which EU political dialogue and development cooperation in Yemen have been mutually reinforcing in pursuit of state-building objectives.

The 2009 recommendations towards a comprehensive EU approach to Yemen identified enhanced political dialogue as the top priority for medium- to long-term engagement. It noted: ‘As Yemen’s state structures co-exist with a complex parallel network of alliances, patronage and co-option, the identification of real and effective decision-makers can be challenging. Yet, as the EU supports the building-up of an effective state in Yemen, continued engagement with all state structures, whatever their shortcomings, remains of primary importance. To give additional weight to its messages and concerns, the EU should seek a dialogue at the highest level. To ensure a positive result, more understanding of the parallel power structures and the actual powerbase in the background will be necessary.’ Key EU messages included the need for an inclusive national dialogue process, and ‘the need to seriously reinvigorate, with renewed determination, the political and economic reform process’ as the basis for the effective functioning of the future state.

The story of EU political dialogue is told in more detail in the state-building case study (Annex 6), with additional focus on EU support to CSOs in the context of state-society relations and the broader governance agenda; the regional dynamic is covered in EQ5, and international elements in EQ8. With regards to prior EU efforts to sponsor governance reforms, the 2009 recommendations noted that ‘effective progress has been minimal as a result of entrenched interests of Yemen’s political elite’. However, renewed emphasis by the EU and other donors from 2009 onwards further politicised the reform agenda, intensifying factional tensions related to succession politics and the balance of power in parliament. The MTR 2010 and the MIP 2011-13 both declared support for the National Reform Agenda, largely led by MOPIC and associated with the formal state; yet, one specific elite faction associated with Saleh’s elder son Ahmed Ali promoted a rival reform programme, the Ten Point Plan, endorsed by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.⁷⁰ Delegation officials tried to reconcile both agendas but struggled to modify their approach to fully account for the link between politics and technicalities; they also found that the EU development budget gave them limited leverage at this level.⁷¹

Key elements of the reform agenda, such as the removal of diesel subsidies, had a direct relationship to the dynamics of Saleh’s political settlement. With the benefit of hindsight, we can conclude that the EU and other donors had not yet fully understood the nature of that political settlement, especially at the sector level, nor yet identified effective elite incentives to create the conditions within which the Government of Yemen could rightfully act on national plans and priorities. It was not until 2011 that the structure of Yemen’s political economy, including the extent of elite control over the commodity supply chain, became more widely apparent (see EQ5 and EQ7). Given that major regime players of the Saleh era retain a substantial stake in the economy and the political economy, and – through proxies – in formal politics,⁷² and that the

⁷⁰ ‘As nations meet, Clinton urges Yemen to prove itself worthy of aid’, *New York Times*, 27 January 2010.

⁷¹ Interview with Delegation official, July 2014.


⁷² Ginny Hill, Peter Salisbury, Léonie Northedge and Jane Kinninmont (2013), *Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict*, Chatham House.

CSP 2014-2015 notes that the TPSD ‘recycles many elements of a number of previous failed reform agendas’, these issues retain their relevance and should form the basis of future strategy revisions, in line with political settlement theory and the definition of state building set out in the 2009 Macdonald/Khalil report.⁷³

JC 3.3 Extent to which the results of EU cooperation have contributed to Yemen state-building objectives.

The figure below shows the pattern of planned expenditure under the 2002-06 and 2007-13 CSPs and their respective NIPs/MIPs. This pattern across governance, human rights and democracy and security and justice, does not demonstrate a coherent and consistent approach to state-building, echoing our findings above under JC 3.1.

Figure 2: Total planned expenditure by contract year on programmes related to governance, human rights and democracy and security and justice, 2002-12 (EUR)



Under the sector of governance, the EU’s main historical programme expenditures have been on public administrative reform (Decision MED/1999/003/337) and support to electoral processes and the Parliament (Decision MED/2007/019/211). The ‘Support for Administrative Reform’ (SAR) programme was approved in 2000 and ran until 2007, with subsequent extensions to 2009 and then 2010. An evaluation report and Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) missions indicate patchy programme performance:

‘The quality of the project outputs was very poor. ... Coordination, management and financial arrangements are not clear. ... It is understood by the monitor that almost 90% of short-term international expert days have been expended on the project to date. There is a risk that the project will not provide the necessary institutional strengthening and local ownership as it is required to fulfil under SAR.’ (ROM Monitoring Report 2006)

‘Changes in the political willingness towards reform have had a very positive impact on the project success. The engagement at Ministerial level and their adoption of Reform initiatives developed in synergy with the WB CSMP, and SAR project has produced dramatic positive effects for the future of the Reform Process in Yemen.’ (ROM Monitoring Report 2007)

The SAR Programme was assessed at mid-term in spring 2006. It found that only MoSAL paid attention to strategy development and re-engineering. ... In December 2008, an assessment was made of the second phase outputs (March 2006 to December 2008). The findings at MoSAL were that the preliminary strategic paper did not lead to implementation.’ (Report on Public Administration Modernisation in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour in Yemen, PAI, 2009)⁷⁴

Support to electoral processes and the Parliament (co-financed with UNDP) was intended to strengthen capacity and preparedness for the 2009 elections, which were postponed as the political and security situation in Yemen deteriorated. The programme design was substantively revised in 2010 to support preparedness and democracy awareness for the rescheduled elections in 2011, but the programme was overtaken by the 2011 crisis. Brief analysis of the UNDP logframe for the programme demonstrates a continued reliance on unrealistic assumptions – eg. ‘Peace and stability in the country’; ‘The Yemeni Government implements the 2006-10 DPPR without significant delays.’

The majority of EU funding for human rights and democracy (65%) has been spent on human rights related interventions. Of the 35% spent on democracy, 23% was spent on election observation missions in 2006. EU

⁷³ Neil MacDonald and Rana Khalil (2009) *Report of the assessment towards a ‘whole of EU’ approach to state building in Yemen: addressing fragility to prevent state failure*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series - Supporting State-building in Situations of Conflict and Fragility - Policy Guidance (2011)

⁷⁴ This is the only ‘evaluation’ of support to PAR that we have been able to locate. In fact the evaluation was more of an identification mission for subsequent support phases and it provides very little evaluative evidence of the effectiveness or impact of the programme over the whole period since the original Financing Agreement was signed.

investment in democracy-related interventions did not start until 2006, when the focus was on election monitoring, using funds provided through the Democracy and Human Rights instrument (DDH). Funding through the bilateral instrument (MED) was limited to very small projects to support civil society organisations. Latterly we can see a more strategic use of the EIDHR instrument in support of political dialogue and development of the TPSD.

The main security and justice programme expenditures were: Strengthening the Juvenile Justice System in Yemen (EUR 2.8m from 2009), implemented by UNICEF to strengthen juvenile justice and the protective environment for children in line with international standards; Support to the Yemeni Ministry of Interior (EUR 725,000 from 2010), implemented by the French Ministry of Interior to provide capacity building for police academies and police schools; and EU Support to Social Sector Capacity Building (EUR 1m from 2010), to strengthen MoSAL policies and capacities. All of these programmes were to a greater or lesser degree overtaken by events in 2011. No evaluations are available for these programmes.

The Macdonald/Khalil report explicitly linked governance reform to better service provision, noting: 'Improving the quality and extension of services can and must be supported by capacity building. But structurally it would also require freeing up a budget that is highly dominated by politically driven expenditures: in particular state employment and subsidies such as the diesel subsidy. It would also mean overcoming the degree to which such control of such budget expenditures forms a part of the patronage system and lack of transparency in state tendering on which the stability of the political settlement rests. There is little public expectation of services from government. Local government, where the contact between citizen and state is greatest, is probably the place to prioritise development of a government which is accountable and organised citizens able to exercise effective demand. Participatory planning and citizen monitoring of delivery will be critical. It is also essential that adequate resources are decentralised along with responsibility.'⁷⁵

The EU's series of health support programmes offers a successful example of state building work strengthening service delivery at the local level, in line with the Macdonald model. These programmes [decision MED 5973 (2006), MED 18518 (2008) and DECI-MED 19573 (2012)] have strengthened the capacity of local health services in selected governorates by providing 'soft' support that complements regular government financing; this involves training of staff, as well as supply of some consumables. To ensure good governance mechanisms, selection of beneficiaries and mechanisms of implementation are managed through voluntary Health Development Councils established at the governorate level that include government health and administrative staff as well as representatives of civil society. Thus, these programmes stand as evidence that EU support has improved or deepened state-society relations; contributed to building public administration capacity to mobilise, allocate and manage public resources; and contributed to more effective accountable and transparent institutions. They also provide a good example of continuity, with lessons learned over time being integrated into new approaches.⁷⁶ However, EU support to health development councils has recently been discontinued (see EQ1.2).

Due to the relative lack of evaluative evidence and to their framing purely as social protection programmes, it is not possible to comment on the state-building contribution of the significant EU support (EUR 28 million over the evaluation period) to two other local authority level programmes, the SFD and the SWF.

Elsewhere, in EQ4 and EQ9, we explore the trade-offs between short-term project success and longer-term capacity development, the use of state versus non-state implementers, and the use of parallel implementation structures and salary top-ups.

⁷⁵ MacDonald and Khalil (2009), Ibid.

⁷⁶ Interviews, July 2014.

2.4. Resilience

EQ4: To what extent has EU cooperation contributed to greater resilience⁷⁷ in Yemen? What has helped or hindered effectiveness?

Summary response: The EU has invested substantially in what might be described retrospectively as resilience-enhancing interventions, although these have been conceived in a poverty reduction rather than resilience-building paradigm. Resilience as a formal concept is now prominent in plans for future development cooperation in Yemen, but it has arrived formally in EU strategy and programming only very recently and quite suddenly. The EU has actively sought to coordinate its resilience-enhancing interventions and dialogue with MS, currently illustrated by its joint programming of resilience interventions.

The historical portfolio of resilience-enhancing interventions has been under-evaluated; EUR 54 million of support to food security between 2002 and 2012 has barely been evaluated at all. Notwithstanding this evaluation gap, the EU itself assesses its historical ‘resilience portfolio’ as having achieved limited impact and with weak sustainability. Attempts to develop a shared understanding and definition of the root causes of fragility and vulnerability have been limited and short-lived. The continued inadequate attention to political economy analysis at sector and problem level means that there remains a missed opportunity to locate resilience interventions in a better understanding of commodity value chains. There is no clear evidence of a systematic approach to coordination with DG ECHO and treatment of the principles of LRRD during the period, although it was flagged for further attention during the 2011 crisis and there are some examples of good practice. Since 2011 when for the first time both DEVCO and DG ECHO had field offices in Sana’a, cooperation has been very close and effective.

Factors supporting EU contributions to resilience include close coordination between EU services, MS and ECHO; and close attention to the building of local partnerships capable of sustaining basic service delivery over the longer term. Factors hindering EU contributions to resilience include weak results-based management, lack of attention to coherence between programmes and limited understanding of the political economy of commodity value chains. With respect to national-level capacity-building for resilience, the fundamental development issue of whether to operate through more efficient ‘parallel’ institutions or contractors or to focus on building the capacity of ‘permanent’ state institutions has not been addressed satisfactorily in line with international norms.

JC 4.1 Extent to which EU development cooperation (in particular, activities in support of food security, private sector development and job creation) has been designed to contribute to resilience objectives.

Following the 2008 food, fuel, and financial crises, the term ‘resilience’ came into use in international development as policy makers and practitioners began searching for new approaches to tackling poverty in the face of such major shocks. In its Communication *The EU approach to resilience: learning from food security crises* (October 2012),⁷⁸ the EU defines resilience as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks.’ With respect to planning, ‘resilience is about linking vulnerability with sustainability in planning.’⁷⁹

Notwithstanding the current focus on resilience and the formal adoption of the term by the EU only recently, this evaluation looks back at how EU cooperation has contributed to what we would now call resilience, paying particular attention to Food Security, and social welfare and job creation and to the interface between development cooperation and humanitarian assistance.

Resilience as a term does not appear in the CSPs, NIPs or MIPs applicable to the evaluation period. Given the arrival of the term in the international development discourse following the 2008 global financial crisis, it

⁷⁷ In May 2013 the EU Council defined resilience as ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects’.

⁷⁸ The term ‘resilience’ does appear in earlier documents. For example, the European Consensus on development states that in countries which are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters, climatic change, environmental degradation and external economic shocks, ‘... Member States and the Community will support disaster prevention and preparedness in these countries, with a view to increasing their **resilience** in the face of these challenges.’ [COM (1996)153], emphasis added.

⁷⁹ ECHO contribution at the workshop on Joint Programming and Resilience in Yemen [Brussels 19-20 June, 2014].

is unsurprising that it does not receive treatment in name or concept in the CSPs, NIPs or MIPs that predate 2008. However, neither the MTR nor 2011-13 MIP mention resilience and the sections on the resilience-related focal sectors of health, the SWF and livelihoods and nutrition enhancement are phrased in similar terms to previous CSPs/NIPs/MIPs, in a poverty reduction rather than resilience-building paradigm.

The term is now prominent in plans for future development cooperation in Yemen, as evidenced by its five mentions in the CSP for 2014-15 and in three new identification fiches for strengthening health systems (EUR 18 million), scaling up rural growth (EUR 10 million) and strengthening nutrition systems (EUR 9 million), the title for each of which starts with the phrase *Enhancing Resilience in Yemen...* The EU Council is now formally committed⁸⁰ to joint programming, including in this area. The proposed Joint programming with MS for the years 2016-20 was launched in June 2014 with a workshop addressing resilience issues, and was attended by one of the our team.⁸¹ From our observation of the workshop, it is clear that both the concept of resilience and its use in planning are still fragmented and embryonic.

The CSPs and NIP/MIPs indicate a consistent concern with resilience-related interventions that we categorise as Food Security, support to the SWF and SFD, water infrastructure, health and civil society strengthening aimed at building social capital.⁸² A total of EUR 109 million was committed to resilience-related expenditure during the evaluation period⁸³ – EUR 43 million from bilateral funds under the CSP/NIP/MIPs and EUR 66 million under thematic instruments and programmes. Support to Food Security represents the largest proportion by far (EUR 54 million) and is the only sector in which there has been a commitment in each year. Analysis of the proportionate commitment by sector indicates significant variation year by year. The total commitment to social protection expenditure, made up by support to the SWF and SFD, was EUR 28 million; and commitments to health totalled EUR 38.5 million. The question, though, is the extent to which these elements of support were designed and managed independently of each other or as part of an integrated strategy to build resilience (or its precursor concepts).

Analysis indicates an integrated and sequenced approach *within* resilience-related areas of support at the level of design. A good example of this is Food Security, where support has been targeted over a long period directly at vulnerable people, at building government and community capacity and at enabling actions such as support to the Food Security Information System (FSIS). However with respect to implementation, resilience achievements have been limited: support to agriculture in the Tihama has primarily benefited the larger landowners,⁸⁴ while government capacity building on monitoring through the FSIS that had started as a pilot project in Hodeida,⁸⁵ was eventually re-contracted to the FAO⁸⁶ due to slow implementation by government and what Delegation staff felt was poor value for money delivered through centralised technical assistance. This reflected a growing understanding at the time within the Delegation and among key food security donors that greater impact was achieved by locating delivery mechanisms closer to beneficiaries.⁸⁷

Employment creation is clearly an issue for the private sector, particularly at a time when all funders are working to persuade government to reduce its salary burden. The SFD, established in 1997 with support from the World Bank, was one of the funds established throughout the developing world to mitigate what was expected to be the temporary negative impact on employment of the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes. Fundamentally a social protection institution, it has only recently taken up ‘cash transfers’. Earlier it was basically providing short-term ‘cash for work’ at a local level in the construction of some community infrastructures and supported the establishment of micro and small enterprises. Over the 16

⁸⁰ Presentation by M Dirk Meganck, director, directorate H, DEVCO, 19 June 2014.

⁸¹ Workshop on Joint Programming and Resilience in Yemen, 19-20 June 2014.

⁸² We have not included support to SME development, to the fisheries sector or to agriculture here, as we consider these to be more enablers of economic activity than direct contributions to resilience. Nonetheless, as the Private Sector Development monograph in Annex 10 indicates, PSD strategy has not been sufficiently coherent and consistent, impact has been limited and sustainability has been weak. So while it has never been a subject for evaluation, we can infer that contribution to resilience from EU PSD will have been limited at best.

⁸³ See Annex 6 for further detail of annual commitments on resilience-related interventions.

⁸⁴ Discussions with EU official, 2014. This was also the finding of evaluations of the World Bank spate irrigation projects in Wadi Zabid in the 1990s.

⁸⁵ Decision 1852, various contracts.

⁸⁶ First under the ECHO project [ECHO/Yem/BUD/2011/91006] Introduction and piloting of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification in Yemen with the food Security and Agriculture Cluster, followed by the National Food Security Information System project contracted to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in 2013.

⁸⁷ European Commission (2009), Action Fiche for Food Security in Yemen.

years between its creation and 2012, the SFD created just under 60 million days of employment for the entire period. Other than support to micro-enterprises, SFD funding only creates casual and temporary unskilled jobs in construction or rehabilitation of projects locally – a contribution to improving household resilience but obviously a temporary stop-gap effort rather than a long-term solution to unemployment. Nonetheless, in comparison with other social funds, SFD's performance in this regard has been impressive.

The private sector support investments certainly focus on long-term resilience for beneficiaries. They include in particular the various fisheries projects discussed further in the private sector development case study, and which have not been very successful. But they also include the more recent co-financing with IFAD of the Economic Opportunities Programme (EOP) in support of smallholder coffee producers and their value chain, as well as the honey and vegetable value chains. At the time of writing results on both are still uncertain and the country's political difficulties have prevented effective supervision to date.

There is at least one example of an attempt to integrate different food security interventions: these included the two contracts to NGOs (Triangle Génération Humanitaire and Aide Médicale Internationale) to provide agricultural and health support that were intended to complement the investment in irrigation through the TDA. The three added up to a reasonably comprehensive programme package.

JC 4.2 Extent to which there has been a coordinated and consistent approach among EU services (DEVCO, ECHO, EEAS) and Member States to understanding the root causes of fragility and vulnerability and enhancing resilience and impact.

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) has long been a commitment of the EU [COM (1996)153] and is addressed in the European Consensus on Development [2006/C 46/01] thus with regard to transition situations (emphasis added):

21. In transition situations, the EU will **promote linkages between emergency aid, rehabilitation and long-term development**. In a post-crisis situation development will be guided by integrated transition strategies, aiming at rebuilding institutional capacities, essential infrastructure and social services, increasing Food Security and providing sustainable solutions for refugees, displaced persons and the general security of citizens. EU action will take place in the framework of multilateral efforts including the UN Peace Building Commission, and will aim to re-establish the principles of ownership and partnership.

Prior to 2011, there was little coordination between DEVCO on the one hand and DG ECHO activities on the other. The latter were driven more by ECHO's worldwide annual budget allocation process and then negotiation of contracts with the European NGOs, UN agencies and international humanitarian organisations through which EC-funded humanitarian assistance has to be implemented according to the ECHO mandate.

There has only been one evaluation of DG ECHO operations in Yemen, undertaken in 2006. The evaluators concluded that DG ECHO-financed operations 'addressed needs in obviously poor communities' and had in general been effective. The evaluators noted that a number of the operations assessed had design flaws, had not been integrated into local systems and had been subject to problems due to poor absorption capacity on the part of Yemeni authorities.⁸⁸ Examination of the details of a sample of individual DEVCO interventions provides no further evidence of a systematic approach to coordination with DG ECHO and –through this – to systematic treatment of the principles of LRRD during the period, although it was flagged for further attention during the 2011 crisis.⁸⁹

Since 2011 when, for the first time, both DEVCO and DG ECHO had field offices in Sana'a, cooperation has been very close and effective. This has taken place at the level of design and planning through a series of consultations between the two with respect to selection of partners, as well as in ensuring that DG ECHO projects whose duration is limited to one year (according to the ECHO mandate), but which needs to be sustained, are then followed up with DEVCO investments as discussed above. For example, DG ECHO initial support to the Integrated Food Security Phase classification with FAO was followed up with DEVCO support to the Food Security Information System. Another example is the complementarity with respect to community-level therapeutic programmes on malnutrition, where DG ECHO set up several hundred Outpatient Therapeutic Programmes while DEVCO worked on improving the Ministry of Health's capacity

⁸⁸ No projects were financed in 2006, during which time DG ECHO undertook an evaluation of its past interventions in Yemen.

⁸⁹ EU Delegation (January-June 2010), External Assistance Management Report.

to deal with malnutrition, through the introduction of food supplements and other activities. Both DG ECHO and Delegation staff pointed out the importance of both being on-site.⁹⁰

Attempts to develop a shared understanding and definition of the root causes of fragility and vulnerability have been limited and short-lived. The MacDonald/Khalil study clearly identified the linkages between politics and poverty (as they stated, ‘politics trumps everything’) and went as far as to propose a sequenced set of reforms that would, inter alia, address resilience. As we have stated elsewhere (especially under EQ3) the EU strategy response⁹¹ picked up on the study, recommending a short-term crisis response and a longer-term state-building focus under a joint EU country strategy. The joint country strategy is not yet under preparation, joint programming efforts are in their early stages and political economy analysis at the sector or problem level has yet to become part of normal practice. One is left to wonder to what extent greater investment by the EU in sector and problem level PEA, addressing such issues as elite control of the commodity supply chain, would have led to different programming decisions and in turn to greater direct impact on household livelihoods and on the numbers of poor beneficiaries of EU investments.

The EU has been an active participant and occasional leader in the various joint donor and government forums that have been in operation over the period of the evaluation, such as the Donor Forum meetings and Sector Working Groups. Resilience-related themes covered by these forums include food security, social protection, health, economic cooperation and private sector development. Examples of the Delegation’s role cited in EAMRs include the Delegation’s leadership of the Food Security task force; agreement of a Memorandum of Understanding with donors on support to the water sector strategy; and more recently EU leadership on the livelihoods component of the JSEA, undertaken in 2012 as an input to preparation of the Government’s TPSD. However it is important to note that these coordination meetings have, over the decades, failed to develop into more than information exchanges.

JC 4.3 Extent to which EU development cooperation has strengthened the resilience of targeted beneficiary populations in Yemen and the capacities of intermediary organisations responsible for service delivery to vulnerable populations

There is a distinct absence of evidence on the results and impact of EU support to Food Security. There is a 2010 Food Security Baseline Survey in the Hodeidah Governorate, conducted by the Food Security Information System and co-financed by the EU, but this does not provide any findings on the impacts of EU-financed Food Security interventions. Reference is made in the 2007-13 CSP to an evaluation of the Food Security Programme (perhaps during 2006) but the evaluators have been unable to trace this evaluation. No other evaluations of food security interventions (totalling EUR 54 million since 2002) were found. Interviews with current and former Delegation staff confirmed that this has been significantly under-evaluated, although the reasons for this oversight are not clear.

The EU itself judges that ‘a considerable number of rural development programmes, an agricultural census, a market information system, a food security information system, institutional capacity building and technical assistance have all been supported, but with limited impact to date.’⁹² The EU also cites capacity-building as a key factor in limiting impact, contrasting its own performance with that of IFAD, which ‘on the other hand, has been able to continue the regular implementation of most of its activities during the 2011 crisis, due to its reliance on strong partnerships with local organisations and institutions.’⁹³

EU Food Security support targeted at the population of the Tihama plain in Hodeidah Governorate has been consistent with the EU’s approach nationally to providing an integrated package of bottom-up and top-down support to Food Security. Support in Tihama has included funding and TA support for the TDA; direct support to the Governorate and district authorities for Food Security operations; support to the National Bureau of Statistics for the development of a Food Security Information System (in partnership with FAO, both at Governorate and national levels); direct contracts with NGOs and non-for-profit organisations; support to irrigation and agriculture programmes and support to the SWF that operates in the area. EU funds have been provided through the CSP and via the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP).

⁹⁰ Interviews with Delegation and DG ECHO staff September 2013, June 2014.

⁹¹ European Commission (2009), *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen*.

⁹² European Commission (2013), *Action Fiche for Enhancing Resilience in Yemen: Scaling Up Rural Growth*.

⁹³ See also our findings elsewhere on the lack of a strategic EU approach to national capacity development.

EU support to the SFD and the SWF is addressed in greater detail in Annex 6. With regard to food security interventions, the absence of evaluations or detailed monitoring reports means that there are no firm data on the socio-economic status of beneficiaries of the interventions classified under food security headings. Anecdotal evidence of the spate irrigation investments in Tihama suggests that the main beneficiaries were larger landholders, with smaller landowners being pressured into selling land to larger landowners in anticipation of higher incomes once water supply improvements were initiated.⁹⁴ In this case, at least, it would appear that the investments have not contributed to increased resilience of vulnerable households.

Complementary investments in the Tihama included two contracts to NGOs (Triangle GH and Aide Médicale Internationale) to provide agricultural and health support thus adding up to a reasonably comprehensive programme package. This indicates a good attempt at coordination and complementarity of activities. Unfortunately the final joint report of these NGOs⁹⁵ does not provide the data required to assess actual achievements against a baseline, though they report water savings due to improved use of irrigation water and the adoption of new crops [vegetables replacing tobacco with lower water requirements]⁹⁶ and some successes in health awareness improvements. Concerning the use of service delivery intermediaries, in the case of food security, direct support has gone to the TDA (the oldest and most established of a number of local agricultural development authorities) for capacity-building and irrigation improvements. Given the considerable earlier investments by others, such as the World Bank (most recently under the Irrigation Improvement Project), it should, in principle, not have needed the EUR 1.5 million TA contract allocated to capacity building in water management.⁹⁷ Most importantly, while TA to the TDA was designed to strengthen capacity of a permanent national institution, the NGO contracts did little to strengthen capacity or resilience at the level of community-based institutions, as they were implemented mostly by international NGOs.

As for the SFD, EU funding is not monitored separately from that of other funders. Its regular overall evaluations suggest that the poor and vulnerable are the main beneficiaries of investments, thus improving their incomes and resilience at the household level. However, with respect to capacity building and institutional resilience at the community level, the 2006 evaluation⁹⁸ raised questions about the sustainability of the community-level institutions established through the SFD. DFID's 2012 review of its support to the SFD also raised questions about whether the programme had led to sustainable improvements in food security. While resilience is not mentioned in these evaluations, there is a strong focus on capacity-building of institutions in the 2009 evaluation at least,⁹⁹ focusing in particular on helping to build capacity 'of local partners, including communities, NGOs, government agencies, consultants and contractors'.¹⁰⁰

With respect to national-level capacity-building for resilience, the fundamental development issue of whether to operate through more efficient 'parallel' institutions or contractors or to focus on building the capacity of 'permanent' state institutions has not been addressed satisfactorily. Despite commitment to the 2007 fragile states principles (which state that 'where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long-term capacity development'), EU support is still mostly distributed through NGOs and parallel institutions such as the SFD, rather than to the SWF. The latter two, regardless of their different *modi operandi*, are both institutions whose main mandates are to provide mechanisms of social protection and improve poor people's living conditions and, therefore, indirectly resilience.¹⁰¹ In the

⁹⁴ Discussions with delegation and consultants, 2013-14.

⁹⁵ Triangle Generation Humanitaire, Aide Médicale Internationale (2011), *Final Report addressed to the European Commission, Integrated Food Security Project in Wadi Siham area, EuropeAid/FOOD/2007/147/002, December 2011*, p.4.

⁹⁶ Ibid. p.37.

⁹⁷ Project Completion Report GOPA (2013), p.1.

⁹⁸ ESA Consultores International (2006), *Social Fund for Development, Impact Evaluation Study, Final Report*.

⁹⁹ The Recovery & Development consortium (2010), *DFID Yemen Social Fund for Development – Institutional Evaluation, SFD Evaluation 2009 final institutional evaluation report, contract nu CNTR 200808562*; The Recovery & Development consortium (2010), *DFID Yemen Social fund for Development – Impact Evaluation, final report*.

¹⁰⁰ Impact Evaluation, op. cit. (2010), p.6.

¹⁰¹ SFD website, objectives of the organisation, 'The Social Fund for Development (SFD) was established by Law No. 10 of 1997 to contribute to achieve, and align its programs with, goals of the national social and economic development plans for poverty reduction (DPPRs)', Europeaid/129783/C/SER/multi FWC COM2 2011 Lot 1: Studies and Technical Assistance in all sectors. Request no 2011/278363, Yemen Social Welfare Fund Monitoring Mission, Final report, Hans World, et al, 14 March 2012, p.4., 'The Social Welfare Fund (SWF) is considered by the Government of Yemen as the main instrument in its effort to combat poverty.'

case of the SFD, it is clear that its size and employment conditions¹⁰² mean that – regardless of intention – in practice it can weaken the state institutions with which it objectively competes, given that the most qualified and competent are drawn by its employment conditions. Furthermore, although the SFD is intended to support decentralisation and has trained local councillors communities to monitor and hold Government of Yemen (GoY) to account, evidence indicates that it can in effect compete with or even replace government services – for example, the 2006 evaluation found that local governments tended to have a low profile in SFD investments. Thus, support for the SFD rather than the SWF – which is the State’s basic social protection institution – demonstrates a strategic choice contrary to the decisions of the New Deal, favouring immediate efficiency at the expense of long-term state-building. Among EU officials there are clearly different views on this point, including some who consider that this approach is suitable to conditions in Yemen while others are aware of the long-term implications of such an approach.¹⁰³ Clearly there is a humanitarian argument to ensure that basic needs are met over the short term; however, from the absence of an explicit strategy or reflection on the trade-offs of short-term delivery against long-term capacity development, we can only conclude that the EU has not sought to address this issue directly. Our evaluation assesses that EU approaches to, and achievements of, capacity-building are highly variable. For example, the work done through the Ministry of Health governorate-level Health Development Council contributes to strengthening local capacity, particularly as it enables in-service training of community-level staff. Similarly, funding through the SFD for community-level capacity building (elected representatives, infrastructure committees, income generating skills etc.) contributes to improved capacity –though its quality is sometimes questionable. But work through Non-State Actors (NSAs) and NGOs has had a far lesser impact on community capacity-building for a number of reasons: a) many of these are international organisations whose capacity improvements do not improve the situation in Yemen; b) while local NGOs/NSAs are learning the procedures necessary to obtain and manage EU funds, this is a skill-set that has very limited application and is not replicable elsewhere, and; c) insufficient attention is given to this in supervision/monitoring.

¹⁰² Comparative salary differentials between SFD staff are significant, with professionals at SFD receiving over USD 1,500 per month, while government staff receive up to USD 200, approximately.

¹⁰³ Interviews, Brussels, June 2014.

2.5. Regional engagement

EQ5: In what ways has the EU engagement with regional actors and donors complemented and strengthened its cooperation in Yemen? Has appropriate emphasis been given to this engagement?

Summary response: The EU identified the Gulf States as important interlocutors in Yemen at the start of the evaluation period, in particular Saudi Arabia. However, fostering more effective EU engagement has taken nearly a decade, in parallel with coordinated efforts by MS. At first, Gulf donors proved reluctant to entertain a partnership approach to development cooperation and humanitarian assistance even as they increased their aid budgets, but regular contact between EU, MS and Gulf officials during 2010 formed the basis for more explicit political dialogue the following year, leading to the GCC's crucial role in mediating Yemen's transition agreement with support from the UN, the US, the EU and MS, and to the subsequent creation of the MAF.

The EU's regional political engagement is helped by the fact that Yemen and the Gulf States are managed together within the EEAS, but for obvious reasons DEVCO has no aid programme in the Gulf region. In addition, none of the Gulf States have been OECD-DAC signatories during the evaluation period. Since 2010, there has been a tentative shift towards greater conditionality attached to Saudi aid to Yemen, in line with Riyadh's growing role within the Friends of Yemen. However, formal diplomacy and aid pledges run in parallel with substantial networks of transnational patronage that shift constantly, affecting Yemen's political settlement and with which the EU has little or no interface. The Saudis' likely preferences should be central to any future EU analysis relating to resilience and state building, in the context of Yemen's transition to a post-oil economy.

The performance of the MAF and Executive Bureau, created to facilitate and accelerate implementation of the Transitional Plan for Stability and Development, offers a challenging example of the interplay of intra-national, regional and donor interests. In light of current tensions between factional interests and longer-term state-building considerations, it remains unclear whether the EU's recent leverage on state-building can be maintained.

JC 5.1 Extent to which the EU has engaged effectively and appropriately with regional actors and donors to leverage development change within Yemen.

The GCC comprises the Gulf monarchies of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Yemen has long sought GCC membership. However, Yemen's per capita GDP is considerably lower than the average per capita GDP for the GCC countries. Furthermore, as a fragile state and a populous republic, Yemen's political culture is not considered to be compatible with that of the Gulf monarchies.

Among the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia has historically provided the most support to Yemen, as a source of transnational patronage to Yemen's tribes and prominent political figures, as well as a labour market for migrant Yemeni workers; it remains the largest bilateral donor. Yet, Yemen's perceived solidarity with Iraq during the 1990 Gulf Crisis strained relations with its Gulf neighbours, notably with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, leading to the expulsion of large numbers of Yemeni workers. Rebuilding relations took many years, helped considerably by the implementation of its border agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed in 2000.

The CSP 2002-06 named the Gulf States, in particular Saudi Arabia, among the most important political and commercial interlocutors in Yemen, along with the USA and the EU. For the EU, however, fostering more effective engagement with Saudi Arabia has taken nearly a decade, despite the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East adopted by the June 2004 European Council having been envisaged as the process through which they aimed to engage with countries in the region, including facilitating the integration of Yemen into the regional and international context.¹⁰⁴ In 2006, the UK hosted a donors' conference in London where the Gulf States pledged more than USD 3.7 billion in development aid for Yemen, including USD 2.5 billion in bilateral aid and USD 1.2 billion managed through regional organisations, to be spent by 2010. The London pledges amounted to a fourfold increase on previous levels of GCC aid spending in Yemen, and followed from the recognition that Yemen was underfunded relative to its need.

¹⁰⁴ CSP 2007-13, section 3.1.

Around this time, EU officials began a tentative political dialogue with the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, to see if they could be encouraged to play a more strategic role in Yemen. In part, this followed from insights gained during the 2006 EU EOM and subsequent preparations for Yemen's scheduled parliamentary elections.¹⁰⁵ Coordination with GCC increased in 2008 with the EU being invited to GCC-Yemen dialogue forums as well as launching a trilateral cooperation mechanism. Improved outreach to the Gulf States also formed a central element of the 2009 Comprehensive Approach – a strategic priority that was shared by the UK, which also underwent a policy review during 2009.¹⁰⁶ Due to Britain's close historical ties to the Gulf, the UK took the lead in this area, with EU support.¹⁰⁷

The formation of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in January 2009, a transnational organisation with joint Saudi-Yemeni leadership, heightened Riyadh's fears about Yemen's deteriorating security conditions, and provided some impetus towards more frequent and open dialogue with the West – albeit, still of a limited and cautious nature.¹⁰⁸ Later that year, AQAP tried and failed to assassinate the head of Saudi's counter-terrorism programme, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. In December 2009, AQAP tried and failed to detonate a bomb on board a plane in the skies above Detroit; the resulting media furore led to the formation of the FoY in January 2010.

From the outset, a strategic partnership between Western governments and the Gulf States was conceived as central to the FoY process. Although it did not offer a formal mechanism for coordinating the disbursement of aid, it did provide some stimulus towards improved aid effectiveness by establishing a new momentum and focus on Yemen policy among its member states. In February 2010, Yemen, the Gulf donors and Yemen's Western donors met in Riyadh to try to speed up delivery on existing big-ticket projects, and to pave the way forward for the next round of pledges. Western efforts to encourage a partnership approach – for example, where GCC donors funded construction projects, such as schools and hospitals, and Western donors funded soft skills programmes to train teachers and medical staff – had limited success, while Gulf donors proved reluctant to pool funds for humanitarian work. Gulf donors also proved reluctant to open their labour markets to Yemeni workers, when they faced internal political and economic pressure. In addition, despite their pledge to quadruple aid spending in Yemen, the Gulf States had not authorised parallel increases in resources for their own development agencies to oversee these sums of money.¹⁰⁹

By the end of 2010, the Government of Yemen said that less than 10% of the promised money had actually been spent. Donors blamed a combination of weak government capacity and scant political will at the highest levels in Yemen, along with stringent conditions imposed by the Gulf States. Despite this, regular contact between UK, EU and Saudi officials improved working relationships, built trust, and allowed for greater mutual understanding of strategic priorities. Thus, valuable groundwork was laid during 2010 that formed the basis for more explicit political dialogue with the Gulf States the following year, leading to the GCC's role in mediating Yemen's transition agreement – viewed by some as a sign of new vigour in Gulf diplomacy.¹¹⁰ Critical to the GCC's success were diplomatic efforts made by the UN, the US, the EU and MS to encourage the GCC secretariat in its endeavours (see EQ7). Aided by MS ambassadors – particularly those from UK, Germany and France – the role of the Head of Delegation was critical towards marshalling a coherent EU response to the crisis.¹¹¹ The FoY process was suspended during 2011; it resumed after President Hadi's election in 2012, when the Saudis joined the UK and Yemen as co-chairs.

JC 5.2 Extent to which EU engagement and cooperation with regional countries and organisations has given it greater leverage for initiating change in Yemen.

Since the creation of the FoY in 2010, growing alignment over the need to improve aid delivery to Yemen (if not the precise disbursement methods), agreement over Saleh's 2011 removal, collective efforts to secure the

¹⁰⁵ Interview with former EEAS official, June 2014.

¹⁰⁶ Interviews with current and former EEAS officials, as well as current and former UK officials, June 2014 (and prior).

¹⁰⁷ Interviews with current and former EEAS officials, as well as current and former UK officials, June 2014 (and prior).

¹⁰⁸ Interviews with current and former EEAS officials, as well as former member states and IGOs, June 2014 (and prior).

¹⁰⁹ Ginny Hill and Gerd Nonneman (2011), *Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy*, Chatham House.

¹¹⁰ Brookings Doha Center/FRIDE (January 2013), *Towards a Strategic Partnership? The EU and the GCC in a Revolutionary Middle East*, joint event briefing.

¹¹¹ Edward Burke (2013), *EU-GCC Cooperation: securing the transition in Yemen*, Gulf Research Centre.

GCC initiative and ongoing commitment to the transition process suggest a notable degree of strategic coherence between the EU, MS and the Gulf States, in particular Saudi Arabia. However, dialogue within Saudi Arabia regarding Yemen's political future tends to be restricted to senior Saudi princes, including the king himself, and by their own admission, EU officials – as well as many others – find it hard to discern the full extent of Saudi Arabia's involvement in Yemen's internal politics.¹¹² Formal diplomacy and aid pledges run in parallel with substantial networks of transnational patronage that shift constantly; the EU has little or no interface with these channels. In particular following the 2011 crisis the EU has taken a key role in the G10 donor group that led to the GCC initiative following the turmoil of 2011. The EU Delegation is part of the G10 diplomatic group (Permanent 5 of the UN Security Council, the GCC and the EU Delegation) that are sponsors and guardians of the GCC initiative.

The EU did attain a higher – and more politically profitable – profile after the March 2011 uprising in Yemen. The GCC Initiative saw Saleh step down from power. The Initiative was supported by the EU, US and the UN at critical junctures – including the contributions of senior diplomats – and many believe that it helped avert full-scale war in the country. Critical to its early success were the diplomatic efforts made by key personnel to encourage the GCC secretariat in its endeavours. The GCC Secretary was able to rely upon the support of UN Special Adviser on Yemen, who in turn was helped by the efforts of the EU Head of Delegation until his departure in mid-2012. Aided by MS ambassadors – particularly those from UK, Germany and France – the role of the Head of Delegation was critical towards marshalling a coherent EU response to the crisis.¹¹³

The EU's regional political engagement is helped by the fact that Yemen and the Gulf States (including Iran) are managed together within the EEAS, ensuring some degree of cross-fertilisation and policy coherence.¹¹⁴ The EEAS takes the lead on contact with the Gulf States regarding Yemen, because DEVCO, for obvious reasons, has no aid programme in the region.¹¹⁵ In addition, none of the Gulf States have been OECD-DAC signatories during the evaluation period, and they have not historically participated in multilateral donor forums.¹¹⁶ However, general bilateral EU-Saudi dialogue remains cautious,¹¹⁷ while efforts to foster discussion on aid effectiveness with other Gulf States have yet to yield significant changes in behaviour. A new DEVCO post in Abu Dhabi and an increase in the number of EEAS staff in Riyadh may yet have future impact; similarly, the number of EEAS staff covering the Gulf states and the GCC has also increased in recent years. Notwithstanding the reinforcement effect of bilateral dialogue regarding Yemen in regional capitals and the inclusion of Yemen on the agenda at the annual EU-GCC meeting, the main diplomatic momentum to date has come through contact between ambassadors in Sana'a.¹¹⁸ However, with the Houthi-Iran relationship increasingly under scrutiny, regional Yemen-related diplomacy has to encompass Iran as well as the GCC – clearly a complex challenge given that the GCC was founded in part to address growing Iranian influence in the region.

JC 5.3 Extent to which EU dialogue with development partners and regional actors has deepened leverage on a central issue – state-building.

Since 2010, there has been a tentative shift towards greater conditionality attached to Saudi aid to Yemen, in line with Riyadh's growing dialogue and coordination with Western donors under the FoY umbrella, within which the EU plays its part. At this level, discussions have focused on formal aid disbursement methods and technicalities designed to promote stronger institutions in Yemen; in parallel, higher-level political discourse has focused on the impact of Saudi Arabia's fluctuating financial support to selected tribal leaders,¹¹⁹ elite brokers, and the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY): in short, the extent and nature of Riyadh's impact on Yemen's political settlement (see EQ3). At the height of the disruption to Yemen's commodity supply chain

¹¹² Interviews with EEAS officials, as well as member states and IGOs, June 2014 (and prior).

¹¹³ Edward Burke (2013), 'EU-GCC Cooperation', op. cit.

¹¹⁴ Interview with EEAS official, June 2014.

¹¹⁵ Interviews, with EEAS and DEVCO officials, June 2014.

¹¹⁶ In summer 2014, the UAE joined the OCED's Development Assistance Committee.

¹¹⁷ Interviews with EEAS officials, June 2014.

¹¹⁸ Interviews with EEAS officials and IGO/G10 officials, June-August 2014.

¹¹⁹ Historically, Saudi stipends to Yemeni sheikhs were managed by the special committee for Yemeni affairs, under the stewardship of the defence minister and crown prince, Sultan bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud, who died in 2011. In recent years, the influence of the special committee has declined somewhat.

that accompanied the 2011 political crisis (see EQ7), the Saudis organised an emergency diesel shipment.¹²⁰ In 2012, Saudi Arabia provided a further \$1bn in budget support to the CBY, as part of its renewed commitments under the FoY.¹²¹ These two measures played a vital role in supporting macroeconomic stability, helping to stabilise the riyal and ensuring the survival functions of the state, including salary payments. In summer 2014, following fuel riots in Sana'a, King Abdullah offered a further \$2bn support package with President Hadi in the form of fuel shipments and budget support.¹²²

While Saudi Arabia is said to be pressing the Government of Yemen to reduce diesel subsidies, in line with longstanding demands from Western donors, it is not yet clear what political trade-offs Riyadh will seek in return for its money.¹²³ Saudi Arabia is said to want stability,¹²⁴ and remains preoccupied by the need for a reliable powerbroker in Sana'a who can tackle the threat from AQAP as a pressing priority;¹²⁵ constitutional revisions affecting the future shape of the state and the shift towards multi-party federalism are thought to be viewed as lower-order, long-term problems. At the same time, Saudi Arabia sees itself as a bulwark against the regional resurgence of political Islam since the 'Arab Spring', as illustrated by their recent designation of Islah as a terrorist organisation. (Islah, formally the largest opposition party under Saleh, holds cabinet posts in the transitional power-sharing government.) Given the resources at their disposal and their preferred mode of support (diesel shipments, budget support), the Saudis' likely preferences should be central to any future EU analysis relating to resilience and state building, in the context of the transition to a post-oil economy.

In 2009, the recommendations towards a comprehensive approach flagged the need to frame EU-Yemen policy, and related dialogue with the Gulf States, in the context of EU policy towards the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden region.¹²⁶ From 2009 onwards the strengthened dialogue on security-related issues has allowed the Delegation to work actively towards developing further IfS interventions in key areas – in particular towards the formulation of a Counter-Terrorism package. In addition to counter-terrorism, regional security challenges include migration, the arms trade and maritime security. For example, in 2010 the EU began work on implementing a project to support Yemeni public institutions and civil society to address the security crisis and enhance stability. This project – a Regional Information Sharing Centre to counter piracy and enhance cooperation in the Gulf of Aden – complemented bilateral and multilateral cooperation programmes in the domains of maritime security and border management;¹²⁷ the problem of Somali piracy has since subsided markedly.¹²⁸ However, trafficking from Africa to Yemen continues, and the recent internally displaced persons (IDP) crisis created by restrictions at the Yemeni-Saudi border suggests that a regional approach encompassing the Horn of Africa remains relevant, in line with the Agenda for Change's focus on the development-migration nexus.

A key regional development initiative in which the EU has engaged with development partners and regional actors is of course the Mutual Accountability Framework, signed in late 2012 by the Government of Yemen, the GCC, the EU and relevant MS, US, World Bank, UN and International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is the framework for financing and implementation of the Transitional Plan for Stability and Development. With over half of the value of funding pledges coming from GCC members, the MAF represents in principle a significant achievement in terms of regional collaboration directed towards the objective of state-building. The EU was instrumental in the establishment of the Executive Bureau that was created to deliver on the aims of the MAF.

However, critics of the design and performance of the MAF and the Executive Bureau point to a range of difficulties including slow disbursement and implementation, shifting donor commitments and prioritisation, and 'a layered dual accountability where each side is not only accountable to the other party but also to their

¹²⁰ Peter Salisbury (2011), *Yemen's Economy: Oil, Imports and Elites*, Middle East and North Africa Programme Paper, MENA PP, 2011/02, Chatham House.

¹²¹ Ginny Hill, Peter Salisbury, Léonie Northedge and Jane Kinninmont (2013), *Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict*, Chatham House.

¹²² Interview with independent analyst, July 2014

¹²³ Interview with independent analyst, July 2014 (and with a range of sources prior to this evaluation).

¹²⁴ Interview with EEAS official, June 2014 (and with a range of sources prior to this evaluation).

¹²⁵ Interview with EEAS official and independent analyst, June-July 2014 (and with a range of sources prior to this evaluation)

¹²⁶ Operation Atalanta is the EU's counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia.

¹²⁷ EAMR, July 2010.

¹²⁸ Actual and attempted piracy attacks began to rise during 2008 and peaked in 2011, before dropping back to pre-2008 levels in 2013.

own constituencies.¹²⁹ According to Abu Hatem, the head of the Executive Bureau who resigned after only one month in post, ‘the government created a body that entrapped it.’ He explained that the ambiguity of the functions, excessive interference from all involved, and the lack of allocations to the Executive Bureau were issues that stifled progress. Abu Hatem added, ‘I have seen this happen before in other initiatives that failed, and I am not sure why they are repeating these mistakes again now.’

The gap between pledges and disbursements is significant. The March 2014 Status Report of the Executive Bureau charged with coordinating the MAF itself noted that ‘when it comes to implementation, only one policy reform has been implemented, with significant work ongoing to implement seven priority reforms, and little or not work ongoing to implement five of the priority reforms.’ In the same month the Executive Bureau’s Monitoring and Evaluation Officer noted in a presentation to MAF stakeholders that ‘at this disbursement rate, it will take around four years and seven months for the entire pledged money to be disbursed. The situation in Yemen is too critical to wait this long.’

As one critic notes, ‘Yemen’s vulnerable and poor people see no visible effect of the current transition process’,¹³⁰ recommending that ‘the development of a truly democratic system in Yemen needs to be reflected in all levels of programming, especially aid programming, in a way that would secure efficiency at all levels of implementation.’ In other words, the approach of donors (including the EU) has taken insufficient account of a political settlements framework in their thinking about the MAF and the Executive Bureau. Despite stated intentions to the contrary, too much ‘business as usual’ has persisted in practice. Yemen’s recent signing of the New Deal may be relevant for future efforts to strengthen MAF effectiveness. As noted in the latest progress report¹³¹ of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building forum, while the MAF is ‘not strictly adapted to [National Dialogue] process, [it] fulfils many requirements in regard to [National Dialogue] compact and fragility assessment.’

¹²⁹ Fatima Abo al-Asrar (August 2013), *Myopic Solutions to Chronic Problems: The Need for Aid Effectiveness in Yemen*, Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law, Stanford University, Working Paper 141.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ New Deal Implementation Progress Overview (October 2014)

2.6. Cross-cutting issues

EQ6: To what extent has EU cooperation taken cross-cutting issues into account and how has this contributed to results?

Summary response: While the EU can claim some successes with regard to specific gender actions, it lacks formal cooperation mechanisms or structured cooperation on gender in Yemen. While environmental issues were prominent in the 2007-13 CSP, no specific environmental activities were included in the accompanying MIP and there is no evidence of a mainstreaming approach. Civil society has received prominent attention throughout the evaluation period, particularly in relation to the promotion of good governance, democracy and human rights. However, such support has not been provided within the framework of a broader strategy for national capacity development in line with fragile states principles. Guidance and support from DEVCO in Brussels on technical aspects of the CCIs is available from the relevant technical departments, but its use tends more towards procedural compliance than to adding value.

The EU has been an active advocate on human rights issues, in which gender issues and civil society engagement have been prominent, particularly during the National Dialogue process. However, support to civil society has not been sufficiently strategic, consistent or coherent to contribute adequately to state-building.

JC 6.1 Extent to which CCIs were taken into account in the analysis and design of EU cooperation in line with EU policy and guidance.

The main cross-cutting issues in EU cooperation in Yemen are environment, civil society, gender and qat. The 2002-06 CSP does not explicitly address CCIs as such, though it does have a regional programme on gender. It discusses qat in terms of its role in the economy and agriculture without having any proposals concerning it and completely makes no mention of the environment. However, it does include civil society support in its fourth priority, hoping to achieve ‘more effective involvement of civil society in promoting social development’ (p.26). The 2007-13 CSP lists the four cross-cutting issues. Following guidance from the Reference Group, we will only deal marginally with qat, focusing on its environmental aspects.

On **environmental** issues the 2007-13 CSP identifies rapidly growing population, changing consumption patterns, urbanisation, transportation, and changed water and land use management systems as the main challenges facing Yemen.¹³² The conclusions and recommendations included pressing for the integration of the environment within national policies, linking environment protection to poverty reduction efforts, and capacity-building at institutional, staff and procedural level in order to manage this sector.¹³³ However, the accompanying MIP (2007-10) had no specific environmental activities that would follow on from this, other than a reference to ‘possible actions at local community level to address environmental issues as part of the EC’s contribution to the Social Fund for Development.’¹³⁴ The 2010-13 NIP makes no further mention of specific actions in relation to environment as a cross-cutting issue. **Qat** is marginally addressed through the EU co-financing with IFAD of the Economic Opportunities Programme, as this is primarily concerned with the promotion of coffee cultivation and value chain. Though not explicitly intended to replace qat with coffee, the project’s ambition is to do just that. At least one of the other three projects under this decision [20570 of 2009] has an explicit plan to ‘replace qat with coffee’.¹³⁵

The 2007-13 CSP incorporates specific mention of **gender** issues in two priority areas: human capital development (fostering women’s access to services and their participation in society at community level) and the promotion of human rights (encouraging women’s participation in civil society organisations and improving their knowledge and awareness of socio-economic rights). The programmatic inclusion of gender within the 2007-10 MIP and subsequently in the 2010-13 NIP included:

- The strengthening of the electoral framework and institutions and, from this, an increase in the number and percentage of voting women and the number of elected women.¹³⁶

¹³² CSP 2007-13, Annex 1.1.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ MIP 2007-10, section 1.

¹³⁵ *Safeguarding food access in Raymah Governorate and building water resource management capacity and income through coffee chain development* – contract for EUR 2.5 million with ACTED.

¹³⁶ MIP 2007-10.

- Support for population and reproductive health measures ('an emergency rather than a priority.')
- Through the Social Fund for Development, support for the development of local communities, including delivery of basic services and SME activities targeted at women.
- More broadly in relation to the state-building activities flagged in the 2010-13 NIP, the 'improved involvement of women, young people and marginalised groups in administration and politics' was cited as an indicator.

The 2010-13 NIP also flagged an improvement of girl's school attendance in relation to the proposed conditional cash transfer system under the Social Welfare Fund.¹³⁷ With respect to practical implementation, a recent contract with Mercy Corps for the development of rural enterprise is primarily targeted at women. All funding of the Social Fund for Development has explicit gender targets and mechanisms, one of the reasons why SFD is such a favourite of funding agencies. The same goes for SWF. However, it is worth noting that neither the EU nor other agencies have had a significant positive impact on gender aspects given the lack of progress in overall indicators.¹³⁹

In late 2009, a Gender Focal Person (GFP) for the Delegation was appointed, though in practice the role remained with a staff member who was not the officially designated person.¹⁴⁰ Some of the more successful development interventions from a gender perspective were the EOP and Fisheries Investment Programme (FIP), both co-financed with IFAD, that had notable gender aspects due to the design requirements of the main financing agency, as well as the investments with the SFD. IFAD policy is to mainstream gender in its projects and this is evident in co-financed projects.

However, the EU was one of the contributors to ensuring that women were well represented at the National Dialogue Conference – where they accounted for 28% of participants, close to the intended 30%. In addition, its support to the Electoral Commission may help to ensure higher levels of female presence on the electoral register, and its support for democratisation through NGOs has included training for women to participate in politics. Despite this, the report on the Gender Action Plan for 2012-13 deplores that 'no formal cooperation mechanisms or structural cooperation on gender has started in Yemen... all cooperation with Yemen throughout the reporting period has been driven by the needs of the (political) transition period and corresponding Yemeni priorities.'¹⁴¹

The CSP for 2007-13 recognises the strength of **civil society** in Yemen as 'a vigorous form of non-electoral participation in political life.' Objective 1 (promotion of good governance) was to include support to human rights and civil society through 'capacity building, the interface with government institutions, internal organisation, and the capacity to deliver services to local communities.'¹⁴² Again, the SFD is recognised as a 'significant player in developing ground services for local communities,'¹⁴³ and there was an expectation that the EU would build on experiences of the 'Capacity Building and Networking – Strengthening civil society in Yemen' project supported by the EU from 2004-06 (approximately EUR 500,000). Civil society elements in the 2007-10 MIP included:

- Civil society participation in electoral education, political parties and parliamentary groups.
- Support for the development of local communities through the SFD and in particular the implementation of social and employment policies, participatory planning processes, etc., that involve civil society structures.

The SFD's work in training district and governorate elected officials contributed to the development of civil society as well as to state building in the longer term.

Guidance and support from HQ on technical aspects of the CCIs is available from the relevant technical departments. The evaluation found that the staff in these departments have considerable responsibilities, technically and geographically; they therefore rarely volunteer advice or recommendations. When procedurally requested, they review projects and proposals and make recommendations, mostly to assess

¹³⁷ MIP 2007-10, 3.2.2.

¹³⁸ NIP 2010-3, section 9.3.4.

¹³⁹ Interviews, June 2014.

¹⁴⁰ Interview, July 2014.

¹⁴¹ 2013 Report on GAP implementation [1 July 2012- 1 June 2013].

¹⁴² CSP 2007-13, section 7.3.1.

¹⁴³ Ibid, section 5.6.3.

whether the proposal follows EU procedures and requirements. When this is not demanded, they respond to requests to the extent that their time allows. Generally they focus their work on the preparation of generic guidelines that they distribute widely on request. Our assessment is that the advice provided is rarely based on sufficient knowledge and understanding of the particular socio-economic and cultural conditions in Yemen to prove useful to Delegation staff.

JC 6.2 CCIs were taken into account in political and policy dialogue in line with EU policy and guidance.

Institutionally, thematic programmes work in a bottom-up approach, relying on calls for proposals from civil society entities. By contrast, bilateral programmes are largely designed in a top-down manner. Thus human rights thematic programmes have relied on NGOs to address and monitor sensitive topics and violations. Within the thematic instruments there has been some complementarity; for instance, between the EIDHR and the IfS that proved useful during the first months of the transition. While both instruments could make use of flexible procedures, the EIDHR was mainly used to increase the inclusiveness of the transition process (through participating civil society institutions), while the IfS provided support for a joint impact assessment and to kick-start reform planning. The Delegation has noted, however, that there is ‘a structural problem’ with thematic instruments in the health sector, suggesting: ‘Thematic instruments provide for interventions that do not necessarily fit with country and sector priorities; this limits the impact and sustainability of small projects supported through those instruments.’¹⁴⁴

With respect to gender, the follow-up to the landmark 2000 conference in Beijing, and the subsequent adoption of resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security by the UN Security Council, was an EU commitment of EUR 1.4 million for a regional three-year project covering Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Gaza, with UNIFEM (the women's fund at the United Nations) as the executing agency. The focus was on establishing governmental and NGO Gender Focal Points to promote gender mainstreaming within their respective institutions. In Yemen, a national project manager, together with experts from the regional UNIFEM office in Amman, Jordan, executed the various activities through the Yemeni National Committee for Women (YNCW).¹⁴⁵

The first half of 2009 also saw the establishment of a human rights donor coordination group under the umbrella of the Governance Group. In the early part of the decade there had been a concerted effort to involve NGOs in the administration of EU projects; by 2003 this involvement was five times that of 1995.¹⁴⁶ The Commission and the Government of Yemen had agreed some years earlier that approximately 50% of the EU assistance to Yemen would be focused on social programmes and projects (including Food Security), and although there may have been some tensions in channelling funds through NGOs rather than government, this percentage was broadly adhered to.

In 2003-04 the EU supported 12 medium-term projects implemented by European/Yemeni NGOs to the tune of EUR 16 million. In the Food Security Programme, for example, in that year there had been an additional commitment of EUR 2 million to be directly channelled through NGOs.¹⁴⁷ NGO support extended to some politically sensitive interventions such as the support to women and minors in prisons (implemented by an Italian NGO in collaboration with three Yemeni NGOs).

2009-10 saw some major increases in EU activities both at the level of dialogue and in implementation, not least because of further de-concentration of staff to Sana'a. Human rights activities (primarily through NGOs) funded through EIDHR included calls for proposals and information meetings in seven main Yemeni towns. Sixteen were received and six were recommended for contracting (with a seventh in reserve). Of these, two projects were on the death penalty; two on torture; one on strengthening media approaches to human rights awareness and one on improving detention/reintegration conditions for female prisoners in the area of Hodeida.¹⁴⁸ On gender-specific areas in the last quarter of 2009/beginning of 2010, EIDHR funds were committed for Shima Yemen Net Combating Violence Against Women – Eliminating Early Marriage Awareness Raising Programme (EUR 163,200) and Yemeni Women Union (YWU) – Empowering women

¹⁴⁴ EAMR, Jan-Dec 2012, section 2.

¹⁴⁵ ‘Cooperation between the European Union and the Republic of Yemen,’ Annual Report 2001.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Rainar Schierhorst, ‘EU Assistance to Yemen exceeded 800 million since unification and is still growing’, *Yemen Times*, Issue 661, Volume 13, 21-24 August 2003.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ EAMR, July 2010.

to obtain their rights (EUR 33,700). In the same period the NSA/LA in Development thematic budget line opened contracts for raising health awareness on reproductive health issues – YWU (EUR 324,000) and ADWAR al-Zahra: women community development and civil society reinforcement – Zahra Association Mokha (EUR 347,250).

This was the calm before the storm of 2011, when many projects were either suspended or closed as a result of the political turmoil that ensued. Most NSA activities faced delays due to the situation, particularly in the Food Security, human rights and Governance focal areas, including the elections support programme. Suspended activities included three NSA/EIDHR projects, two large TA contracts in the Food Security area, the Juvenile Justice programme with the Ministry of Justice/UNICEF, and the support programmes to the Ministry of Interior (including police training) and to the Yemeni Parliament. The resumption of programmes in 2012 included extensive consultations with both formal institutions and civil society in the formulation of the Governance programme adopted in August 2012. In response to repeated demands from Civil Society Organisation (CSO) partners, the Delegation signed a contract in December 2012 to strengthen CSO capacities on financial management and monitoring. At the same time consultations took place during the last quarter of 2012 for the preparation of the identification fiches for health and for nutrition that were to include NGO implementations.¹⁴⁹

Overall it is worth noting that the EU has channelled funds to institutions which have a mandate to address some of the cross-cutting issues, such as SFD (gender, environment, civil society), SWF (gender), IFAD (gender, qat, environment), Mercy Corps (gender, civil society), etc. However the achievements have been less than impressive, and the reasons for this deserve to be addressed through overall analysis. In the case of gender and qat, it is clear that this is a primarily ‘donor-driven’ agenda that has certainly not been adopted, taken over and ‘owned’ by Yemeni authorities.

JC 6.3 The effective treatment of cross-cutting issues has contributed positively to the results of EU cooperation.

By 2009 the EU was claiming a successful track record in promoting democracy and human rights through its continued support for the electoral processes and the increased number of activities in the field of human rights (aiming at gender-based violence, political empowerment of women, children’s rights and discrimination of social/religious minorities, activities in support of abolition of death penalty, etc.). Increased activities combined with advocacy (e.g. condemnation of death penalty, particularly for juveniles, handicapped persons, etc.) made the EU a ‘major player’ in the area of human rights in Yemen in the eyes of donors, civil society and government, according to the management reports.¹⁵⁰ This contributed to the Government of Yemen’s decision in 2013 to establish the Forensic Committee that would determine the age of alleged offenders.

With regard to civil society we note a number of project failures or near-failures reported in the earlier phases (2002-06), including:

- Strengthening Civil Society (started October 2003), implemented by UK-based NGO YDF. An interim report with some serious omissions was received in March 2005, provoking an EU control mission in August 2005 and a full audit mission in July 2006. This noted serious shortcomings in output delivery, ‘very limited and minor achievements,’ and operational and financial obstacles unresolved.¹⁵¹
- Last Chance to Freedom project that was closed in 2005 following accusations of corruption and mismanagement and a control mission by the Delegation in May 2005. The main problem was a lack of trust between the implementing NGO and beneficiaries, and allegations of coercion against the Ministries of Planning and Social Affairs.
- The Financing Agreement of the ‘Sharaka Yemen – Supporting Government and NGO Partnerships for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Yemen’ project was signed in October 2005. The programme aimed to strengthen partnerships between the Ministry of Human Rights and NGOs through capacity building, dialogue and micro-grants for local NGOs. Shortcomings in project design were noted in a 2006 inspection mission and the programme was recentralised by the Commission in late 2007.

¹⁴⁹ EAMR, Jan-Dec 2012, section 3.

¹⁵⁰ EAMR, January 2009; Interview, July 2014.

¹⁵¹ EAMR, 2006, section A2.

There followed an internal reallocation to strengthen the civil society component. The situation was somewhat retrieved through the corresponding call for proposals in mid-January 2008 that was evaluated in June with some ten project proposals retained.

- Within the Food Security Programme, the ‘Improvement of Food Security through women empowerment and capacity-building in the governorates of Taiz and Lahj, COOPI project’ (end-date: 31 December 2008). The project was deemed ill-conceived.¹⁵² In February 2006, the Delegation instructed the implementing partner, Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), to focus exclusively on the livestock development component of the project and conduct an internal mid-term review with the support of an external livestock expert. Fundamentally, the project’s main weakness was the inexperience of COOPI staff and high staff turnover. It improved with the new COOPI team arriving in March 2008.¹⁵³

The story of the ‘NSA/LA in development’ thematic budget line is revealing. An allocation of EUR 1.4 million was made available for the first time in 2007 with calls for proposals launched in early March 2008. This marked a significant innovation, as it was the first time that applicants from partner countries were allowed to submit proposals; in addition, it was the first time that Local Authorities (LAs) were included. By May, approximately 30 concept notes were received, with six NSAs and one LA accepted for full proposals. By 2012 the budget was EUR 1.2 million, and 76 NGOs submitted concept notes; of these only four were contracted (total value EUR 2.19 million), only two of which were national NGOs. This extraordinary fall-off in numbers was due to a number of reasons: a) procurement requirements, including the requirement that the full proposal is written in English; and b) inadequate information outside of Sana’a, precluding many from applying simply because they were not aware of the possibility.

The performance rate on LAs was much worse. With a 2012 budget of EUR 300,000, 11 proposals were submitted – all were rejected. Again, a prime problem is language; even those local authorities previously contracted still found the reporting requirements difficult. The scale and outreach of the programme as it currently stands seems to belie all three objectives set by the thematic programme¹⁵⁴ – empowerment and inclusivity, awareness raising on development issues and facilitating coordination and communication.¹⁵⁵ In August 2013 the Head of Delegation requested that the entire budget of EUR 300,000 for 2012 be temporarily reallocated to other countries, citing ‘difficulties in transparently identifying local authorities’ interested in participating in the scheme, and ‘concerns over the accountable use of EU funds.’¹⁵⁶

A major difficulty and risk from early 2011 through mid-2012 was related to maintaining regular working relations with implementing partners on a ‘remote control’ basis, particularly regarding monitoring, evaluation and audits. The difficulty receded following the return of all Delegation DEVCO staff to Sana’a in the latter half of 2012, but a great deal of time was spent on rescheduling suspended projects.¹⁵⁷ We also note (in cross-reference to EQ7) the Delegation’s increasing concern over the historical model for project design used for the Yemen portfolio, notably the considerable use of partially decentralised management, that, in their view, was now inappropriate for the Yemen context and an impediment to speedy and effective programme implementation.¹⁵⁸ Although not strictly related to CCI, the implications of this are plain: that the Delegation was unable to guarantee effective monitoring of decentralised funds, even where TA was employed. This applied to a large proportion of the Yemen portfolio in health and Food Security.

With such a long history of EU support to civil society, including CSO capacity building, the absence throughout the evaluation period of an overarching strategy for capacity development has undermined sustainability and the EU’s ability to adhere to aid effectiveness and fragile states principles.

¹⁵² First Progress Report, 01/04/05-31/07/06.

¹⁵³ EAMR 2008, Annex A.

¹⁵⁴ Interview with CSO representative, Yemen.

¹⁵⁵ European Commission (2011), *Non-state actors and local authorities in development, 2011-13 Strategy Paper*.

¹⁵⁶ Letter to the Director of DEVCO.B from Head of Delegation, Yemen, 18 August 2013.

¹⁵⁷ EAMR, Jan-Dec 2012.

¹⁵⁸ Letter from HoD to Director DEVCO.H requesting re-centralisation of all partially decentralised projects, 20 February 2013.

2.7. Responsiveness

EQ7: In what ways and how effectively has EU cooperation been responsive to changes in the Yemen context? What has helped or hindered responsiveness?

Summary response: The EU has progressively equipped itself to be responsive since the start of the evaluation period, upgrading its in-country presence and drawing on an improving analytical basis from 2007. 2009 was a watershed year – the MacDonald/Khalil study predicted regime instability and successive MIPs adopted relevant recommendations; and the 2009 recommendations *Towards a Comprehensive EU Approach to Yemen* provided an explicit mandate for the EU to deepen its political engagement and for development cooperation to focus on basic needs that would be most relevant during acute crisis. However, development cooperation programming did not have time to improve fragility relevance by 2011 and the bulk of DEVCO's activities were suspended. For much of the period of this evaluation though, the absence of an overarching strategy against which choices can be assessed and evaluated has meant that the complex interplay between formal strategy processes and the exigencies of political engagement have rendered the EU's strategic choices riskier than they might otherwise have been. The majority of programmes and projects have been initiated without any political economy analysis or conflict analysis. Thus, while the choice of programmes was responsive and relevant, their detailed design was less so. Notwithstanding the slower rate at which development cooperation can respond, the Delegation has made good use of more flexible instruments such as IfS and EIDHR to meet short-term financing needs, to reinforce political engagement and to compensate for the longer time required to design development cooperation programmes.

Responsiveness has been significantly enhanced by the presence of a full Delegation in Sana'a, by investment in contextual analysis and by the Delegation's proactivity in pursuing a comprehensive approach. However, the absence of a consistent approach to contextual analysis since 2009, the lack of progress in formalising a comprehensive approach and the current remote location of the Delegation seriously hinder the EU's current and future ability to be responsive.

JC 7.1 The extent to which EU services drew effectively on context analysis and feedback mechanisms to design and adjust EU cooperation.

The EU has progressively equipped itself to be responsive since the start of the evaluation period, gradually boosting its in-country presence through the process of de-concentration from Brussels to Amman to Sana'a (see EQ10). From 2007 onwards, EU programmes drew on an improving analytical basis. The 2007-13 CSP had a fairly comprehensive 14-page political, economic and social analysis, contrasting with the sparser and less focused eight-page analysis of the previous 2002-06 CSP. The EAMR in mid-2009 noted that a paucity in policy dialogue extended also to international organisations (UNDP in particular), and led to 'ready-made programmes being presented for thematic funding without involvement of the Delegation on the ground, until implementation starts.' The 2009 state-building study placed EU interventions within a conflict analysis framework that looked at structural causes of instability, drivers of change and a risk assessment. Successive MIPs (2011-13 and 2014-15), both extensions of the original 2007-13 CSP, adopted several recommendations outlined in the state-building study.

In parallel with efforts to improve donor coordination, the process of commissioning and sharing the 2009 state-building study, and the consultation stage of the 2009 recommendations towards a comprehensive approach strengthened the Head of Delegation's relationships with key MS. It also gave the Delegation a sound analytical basis and an explicit institutional mandate that enabled staff to respond to growing political tension during 2009 and 2010, and in the 2011 crisis. Indeed, EU actions during 2011 were consistent with the following priorities of the comprehensive approach: closer dialogue and coordination with the GCC, and bilaterally with its member states; collective messaging on the part of the international community; and the importance of direct engagement with elite actors. Thus, the EU was able to draw on prior context analysis and existing relationships to adjust cooperation and ensure relevance, providing a strong example of emergent strategy in the field of political dialogue.

The 2009 recommendations towards a comprehensive approach had correctly noted 'the potential for a serious escalation of violent conflict' and called for development cooperation to 'focus on basic needs, from food supplies to water and sanitation and basic healthcare which are most relevant also in a situation of acute crisis'. Certainly healthcare played a major role in EU investments in the middle of the evaluation, while the increase in DG ECHO funding also attempted to respond to basic needs, as well as food supply (see EQ4). However, we are not aware of any detailed contingency planning or scenario planning that took place

between 2009 and 2011 to prepare for these likely eventualities, nor any consideration of the need to prepare for remote management. In the event, escalating violence between elite factions in Sana'a and through proxy conflicts across the country sent government ministries into a state of political shock, disrupted commodity supply chains and led to hyperinflation.¹⁵⁹ Delegation staff began leaving in March and the Delegation was formally evacuated on 1st April, with only a skeleton staff remaining in Sana'a, including the HoD.

By 2011, EU development programming had not yet had time to adapt to the findings of the 2009 state-building report, in order to improve fragility relevance, and the bulk of DEVCO's activities had to be suspended.¹⁶⁰ Most institutional strengthening activities and cooperation programmes with the Government of Yemen stalled, while almost all international technical assistance was halted and official exchanges were reduced to a bare minimum to avoid giving too much credibility to Saleh's regime. Activities implemented by local partners (NSAs) or UN organisations continued, albeit at a considerably slower pace.¹⁶¹

Programmes resumed during 2012 and the Delegation made efforts to incorporate emerging best practice in new project design, including an EUR 18 million governance programme designed to support the transition and a EUR 10 million package to support socio-economic issues, mainly through the SWF. However, we are not aware of any analysis or evaluation process designed to identify lessons learned during the 2011 crisis to improve future relevance for fragility programming, and since 2011 much of the EU's contextual analysis has been outsourced to NGO partners. While the EU's decision to take responsibility for police reform in 2012 followed from an opening created by the transition, and in this sense was highly responsive, programming is not yet underpinned by any detailed PEA or conflict analysis. We are not aware of any EU-led scenario planning to consider possible trajectories and mitigate risk during the transition process.

The majority of projects originating in earlier planning cycles had been initiated without any PEA or conflict analysis, were predicated on the assumption of political stability, and were largely technical in their approach. Many failed to withstand the scale of disorder in 2011 and were either suspended or closed. The exceptions were those such as the Reproductive Health and Population Programme that, because of its decentralised nature, was relatively unaffected by the Sana'a uprisings. The EU compensated by increasing its levels of humanitarian support, through a new DG ECHO office in Sana'a and continuing implementation through UN agencies and NSAs. The SFD remained open. Nevertheless, there was now a sea-change in the operational landscape that would imply an increasing remote management modality that the EU had not yet prepared for. As our intervention logic analysis indicates (see Annex 9), the responsiveness of development cooperation has been patchy across the main sectors of EU support – governance, economic development and poverty reduction – characterised by flexible use of thematic instruments and a slower reorientation of bilateral cooperation, built on gradually improving analysis.

JC 7.2 The extent to which changes in EU cooperation strategy and its implementation were appropriate responses to changes in the Yemen context.

The evaluation notes the persistent funding and use of parallel Project Implementation Units (PIUs) by the EU, despite reservations expressed over the potential undermining of government institutions.¹⁶² By January 2011, four PIUs funded by the EU were operational, with a further one (within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour) established early that year.¹⁶³ Almost all halted EU-funded programmes resumed their activities during 2012, and by November, all EU staff had returned to Sana'a (see EQ10). The delegation designed a EUR 18 million governance programme to support key elements of the transition that was adopted in 2012. It also aimed to adopt a EUR 12 million support measure to address socio-economic issues, mainly through the SWF; however, the design of this programme could only be finalised very late in 2012 and was not adopted until 2013 (reduced to EUR 10 million).¹⁶⁴ During the third quarter of 2012 a coherent package of proposals for AAP 2013 was designed to focus, through bilateral funds, mainly on social and economic issues with resilience as a central guiding principle, as well as further support measures through the Food Security Thematic Programme. However, the National Food Security Secretariat, an inter-ministerial

¹⁵⁹ Peter Salisbury (2011), *Yemen's Economy: Oil, Imports and Elites*, Middle East and North Africa Programme Paper MENA PP 2011/02, Chatham House.

¹⁶⁰ EAMR Final Jan-Dec 2011, section 1.1.

¹⁶¹ EAMR, Jan-Jun 2011.

¹⁶² The issue was acknowledged as 'problematic' in all EAMRs from 2008 onwards.

¹⁶³ EAMR, Jan-Jun 2011, section 4.

¹⁶⁴ EAMR, Final, Jan-Dec 2012, section 1.

mechanism under the Prime Minister's Office, did not materialise as planned and the Delegation was left having to identify alternative uses for these earmarked funds.

Suspended EU programmes resumed during 2012, and efforts were made to incorporate emerging best practice in new project design and existing project extensions. For example, the Sustainable Development Of Fisheries Sector (SDFS) project demonstrated a greater level of awareness and responsiveness towards the changing political landscape and the challenges inherent in working in Yemen, and the differences between EU support to private sector development before and after 2012 are apparent in the preparation and execution of new projects. These have distinctly better intervention logics, and are likely to perform better with respect to the performance indicators used for the present evaluation. However, we are not aware of any in-house analysis or external evaluations designed to formally incorporate any lessons learned during the 2011 crisis to improve future relevance for fragility programming.

Since the start of the 2011 youth-led uprising, much of the data collection and micro-analysis of events on the ground – and hence contextual analysis and prognosis – has been outsourced to the EU's NGO partners. In November 2011, Saferworld conducted a participatory analysis on youth perceptions of the drivers of the crisis and potential responses.¹⁶⁵ Youth from diverse backgrounds in four major cities – Sana'a, Taiz, Aden and Al-Mukalla – offered a snapshot on their perspectives on the challenges facing the country. This analysis was supplemented by interviews with politicians, religious and tribal authorities, businessmen, women and youth leaders. The study found that the EU made very little contact with people living outside Sana'a, and that views of the EU (and other donors) therefore tend to be biased towards considerations within the city.¹⁶⁶ A resulting recommendation was that the EU should 'increase its understanding and awareness of the insecurities and violence faced by Yemenis at local and national levels, their root causes and key actors involved to better inform policies and programmes and to ensure they are conflict sensitive, minimising negative impacts and maximising positive, peacebuilding impacts.'¹⁶⁷

The Saferworld study was financed under the IfS People's Peace-making Perspectives project and jointly implemented by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld. Between 2010 and 2012, the two organisations conducted 18 conflict analyses seeking to reflect the perspectives of those most closely affected by conflict; Saferworld chose Yemen as one of the case studies at a time when concerns to negotiate a peaceful transition were particularly acute. Other Yemen-specific projects commissioned through the IfS in 2010 include the Community-Based Conflict Mitigation Program (Y-CCM), co-funded by DFID and run by Partners Yemen and Partners for Democratic Change International. It began with a baseline conflict analysis, and aimed to assist local authorities and community-based organisations establish sustainable methods of resolving conflict over land, natural resources, and service provision.¹⁶⁸ The deterioration of tribal customary law and the absence or inefficiency of government strategies to address conflict had left a gap in conflict mitigation that the Y-CCM tried to fill.¹⁶⁹

The EU funded the Y-CCM through decision series 22613, which relates to governance programming. Contract dates start in late 2009, suggesting programme design was now informed by the 2009 state-building study (see EQ3). Other projects in the 22613 decision series include Strengthening Social Cohesion in Conflict-Affected Areas, run by Dar Al-Salaam, a local conflict-resolution NGO; Citizens Empowerment in Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding, run by Islamic Relief; Promoting Moderation to Stabilise Yemen, run by Search for Common Ground; and Pursue's Preventing Radicalisation project. Each of these projects combined some degree of baseline analysis with training, facilitation and conflict prevention activities, and in some cases reinforced interaction between communities and elected representatives. However, they do not appear to be linked to the broader governance or state-building agenda: for example, exploring the role of the sheikhs and the use of local-level resource allocation in the macro-level political economy and the political settlement.

¹⁶⁵ Saferworld (2011), 'Public Protest and Visions for Change: Yemen: People's Peacemaking Perspectives', November 2011.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p.24-25.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p.32.

¹⁶⁸ PDCI and Partners Yemen (2011), *Baseline Conflict Assessment Report (Y-CCM)*, February 2011.

¹⁶⁹ In 2012 the Y-CCM project was further analysed in Lisa Hammond et al. (2012), *Yemen in Perspective: Applying a conflict-sensitive approach to development interventions*, PDCI.

2.8. EU influence

EQ8: To what extent have the EU's standing and achievements in Yemen been regarded as influential to the direction and pace of change in the country?

Summary response: The EU has been seen historically by regional commentators as out of touch with key regional actors and with the political realities of Yemen. EU political influence increased substantially during 2011 due to the Head of Delegation's activist diplomacy in helping to secure the GCC initiative. While the EU was well placed to respond to the political opportunity created by the 2011 youth-led protests and the subsequent political crisis, its institutional readiness was constrained. The EU's reliance on formal politics and formal institutions over much of the evaluation period in part explains the lack of expertise on the dynamics of the informal political settlement, while time-consuming procedures and institutional differences between DEVCO and EEAS have meant that development cooperation has struggled to keep pace with political engagement.

Yemenis officials tend to see the EU as being more neutral than MS and other donors, while support for human rights stands out as one of the EU's clearest comparative advantages. The EU is seen in the region as the most trustworthy of the G10 members, as having played a helpful role in supporting the transition process, the signing of the GCC initiative, and the National Dialogue process. However, some Yemeni activists see the EU's investment in the GCC initiative, which left all the key regime players in place, as privileging short-term stability at the expense of more radical change.

JC 8.1 Extent to which the EU has demonstrated leadership and/or a contribution in convening and coalition building with Government, Member States and other development partners around the need for change in Yemen.

As we have stated elsewhere in this report, 2009 was a watershed year for the EU in Yemen, including for its political engagement around the need for change. Prior to this point, the EU (and other Western donors) had been criticised by regional actors as out of touch both with the key regional actors and with the political realities of Yemen.¹⁷⁰ The EU's political profile increased significantly in 2009 with the Delegation upgrade and the EU's participation in the FoY from its creation in 2010 (see annex 6). This period coincided with a growing awareness within EU institutions (most notably the Political and Security Committee of the European Council and the Delegation in Sana'a) of the deteriorating situation and the need for a comprehensive approach informed by deeper analysis of context. During 2011, EU political influence increased substantially due to the Head of Delegation's activist diplomacy in helping to secure the GCC initiative, building on established relationships with political contacts in Yemen.¹⁷¹

In reality, the EU was just one actor among many others who played a part in securing the transition deal; this remains a crowded political space, where competitors are keen to claim credit. A more nuanced account suggests that the EU, the US, and the UK collectively contributed to the foundations for a successful transition during spring and summer 2011, along with several Gulf interlocutors, but it was the intervention of the UN Security Council that helped to bring these plans to fruition.¹⁷² The EU played no role in securing UNSCR 2140 in New York; rather, it was the views of the P5 that mattered in this regard, notwithstanding the Head of Delegation's outreach to P5 ambassadors in Sana'a (see EQ5).¹⁷³

Since the end of 2011, the EU has continued to play a significant role in transition politics, through its membership of the G10, its role in SSR and its support for the National Dialogue Conference (NDC);

¹⁷⁰ See, for example, Edward Burke (2013), *EU-GCC Cooperation: Securing the Transition in Yemen* that states: 'Until 2009, contact [between GCC embassies and the EU delegation and its member states] had been infrequent – some GCC ambassadors expressed their dislike of the clumsy demands for transparency demanded by Western diplomats in a system dominated by public largesse and patronage. They understood that some reforms were necessary but some diplomats of GCC member states regarded their European counterparts as being too rigid and lacking knowledge of the real political drivers behind Yemen.' It is interesting to note that the EU funded the workshop at which this paper was presented, indicating a readiness to receive criticism of its historical stance.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, pp.14-15: 'The EU delegation...cannot be faulted for a lack of outreach...[and] is generally perceived as the most trusted member of the G10 – which testifies to the deft diplomacy and hard work of EU diplomats in Sana'a... The EU has played a discreet and helpful role in persuading various parties to keep faith with the transition process and to take part in the National Dialogue when it was convened. The EU has also done an excellent job of facilitating the work of the Secretariat for the National Dialogue and its working committees.'

¹⁷² Interviews with EEAS officials and G10 officials, June 2014 (and with a range of sources prior to this evaluation).

¹⁷³ Interviews with EEAS officials and P5 official, June 2014.

however, it is not possible to determine the precise extent of EU influence. Both the EU and the UN can claim some credit for promoting the inclusion of youth, women and other non-traditional actors in the NDC, along with prominent MS. The EU may have wished to promote a greater degree of national ownership as a basis for the NDC, but it was the UN Security Council that had the necessary high-level political clout to get the process under way.¹⁷⁴ While there is clear evidence that the EU played an important contributory role, it is a somewhat contested story and some EU officials have been tempted to overplay the EU's role,¹⁷⁵ possibly resulting from high-level institutional investment in the perception of the GCC initiative as an EU success story.

Since 2012, there has been some perceived loss of focus and impetus in the EU's political dialogue, or at least perceived a change in style and tempo.¹⁷⁶ The Head of Delegation's departure at the end of his term of service more or less coincided with the departure of the UK Ambassador, and the US Ambassador left the following year; all three had been instrumental in the GCC initiative and had each established effective working relationships with key regime protagonists.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Head of Delegation's diplomatic achievements drew in part on the knowledge and expertise of his colleagues in the delegation; to a certain extent, with Hadi's succession to the presidency, the stalling of the start of the NDC, the departure of several key EU delegation staff members over the following two years, and the ebbing of sustained high-level engagement in Brussels, the political adrenalin subsided. At the same time, political power in Yemen has become increasingly diffuse, necessitating intensive relationship building, network mapping, ongoing analysis, and sustained diplomacy. Nevertheless, the current Head of Delegation sustains an active role in supporting the transition process, including a visible commitment to inclusive politics.

With respect to development cooperation, the EU has actively supported humanitarian programmes through DG ECHO, nutrition programmes (via UNICEF and the Ministry of Health) and development programmes in food security working with IFAD and other funding agencies. Concerning child marriage and juvenile justice, consistent lobbying by successive heads of delegation dating back to the first resident Chargé d'Affaires, is credited with highlighting individual cases, raising the profile of these policy areas, and influencing recent draft legislation (see annex 6). Dating even further back, the EU has played a prominent role in various national and regional mechanisms in an attempt to improve donors' coordination since 2002 (see EQ2). It is clear that the EU's voice is heard at the political level largely thanks to its parallel investments in development and humanitarian assistance. Without the material cooperation, the political influence would be far weaker;¹⁷⁸ and yet, there is still considerable scope for improvement in aid delivery.

JC 8.2 Extent to which the EU is seen as more than a donor and as having been instrumental in shaping and supporting change processes in Yemen.

Despite a decade's concerted engagement as a donor, and as a supporting force for political change (albeit balanced by security constraints), the EU's traction was relatively limited during the Saleh era, along with that of other Western donors; the most visible and significant indigenous 'change process' – the youth-led street protests in 2011 – occurred towards the end of the evaluation period, driven in part by demographics, media deregulation and pan-regional social forces.¹⁷⁹ Nevertheless, Yemeni politicians acknowledge the importance of the 2006 EOM, on the grounds that the presence of EU monitors lent credibility to the democratic process and laid the foundations for more sustained international engagement in the months that followed – for example, the 2006 donor conference in London (see EQ5). The Head of Delegation's dialogue with the ruling party and opposition coalition during negotiations over the delayed 2009 parliamentary elections was similarly appreciated by those representing the formal state,¹⁸⁰ as was EU involvement in the FoY. Yemeni officials also perceive the EU as having played a valuable role in securing the GCC initiative

¹⁷⁴ Interviews with G10 and IGO officials, June-July 2014.

¹⁷⁵ One senior EU official highlighted the EU's role by referring to it informally as the 'EU-GCC deal.'

¹⁷⁶ Interview with EU officials, corroborated by non-EU source, June 2014.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with EU officials, corroborated by non-EU source, July 2014.

¹⁷⁸ Numerous interviews with Yemenis in 2013-14. All those with whom the issue was discussed stated this in one form or another

¹⁷⁹ Ginny Hill, Peter Salisbury, Léonie Northedge and Jane Kinninmont (2013), *Yemen: Corruption, Capital Flight and Global Drivers of Conflict*, Chatham House.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with senior Yemeni government official, July 2014 (and with a range of Yemeni sources prior to this evaluation).

in 2011, along with the UN, the US, the UK and the French,¹⁸¹ and in supporting the National Dialogue Conference.¹⁸²

Senior Yemeni officials express regret that the Delegation withdrew in 2014, on the grounds that the EU still has an important role to play in supporting the transition process, both in the field of political dialogue and development cooperation.¹⁸³ Yemenis view the EU as a prestigious international institution, and to some extent, the EU's decision to withdraw might be regarded as an indication of doubt over the viability of the transition process. However, there is some confusion regarding the EU's scope as a multilateral actor, representing the collective views of the MS, and as a bilateral actor in its own right. There is a tendency to assume that prominent MS set the policy agenda, with the EU following their lead.¹⁸⁴ One Yemeni official identified the potential for the EU to develop a stronger leadership role, against the backdrop of a lack of confidence in the strategic coherence of the international community as a whole.¹⁸⁵

Similarly, MS and other donors agree that the EU presence in Yemen is important, not least because visibility equates to influence.¹⁸⁶ While the EU may have limited impact as a single donor, as part of a broader coalition it can achieve a cumulative impact.¹⁸⁷ However, the EU is not yet seen as a coordinating force for MS policy in Yemen, neither driving things forward in an organisational sense, nor setting strategic direction.¹⁸⁸ In part, this is assumed to follow from Yemen having had a low profile in Brussels for much of the period.¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, the EU cannot capitalise on the scope for greater leadership until it can guarantee basic Delegation security. In the absence of strong EU leadership, there is a tendency for the UK and the French to provide strategic impetus, driven in part by explicit national security or commercial interests (see EQ2).

EU officials correctly believe that Yemeni officials, activists and citizens see the EU as being more neutral than MS and other donors, including the US.¹⁹⁰ Civil society actors describe the EU Delegation as more open than the US embassy, with a broader focus, and they think that it would like to see itself as a balance to US interests; yet, the EU is not perceived as a forceful balance. 'The US establishes red lines, and the EU moves around them,' one interviewee said.¹⁹¹ Even at the time of the 2006 EU EOM, US officials in Sana'a tended to prioritise bilateral relations with MS, especially the UK, rather than the EU.¹⁹² However, the US did – and still does – view the EU as an active partner for democratisation and there is some belated acknowledgment that both the EU and MS behaved as more consistent donors than the US during the Saleh era;¹⁹³ Yemen's attempt to join the Millennium Challenge scheme, a Bush administration plan that tied aid to governance benchmarks, was fraught with difficulties.

Some Yemeni CSO leaders perceive the Delegation to be less directive than the US in terms of the conditions attached to its support, making a clear effort to consult widely prior to issuing calls for proposals and encouraging CSOs to be self-directive rather than following a pre-determined agenda; support for human rights stands out as one of the clearest branding points for the EU in Yemen.¹⁹⁴ CSO leaders also praise the EU for channelling funding to Yemeni-led organisations and/or insisting on local partnerships for international NGOs (INGOs) as a method of building local capacity.¹⁹⁵ However, others see the EU's heavy investment in the transition deal as leading to an ambivalent stance towards change.¹⁹⁶ Youth activists who participated in successive Chatham House workshops in 2011 and 2012 were asked to share their perceptions of key players in the transition process: in Autumn 2011, they described the EU as 'reluctant, silent, an

¹⁸¹ Interview with senior Yemeni government officials, July 2014 (and with a range of Yemeni sources prior to this evaluation).

¹⁸² Interviews with senior Yemeni government officials, July 2014.

¹⁸³ Interviews with senior Yemeni government officials, July 2014.

¹⁸⁴ Interviews with senior Yemeni government officials, June 2014.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with senior Yemeni government official, July 2014.

¹⁸⁶ Interviews with member states and IGOs, July 2014.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with member state, July 2014.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with member state, July 2014.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with member state, July 2014.

¹⁹⁰ Interviews with a range of Yemeni officials and civil society actors, June-July 2014.

¹⁹¹ Interview with INGO source, June 2014.

¹⁹² Interview with former US official, August 2014.

¹⁹³ Interview with former US official, August 2014.

¹⁹⁴ Interviews with Yemeni CSOs and IGOs, August 2014.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Yemeni CSOs, August 2014.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with prominent independent youth activist, June 2014.

observer, US-follower, has interests'; in Spring 2012, they said the EU was playing a 'positive role' and 'wants real change, but their efforts are not enough.'¹⁹⁷

More forceful critics argue that as a guarantor and sponsor of the transition process, the EU and the GCC have intervened to preserve the old system for the sake of short-term stability at the expense of more radical change.¹⁹⁸ 'The international community has defined the parameters of legitimate politics in Yemen and they want their system to be endorsed. They want to be seen to engage with us without taking on board what we're actually saying,' one youth activist said.¹⁹⁹ One EU official was described as being arrogant when a group of activists expressed their criticism of the GCC initiative, reinforcing the idea that political terms are set by international players and contravening the priority focus on legitimate politics under the FSPs.²⁰⁰

JC 8.3 Extent to which the process and results of EU cooperation have contributed to EU successes in influencing the direction and pace of change in Yemen.

While the EU was well placed to respond to the political opportunity created by the 2011 youth-led protests and the subsequent political crisis, it was limited in the extent of its ability to open up political space for change prior to this moment. Despite increasing levels of EU support to CSOs under Saleh, and growing awareness that Saleh's regime was unstable, the nature of the bilateral agreement, combined with a broad international consensus on the primacy of security issues, constrained the scope of institutional readiness. One EU official commented: 'We saw the crisis coming from 2009 but we were unable to respond in an innovative manner. We are conditioned to think in terms of long processes and slow disbursements, with endless checks and balances during procurement and tendering. Our conventional programming mode is not sufficiently flexible to adapt to political crises in places like Yemen.'²⁰¹

The EU's reliance on formal politics and formal institutions explains the concomitant lack of expertise regarding the dynamics of the informal political settlement. In the words of one interviewee: 'There's an institutional bias towards technicalities. It's a comfort zone, reinforced by the fact that EU officials engage mostly with ministry counterparts.'²⁰² In the words of another source: 'They tend to design programmes on the basis of formal political structures but that's not how things work here. They plan things according to the way things are supposed to be, rather than the way that power is really structured.'²⁰³ Several interviewees, discussing the EU's role since the beginning of 2012, warned of the danger of repeating mistakes from the Saleh era, namely 'pushing technical solutions to political problems.'²⁰⁴ Lengthy planning cycles and inflexible bureaucracy are seen to exacerbate this problem: 'Brussels takes ages to agree things, then people get stuck in an extreme close-up view, worrying about delivering projects on time, and to budget, even in the middle of a ground-breaking political crisis.'²⁰⁵

¹⁹⁷ By email (not published).

¹⁹⁸ Interview with independent youth activists, June 2014 (and interviews prior to this evaluation).

¹⁹⁹ Interview with independent youth activist, June 2014.

²⁰⁰ Interview with prominent independent youth activist, June 2014.

²⁰¹ Interview with EU official, July 2014.

²⁰² Interview with INGO source, June 2014.

²⁰³ Interview with independent youth activist, June 2014.

²⁰⁴ Interview with independent youth activist and INGO source, June 2014.

²⁰⁵ Interview with INGO source, June 2014.

2.9. Legal instruments and aid modalities

EQ9: To what extent were the EU's legal instruments, thematic instruments, aid modalities and management modalities applied in the most efficient and effective manner?

Summary response: The overall ambition of EU development cooperation, delivered through the project modality, has consistently exceeded the absorptive capacity of Yemeni authorities over the period of the evaluation, leading to persistent backlogs in the project portfolio. Reliance on the project modality has been more a default setting than a conscious choice of the most relevant instrument within Yemen's particular context. Conversely, the scale of the EU's engagement with Yemen has not been commensurate with the challenges facing Yemen nor with the potential fallout from failure to address those challenges. The scoping and calibration of the scale and composition of EU cooperation has therefore not been strategically managed for much of the evaluation period.

The range of instruments has been used expediently rather than strategically. Greater synergies between the instruments would have aided complementarity and sequencing. EIDHR made it possible to allocate NGO/CSO funding without potential political interference, but there have been difficulties over scaling up. The NSA fund has had particularly poor performance and uptake. IfS decision-making processes have been comparatively 'quick' by EU standards but it still takes six months to reach an agreement – too long for the rapidly shifting needs of NGOs during periods of rapid change.

The historical model for project design and the recent shift from decentralised management to partial decentralisation and centralisation or joint management is still unfit for purpose. The lesson learned from health is that relevance can be built through engagement even when the starting point is not ideal, but this is highly dependent on building long-term relationships and a long-term capacity building strategy. Weak absorption capacity in government departments and agencies through which EU cooperation has been channelled over long periods points to design processes that have not sufficiently taken account of the problem at a project level, and with insufficient attention to a longer-term capacity building perspective.

JC 9.1 Extent to which the manner in which EU instruments and modalities were applied in Yemen was appropriate to achieve EU cooperation objectives.

The EU has deployed a broad range of geographical and thematic legal instruments in Yemen since 2002. The main bilateral geographical instrument (MED 2002-2007, and subsequently DCI-MED) forms the backbone of EU development cooperation, with a total spend of EUR 168.6 million (59% of total EU expenditure in Yemen) across the evaluation period of 2002-12, delivering towards the objectives of two Country Strategy Papers and four National or Multi-annual Indicative Programmes. DCI (and previously MED) bilateral funding carries complex and onerous administrative procedures,²⁰⁶ including rigid internal timetables.²⁰⁷ Precisely because these are long-term commitments that underpin a contractual process with the Government of Yemen, the EU looks to an array of smaller supplementary thematic instruments designed to achieve more flexible programming in a fragile context, including crisis response.²⁰⁸

Spending under DCI-FOOD and FOOD (also known as the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP)) forms the next biggest spend, at EUR 82 million (29%) over the same period (2002-12). The FSTP is designed to complement programming at the national level through the bilateral geographic instruments by focusing on Food Security issues at a regional and global level. However, in practice, the instrument has also been used to tackle national food security issues where the geographic instruments are not able to do so, and the decision rests with the Delegation as to which instrument to select for which purposes. For example, it was decided that the SWF in Yemen should be funded through the FSTP rather than the bilateral DCI-MED instrument. The 2011 Mid-term Review stated that this instrument '...is becoming one of the best instruments available today in Yemen in order to institutionalise the response to shocks and emergencies.'²⁰⁹ However, interview findings indicated clearly that decisions were more often based more on the availability of funds rather than any specific merits of the instruments.


²⁰⁶ Interviews with DEVCO officials, June 2014.

²⁰⁷ Interviews with DEVCO officials, June 2014.

²⁰⁸ Interviews with EEAS and DEVCO officials, June 2014.

²⁰⁹ European Commission (2011), *EC-Yemen Country Strategy Mid-term Review*, p.15.

Figure 6: EU geographical and thematic instrument expenditures, Yemen, 2002-2012



The launch of the EIDHR in 2006 and the IfS in 2007 offered new options for country programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. EIDHR is the smallest instrument applied in Yemen, accounting for EUR 2.8 million, or 1% of the total budget from 2002-12. It works independently of national governments, allowing the Delegation to address more sensitive issues excluded from the bilateral programme. Moreover, as Saleh's government had no national plan on human rights, EIDHR afforded greater freedom to NGOs and CSOs to choose their own priorities.²¹⁰ In 2014, an evaluation of EIDHR projects during 2009-2012 identified high relevance for project choices on child marriage, children's rights, detention-related projects and freedom of expression, but also found low levels of sustainable activity extending beyond the project lifecycle. The specific impact of the EIDHR in countering human rights violations cannot be assessed.²¹¹ This disbursement style will be harder for the Delegation to maintain as the minimum grant size rises to EUR 400,000 from spring 2014, and harder for Yemeni CSOs to absorb and manage.²¹²

The NSA/LA instrument, which supports NGO co-financing and decentralised cooperation, had an envelope of EUR 300,000 for LA projects in 2012. However, this attracted only two projects with LAs (administered by NGOs) and in the past three years not a single LA has applied directly for such funds, presumably because they decided the procedures were too cumbersome for the relatively small amounts of money involved. As a result, technical fiches have been written recommending other modalities, for example direct grants, although these are usually only awarded in certain situations such as crisis. A general weakness of the call for proposals process for both the EIDHR and NSA instruments is that NGO capacity in Yemen is very limited and so the proposals received are generally of a poor quality.

As the only non-programmable instrument available for use in Yemen, the IfS (EUR 8.1 million or 3% of total expenditure over the period) is designed as a tool for crisis response, to offer timely financial help that cannot be accessed from other EU sources. This instrument funded the 2009 state-building study that underpinned the comprehensive approach that in turn established an IfS project manager post in Sana'a in order to boost the EU's crisis response capacity. While the IfS allows for vital flexibility to complement longer-term cooperation and humanitarian work, and while decision making is comparatively 'quick' by EU standards, it still takes six months to reach an agreement and any adequate crisis response during 2011 required a faster turnaround than that.²¹³ Examples cited by EU officials included a failure to follow through on promises to youth activists, leading to some loss of goodwill and confidence in EU leadership.²¹⁴

²¹⁰ Interviews with DEVCO official, June-July 2014.

²¹¹ Evaluation of support under EIDHR Programmes in Yemen 2009-2013 (DRAFT).

²¹² Evaluation of support under EIDHR Programmes in Yemen 2009-2013 (DRAFT).

²¹³ Interview with DEVCO official, June 2014.

²¹⁴ Interviews with EEAS and DEVCO officials, June 2014.

Since 2012, the IfS has supported a joint impact assessment (with the World Bank) and kick-started reform planning in the transition. It has also allowed for some scoping work with the Ministry of Interior on SSR, designed to mobilise expertise quickly and lay the ground for larger-scale longer-term cooperation in response to a personal request for help from President Hadi.²¹⁵ This allows for a high degree of responsiveness on the part of the EU, but we are reminded of the absence of adequate underlying analysis or sufficient sector-level coordination (see EQ1); indeed, we detected discernible doubt and unease about SSR among some EU officials in Brussels.²¹⁶ In March 2014, the IfS was succeeded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) that has essentially the same purpose.

JC 9.2 Extent to which the mix of EU aid modalities applied in Yemen was appropriate to achieve EU cooperation objectives.

All EU development cooperation has been provided through the modality of project support. Notwithstanding moves towards a sector-wide approach in the health sector, no budget support has been provided or is foreseen. Project support has been provided using government systems, through parallel systems and through implementation by NGOs and international organisations. There have been efforts to consolidate projects into programmes, such as support for moves towards a health sector-wide approach, but project support remains the sole modality in EU development cooperation.

With regard to the volume of aid, one commentator noted in 2010 that ‘the scale of [the EU’s engagement with Yemen] seems commensurate neither with the level of the challenges the country faces nor the potential fallout from failure to address those challenges.’²¹⁷ But use of the project modality and the amount of staff time required to manage a large number of projects has in principle limited the EU’s capability to manage even historically low volumes of aid. As aid volumes to fragile states, including Yemen, increase in response to the Agenda for Change, the importance of reviewing the appropriateness of aid modalities in relation to Delegation capacity becomes even more important. Notwithstanding initiatives to set up trust funds in some cases, we have not seen evidence of a review of aid modalities against fragile states principles that call for alignment ‘with local priorities in different ways in different contexts’. Thus the reliance on the project modality has been more a default setting than a conscious choice of the most relevant instrument within Yemen’s particular context.

JC 9.3 Extent to which the mix of EU management modalities applied in Yemen has been appropriate to achieve EU cooperation objectives, including the building of national capacity.

Bilateral projects funded within the country strategy programmes are implemented through one of three management mechanisms. Joint management refers to projects contracted through International Organisations already operating in-country, e.g. UNDP. According to interviews, this mechanism is used widely in Yemen due to the difficulty in finding relevant expertise, but also as a platform for galvanising other donors. EU involvement in implementation depends on the programme being managed. Typically, the activity is managed and supervised entirely according to the procedures of that institution, and the EU has no systematic involvement in implementation, although interviews highlighted the example of a nutrition project managed by UNICEF that – due to performance-related issues – required greater EU involvement in management and implementation.

Decentralised management is a mechanism whereby the EU signs a contract with Government, and a government institution is in charge of full implementation. According to interviews and to internal correspondence,²¹⁸ this mechanism functions the least efficiently, and as a result there has been a significant shift in recent years to recentralisation. Centralised management refers to projects that are entirely operated by the EU, either through grants or tenders. The latter involves the EU issuing grants tender documents, evaluating offers (with or without the assistance of the beneficiary government institution) and signing the contract with the company for TA, supplies or works. An additional mechanism is indirect centralised management, whereby a project is managed by the EU but indirectly through a Member State. This is

²¹⁵ Interviews with a range of EU officials, June 2014.

²¹⁶ Interviews with a range of EU officials, June 2014.

²¹⁷ Vincent Durac, *The European Union in Yemen: The Triumph of Pragmatism over Normativity?* (2010) 15 *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Issue 5, pp.645–661

²¹⁸ Most notably, External Action Management Reports or EAMRs.

frequently used elsewhere for IfS long-term projects where a pool of expertise exists within a MS and recruitment is conducted on an individual basis. Interviews indicated that the advantage of this process lies in its simplicity, although due to a dearth of Yemen experts this mechanism is not always appropriate for other instruments.

The 2011 Mid-term Review²¹⁹ emphasised continued efforts to reduce the number of PIUs that work in parallel to existing implementing mechanisms. These have been utilised in Yemen due to weak organisational capacity in Government and parastatal agencies. In spite of plans to reduce these and harmonise technical assistance inputs,²²⁰ interviews and internal correspondence indicate that PIUs are still very much needed over the short- to medium-term to compensate for weak government capacity to deliver basic services.

Partial decentralisation currently accounts for a large part of the Yemen portfolio, especially in the health sector, but due to capacity shortages in relevant line ministries the Delegation is arguing for greater use of centralisation and joint management.²²¹ A number of problems have been cited with regard to the use of decentralised and partially decentralised management in Yemen. The latter is seen to have been an appropriate approach during times of stability but in more recent times of crisis and fragility is no longer conducive to effective implementation,²²² and ‘practically obsolete for all new projects in Yemen.’²²³ In spite of these criticisms, however, a recent evaluation in the health sector found that ‘decentralisation has been shown to be feasible, at least in the health sector. The EU has successfully supported this process within the context of the Health Sector and Demography Support Programme by liaising directly with the Governorate and District levels.’²²⁴

There have been major disbursement and implementation difficulties throughout the evaluation period, particularly with respect to previous Food Security programming.²²⁵ The Draft 2014-15 Yemen–EU Country Strategy Paper points to the Government of Yemen’s weak absorption capacity, a lack of concentration and complementarity between projects and EU administrative complexities.²²⁶ Almost 10 years before, the 2005 NIP cited weak government capacity, and proposed a stronger focus in programming, stronger coherence with the Yemeni Poverty Reduction Strategy, particularly for Food Security projects, and highlighted a 2001 Court of Auditor’s report that disbursement should be slowed down until the Commission had agreed a better framework for intervention with the Yemeni Authorities.²²⁷ The project backlog that had accumulated during the 2002-06 period combined with the political crisis brought about substantial programming delays during the 2007-13 period, according to interviews.²²⁸ This points to a consistent mismatch between the overall ambition of EU cooperation and the absorptive capacity of Yemeni authorities.

While the objective of building national capacity, in particular that of government ministries and agencies, has been central to development cooperation programming, it has been founded on unrealistic assumptions about government intentions and capabilities. Throughout the period of this evaluation, when issues of government or implementing partner capacity have been cited in EU documents – most notably strategy documents and EAMRs – the focus has been on how best to strengthen delivery. Especially since 2007 and the EU’s endorsement of the OECD-DAC fragile states principles, the absence of explicit and strategic attention to the challenges of national capacity building²²⁹ in the Yemeni context has weakened the impact and sustainability of development cooperation.

²¹⁹ European Commission (2011), *EC-Yemen Country Strategy Mid-term Review*.

²²⁰ Ibid, p.10.

²²¹ European Commission (2012), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2012-31/12/2012, p.7.

²²² Ibid, p.6.

²²³ European Commission (2011), *External Assistance Management Report (EAMR)*, 01/01/2011-31/12/2011, p.5.

²²⁴ Dubok H. et al. (2011), *Evaluation Study Health Development Councils (HDC) – Yemen: Final Report*, p.78.

²²⁵ European Commission (2004), *National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2005-06*, p.4.

²²⁶ European Commission (2013), *Yemen-European Union Country Strategy Paper for the Period 2014-15*, p.13.

²²⁷ European Commission (2004), *National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2005-06*, p.9.

²²⁸ Interviews with Delegation staff, July 2014

²²⁹ See, for example, the TRUST elements of the New Deal that frame how aid should be managed in partnership with national actors (which include but are not limited to government).

2.10. Institutional arrangements and staffing

EQ10: To what extent has the EU resourced and deployed its services to deliver EU cooperation in an efficient manner?

Summary response: Human resources have been insufficient to deliver to the EU's strategic ambitions in Yemen. Weaknesses in human resource management have undermined the EU's ability to maintain and build capacity internally and have led to a reliance on technical assistance that has often performed poorly. The presence since 2009 of a fully staffed Delegation in Sana'a delivered immediate benefits, allowing the EU to intensify dialogue with the government beyond just projects.

Efficiency and effectiveness have been undermined by insufficient attention to the impact of Yemen's fragility on staff and programmes, such as the staffing and workload required to build and maintain effective relationships; the need for a systematic approach to evaluation, knowledge management and institutional memory; and the need for a more strategic approach to capacity development and technical assistance. The complexities and inflexibilities of EU development cooperation procedures have exacerbated the management challenges faced by staff.

The lack of evaluative evidence relating to EU programming and its fragility relevance in Yemen is a key finding of this evaluation. Nonetheless we note the impact of several highly committed individuals in the Delegation who have worked hard to understand local needs, build relevance, satisfy internal demands, overcome EU inconsistencies and achieve coherence. Unfortunately, institutional memory is not actively maintained through effective human resource management. The challenge to support active engagement and learning looks more intimidating in the context of current remote management arrangements and the scaling up DEVCO's portfolio.

JC 10.1 Extent to which EU services in Brussels, Amman and Yemen have been adequately staffed, resourced and organised to design and manage EU cooperation efficiently and responsively

At the start of the evaluation period, the European Commission's presence in Yemen took the form of a technical assistance office, functioning as a 'satellite dependency' of the EU Delegation in Jordan. In 2004, the EU upgraded its representation to Yemen, with a non-residential Head of Delegation based in Amman, reporting directly to Brussels; four years later, the EU devolved project management from Brussels to Amman. In 2009, the Yemen delegation was upgraded, leading to a full transfer of responsibility to Sana'a.

From 2001-03 the Technical Assistance Office in Sana'a had 12 staff in total, including administrative support staff, guards and drivers, with an administrative budget of about EUR 1.5 million.²³⁰ By 2003, the EU had 53 interventions, but only three staff project monitors in the Sana'a office. To some extent this was offset by the Commission's ability to send international field monitoring missions once a year to cover some of the larger interventions; for instance, in June 2003 a monitoring mission reported on the Vocational Training Project, the Food Security Programme, Abyan Delta Spate Irrigation and the Family Planning Centres of Marie Stopes in Taiz and Aden.²³¹ But more regular monitoring was constrained by staff shortages. At any one stage there were up to 18 resident TA specialists assigned to some of the 50+ projects and programmes (total commitments of about EUR 160 million). Disbursement rates had been poor in previous years, but began to improve – from EUR 14 million in 2001, to some EUR 18.5 million in 2002, and more than EUR 22 million by 2003.²³²

Until at least 2009 there were persistent internal concerns over staff resources and TA abilities, reflected in several EAMRs. In short, the human resources available for the management and monitoring of EU projects were spread too thinly.²³³ The January 2009 EAMR states the management challenges quite bluntly: 'EC

²³⁰ This was itself a project, European Commission Technical Advisory Office (1999-2003, with extension), with the project authority being the Ministry of Planning and Development. (c/f Early Projects 2002-2003, internal summary document).

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ EAMR, February 2006, states that the delegation 'requires additional resources (mission budget) to maintain overview of implementation of projects in Yemen, a country with a bleak record of sound financial management,' and 'without a fully deconcentrated status, the increasing expectations from our counterparts and fellow donors cannot be met'. Again, EAMR January 2008 reiterates: 'additional human resources, which were expected to be recruited before the end 2007 have not been completed due to difficulties in finding suitable candidates willing to take up posts in Yemen.'

dialogue and monitoring was hampered by the volatile security situation...capacities and commitment of Ministries to drive a reform agenda and steer programmes remains low... even Ministries which have the mandate to encourage public sector reform such as the Ministry for Civil Service reform have not been able to utilise strategically EC institutional support; this has been also associated by poor quality of the technical assistance in some cases.’

Throughout the period the EU has been reliant on TA to support programme delivery. However, the quality of the TA specialists the EU could recruit in a challenging and non-family duty station has been a major constraint. The 2002-06 CSP reiterates the challenge by recognising the continued need for expatriate TA, yet stating that: ‘The selection and mobilising of technical assistance is a long and cumbersome process, delaying the project start. In addition, it appears to be difficult to find qualified and motivated experts. Selected staff often have to be replaced shortly after being assigned in Yemen.’²³⁴ All TA specialists reported to Brussels directly, so little formal management or overview from Sana’a was possible. Weaknesses included: poor-quality TA assigned to public administration projects,²³⁵ compounded by a confused strategy over payrolls and budgetary processes; and the diminished influence the EU had within the SFD due to its insistence on having separate administrative procedures from the World Bank, resulting in significant delays in disbursements and therefore in the deployment of the two TA specialists assigned to the SFD.²³⁶

The situation improved from 2008 following the decision of the Delegation to close a certain number of projects, in agreement with the Yemeni government; and the devolution of the financial and operational management of projects from Brussels to Amman and then to Sana’a. 2008 also saw the transfer of two Programme Managers from Amman to Sana’a. However, it took a long time to mobilise the new Head of Section for cooperation (who eventually took over duties on 16 April 2009). The main challenge for 2009 was to fill the eight new posts associated with the upgraded status to a full Delegation.²³⁷

By the start of 2011, the Head of Delegation and his team were based at the new delegation building in Sana’a, including contract agents and local agents.²³⁸ DEVCO staff were by now managing an active portfolio of EUR 102 million. As we have commented elsewhere (EQ3 and EQ7), the presence of a fully staffed Delegation in Sana’a delivered immediate benefits, most notably the direct involvement of the Head of Delegation in political negotiations with major political parties leading to the signature of the GCC initiative and the Transitional Plan for Stabilisation and Development. In short, it allowed the EU to intensify dialogue with the government that was beyond just projects.

Given that the EEAS had already foreseen increasing instability in Yemen, fragility thinking should have been starting to take effect, both with regard to the specific mix of skills among delegation staff, and preparation for a potential evacuation; yet, to our knowledge, evacuation plans and readiness for remote management were inadequate.²³⁹ In the event, the evacuation process undertaken in spring 2011 was reported as ad hoc; all missions were suspended and most in-country technical assistance was withdrawn. From May/June 2011 only the Head of Delegation remained in place, focusing on political dialogue and overseeing the minimum ‘survival’ functions of the Delegation.

The 2011 disruptions to the programme included the relocation of Operations (OPR)/FCA staff to Brussels and arrangements were made for ‘remote control’ management.²⁴⁰ All missions were suspended and most in-country TA presence was withdrawn. Although the Head of Delegation remained in place, the Delegation almost closed after fighting in the capital in May/June 2011. The focus was now purely on engagement in the political process and the declaration of ‘crisis situation’ was approved by the DEVCO Director-General on 3 November 2011.

The disruption to EU activities in 2011 was immense. Security level 2 was retained for months on the basis of there being ‘no progress’ in the political stalemate, but since no sanctions were imposed on the authorities

²³⁴ CSP 2002-06, section 4.1.

²³⁵ The EC Financing Agreement focused in particular on administrative reform in the Ministry of Public Health and Population, Ministry of Social Security and Civil Service and Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority.

²³⁶ Interviews with EC officials, June 2014

²³⁷ EAMR, January 2009.

²³⁸ A political officer was appointed to the delegation later in 2011 and a second in 2012.

²³⁹ Interview, June 2014. The evacuation was formally effected as of 1st April 2011 – although a majority of staff had already left in March on personal initiative, and on strong advice from the Head of Delegation.

²⁴⁰ EAMR, Jan-Jun 2011.

throughout the period, the expectation was that most programmes should continue despite the lack of staff on the ground. Unable to consult with local CSOs, delegation staff decided not to launch a call for EIDHR proposals; instead, they selected the best unsolicited proposals. Local staff were unable to visit partners; delegation staff, based in Brussels, found it difficult to maintain contact with local staff and Yemeni counterparts as the phone lines were routinely down. Ironically, the uptake of training opportunities increased with the evacuation of staff to Brussels in April 2011 and the bringing of newly recruited local staff to Brussels for training over the next six-to-nine months. Global average training increased to ten days per staff member per year.²⁴¹

By November 2012, all EU staff had returned to Sana'a, coinciding with the full devolution of financial responsibilities set in motion by the delegation upgrade; the management of the cooperation programme was formally devolved on 15 November 2012. As a priority, DEVCO set about terminating several financial commitments with the Government of Yemen that could no longer be justified according to standards of Public Financial Management (PFM) and getting to grips with the extent of disruption during the previous year, including missing data and significant disorder to reporting cycles.²⁴² During 2013, some aspects of delegation management improved, with efforts to standardise procedures, reduce the number of contracts, and reorganise staff responsibilities.²⁴³ However, systemic inefficiencies dating back to the Amman period were still evident as late as 2013, when the first external audit was completed.²⁴⁴

The delegation barely had time to make up for lost ground during the first evacuation in 2011 and adapt to Yemen's new circumstances, when security conditions in Sana'a began to deteriorate again, in part associated with the completion of the NDC in January 2014, and Hadi's new offensive against AQAP. The delegation was evacuated for a second time in spring 2014 after an EU security contractor was killed in Sana'a: yet another ad hoc procedure. In our assessment the 2014 evacuation represents a significant indicator that the EU was not sufficiently staffed, resourced and organised to cope with Yemen's fragility, including having regular access to reliable intelligence.²⁴⁵ Furthermore, it raises pertinent questions about the EU's institutional expertise for operating in hostile environments, the maturity of EEAS's internal risk architecture, and the speed at which EEAS can respond to changes in the security environment.²⁴⁶

JC 10.2 Extent to which EU administrative and financial procedures and processes have enabled EU services to design and manage EU cooperation efficiently and responsively

In 2004, one single EU grant, disbursed via a World Bank-administered trust fund, had required individual approval of 300 separate contracts. EU procedures have since improved, becoming increasingly more efficient and less complex. However, there are notable contemporary examples of inefficiencies and delays. One 2007 grant was only approved in 2011 due to operational issues; the recipient was then told to spend the money by the end of the year.²⁴⁷ The Yemen Economic Support programme (SMEs), initiated in 2009, was finally contracted in 2012 but still not operational in 2014 – five years after the project was first identified – due to EU demands for bank guarantees that Yemeni NGOs are unable to provide.²⁴⁸

Responsibility for managing instruments and ensuring complementarity rests with the Delegation. Programming advice is normally requested once the Delegation has already decided to incorporate a specific action into its country programme, and as a result, questions of relevance and comparative advantage are rarely addressed prior to project identification.²⁴⁹ For example, DEVCO's unit for Employment, Social Inclusion and Social Protection has neither advised on the job creation aspect of the SFD, nor provided input on the social protection mechanism prior to project identification.²⁵⁰ In addition, Delegation staff describe difficulties navigating the EU's silo culture, working around splits between thematic teams – for example, health and nutrition are managed together in Sana'a, but these two portfolios fall under different directorates

²⁴¹ EAMR Jan-Jun 2011, section 5.

²⁴² Interviews with EC officials, June 2014.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ An earlier external audit, launched in 2010, had to be closed when the auditors decided not to travel to Yemen.

²⁴⁵ Interviews with EC officials, August 2014.

²⁴⁶ Interviews with EEAS officials, July 2014.

²⁴⁷ Interview with CSO representative, July 2014.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Interviews with EC officials, June 2014.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

within in DEVCO.²⁵¹ Efforts are currently being made to tackle the EU's silo culture, with the creation of several new flagship programmes designed to encourage closer collaboration between thematic teams.²⁵² However, by their own admission, the thematic units only respond to demand from the Delegation staff, as their portfolios are vast and they have little specific country knowledge. Their mandate does not extend to the NSA sector, where projects are selected on the 'call for proposal' basis, meaning that, for example, they had no input in the recent SME project.

At a time when other agencies such as the World Bank or IFAD design projects for six or seven years, the EU continues with the three-year project cycle with complex procedures. The results include: a) long delays in start-up and implementation due to the procedural complexities in Brussels; b) additional delays due to the negotiating process with the participants in Sana'a or elsewhere in Yemen; c) insufficient time for implementation; d) additional burdens on EU and Yemeni staff as the whole process needs to be repeated too frequently; e) frequent extensions of projects which are also demanding of staff time; f) uncertainty for the beneficiaries, who have barely seen the project get going when it is ended and a new one needs to be designed.

Specific problems occur with co-financed projects when the donors have different project durations. For example, a three-year input by the EU in the EOP and FIP, co-financed with IFAD, requires the IFAD project management²⁵³ to focus specifically on the EU-financed parts in order to complete them on time – detracting from the overall synergy and coherence of what was designed as a single project. Other UN organisations also have to adjust their timing and planning to fit in with the EU cycle whereas in many cases (eg UNICEF nutrition programmes) a longer duration would be more rational and save valuable staff time on all sides. It is only for organisations like the SFD, which work with a multiplicity of funders, that adjustment is relatively easy. However it is worth noting that the SFD and EU agreed to operate an entire EU project through a trust fund with the World Bank, just to avoid the complexity of reporting requirements set by the EU – even at a time when the EU had sent a specific mission that had approved the SFD procedures²⁵⁴ which have, indeed, been designed and approved by the World Bank and are considered good by numerous international funders, including MS such as the UK.

A further problem is that of internationally recruited technical assistance. While in some cases it has been useful and effective (e.g. Tihama water management), in others it has been seriously problematic (SWF support); in the latter case, a single company had a series of contracts and these were only finally not renewed at the express request of the Minister, although performance had been below standard for many years. Instead the SWF now has technical assistance financed by the World Bank. In other cases, the Yemeni parties have considered that they were provided with expensive technical assistance, as for example in health matters, when the funds could have been used more effectively in building national capacity through training local staff.²⁵⁵

JC 10.3 Extent to which EU services related to Yemen have been active in learning from its experience in Yemen, in communicating these lessons to wider relevant EU services and staff and in incorporating lessons into strategy and programme design and management.

The lack of evaluative evidence relating to EU programming in Yemen is itself a key finding of this macro-level evaluation. Between 2002 and 2012 the EU financed 154 interventions through its NIP/MIPs and 140 interventions through thematic instruments and programmes, but we have only been able to secure very limited documentation on the results and impacts of these interventions. Where the EU co-financed projects with other donors – most notably, some interventions with IFAD, the SWF and the SFD – evaluations and impact assessments commissioned by EU partners can be used to infer the effectiveness of EU support. However, there is a distinct lack of in-house evaluations in priority EU areas, including much of the Food Security portfolio. Even where recent evaluations have been carried out – such as fisheries – they have paid insufficient attention to fragility relevance as a programming criterion. As with many other systemic failures

²⁵¹ Interviews with DEVCO and EEAS officials, June 2014.

²⁵² Interview with EC official, June 2014.

²⁵³ Interview with development partner July 2014.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Interviews with Yemeni officials, July 2014.

highlighted in this report, Yemen's low profile in Brussels for much of the evaluation period is likely to have played a part (see 2.1).

Despite this, we note the impact of several highly committed individuals in the Delegation who have worked hard to understand local needs, build relevance, satisfy internal demands, overcome EU inconsistencies and achieve coherence. In an environment like Yemen, where power is only partially structured through formal institutions, success at all levels – including the assessment and provision of delegation security – depends on intensive investment in personal relationships. This approach requires a high degree of empathic engagement, and it is our impression that this is not sufficiently recognised in Brussels – where senior managers may have less direct experience of functioning in such fragile environments. As a result, some of the most committed individuals have, at times, felt that they were working in isolation, without sufficient professional acknowledgment or institutional support.

Significantly, given the extent to which relevance is built through relationships, there is an obvious need for an appropriate handover period and carefully planned transfer of knowledge during the deployment of new staff. Without this, a single individual's departure can decimate institutional memory and essential contextual understanding.²⁵⁶ However, there is rarely an in-country handover period; more often, there is a gap of several weeks or months between the departure of the outgoing staff member and the arrival of the replacement. Recruitment can take up to nine months, compounded by visa delays and security constraints, but the challenging security environment makes forward planning even more important.²⁵⁷ Local staff have not been able to offer the 'default' institutional memory that they could – in part, because they had little overview of programming before decentralisation was completed in 2011, precisely at a time of major political upheaval.

As we have already noted, responsibility for implementing thematic programmes and ensuring complementarity rests with the delegation. Building relevance and achieving effective implementation requires a dedicated team on the ground, yet as a result of the latest evacuation in 2014, each of the substantial challenges detailed in this report now has to be tackled by remote management. This undoubtedly has considerable impact on the delegation's ability to consult the Government of Yemen on the delivery of EU assistance in the short term, and engage in long-term planning; it also has substantial impact on EU engagement with CSOs, and EU coordination of other donors.²⁵⁸ The challenge looks more intimidating in the context of scaling up DEVCO's portfolio, while at the same time Yemen's political environment is becoming more nuanced. It will be some months before a new EU compound can be constructed – in the meantime, EU ambitions need to be adjusted, and a recovery period will be required when the delegation does return.²⁵⁹ Leadership style is cited as an important factor, given the small size of the diplomatic community in Sana'a, the tense nature of current working conditions and the need for credible relations with Yemeni actors.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁶ Interviews with EC officials, June 2014.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Interviews with DEVCO and EEAS officials, June 2014.

²⁶⁰ Interviews with EEAS and DEVCO officials, corroborated with G10 sources, June-July 2014.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding section we have presented our findings against the ten evaluation questions. We have seen consistent themes emerging across these questions, and in our conclusions we have synthesised these findings to arrive at a more strategic analysis of the drivers of, and constraints to, successful EU cooperation in Yemen from 2002 to 2012.

C1. EU cooperation has contributed to state-building and resilience with some success in a very challenging context, but overall results have been mixed and sustainability has in many instances been weak. Longstanding support in the health sector offers a successful example of state-building work at the local level and has contributed to household-level resilience through access to basic services. EU political engagement was instrumental in mediating Yemen's transition agreement and in supporting the National Dialogue. EU support for social protection and food security has contributed to greater resilience of poor households and to strengthened capacity for delivery, but these achievements have been undermined by aspects of weak programme design and by beneficiary-targeting problems. Support to private sector development has delivered some impact to direct beneficiaries, but links to strategic objectives for economic growth and poverty reduction have been weak and sustainability has been generally poor. Across all sectors, the absence of a strategic approach to capacity development has weakened sustainability. With recent improvements in the quality of programme design, prospects for results and sustainability are in principle better, but the deteriorating security situation presents major risks going forward. Due to the very limited availability of secondary evaluation sources on the results of EU cooperation, this conclusion is based significantly on the EU's own assessment of its performance (as set out in programming documents) and on extensive interviews with EU officials and other stakeholders. Due to the cancellation of the field mission on security grounds, we were unable to verify results in the field.

C2. Strategy design and its implementation has been weak for much of the period of this evaluation, with limited evidence of shared strategic thinking to build and manage coherence and be responsive to context. Under the first CSP (2002-06) strategy and programmes were based on unrealistic assumptions and insufficient analysis, while the strategic coherence and consistency of the portfolio was not actively designed or managed. Programmes were not adequately monitored or evaluated, poor performance was not adequately addressed and EU cooperation strategy as a whole has never been independently or rigorously evaluated. Although the quality of strategy improved from 2007, and a much more reflective and responsive strategic stance is evident from 2009, the lag between strategy and programming has meant that many of the weaknesses of strategy implementation under the 2002-06 CSP were carried forward into the second strategy period. The significant improvement in the quality of programming since 2010, with its sharper focus on state-building and resilience, has yet to feed through substantially into strategy implementation. This conclusion is based on a comparison of the focus and coherence of strategic choices, their basis in sound analysis and evaluation, and what was actually implemented and achieved. This conclusion is therefore also subject to the very limited availability of secondary evaluation sources.

C3. At both strategy and programming levels there has been a de facto lack of senior management engagement with results and accountability. This has allowed EU cooperation in Yemen to be significantly under-evaluated and has led to a lack of transparency in the rationale for programming decisions. The absence of a shared understanding and narrative between the Delegation, DEVCO and the EEAS about the strengths, weaknesses and lessons of EU cooperation has undermined effectiveness, impact and sustainability as well as value for money. This country evaluation and the increased number of programme evaluations ongoing or recently completed together signal a revived interest in results; but DEVCO and the EEAS will need to strengthen accountability and learning loops if this is to translate into improved results-based-management of EU cooperation in Yemen. This conclusion is a logical inference that leads from our findings about the poor attention to monitoring and evaluation over the period, triangulated with findings about weaknesses in strategy and its implementation. It is further informed by the sheer variety of opinions expressed by EU officials, often conflicting, about the effectiveness of different aspects of EU cooperation.

C4. The EU has not invested sufficiently in contextual analysis and this deficit continues to expose EU cooperation to significant risks. The 2009 McDonald/Khalil study demonstrated the importance and utility of contextual analysis; the study has been influential in guiding strategic thinking and programming since then. However, historically insufficient attention to, and investment in, contextual analysis (including political economy analysis, conflict analysis and fragility assessment), has undermined relevance and

responsiveness. In particular, fragility thinking has percolated only slowly into strategy and programming processes. Although the importance of such analysis is now recognised, confusion between DEVCO and EEAS over responsibility for its conduct and inconsistent application across the development cooperation portfolio continues to undermine the EU's ability to be relevant, responsive and effective. The continued lack of attention to sector- and problem-level analysis presents risks to the relevance and feasibility of the resilience and security sector-reform programmes currently in the pipeline. This conclusion is based largely on our analysis of the presence and quality of the analysis that has underpinned EU cooperation in general and development cooperation strategy and programmes in particular; a comparison of this analytical base with the fragile states principles to which the EU formally subscribes; and on the perceptions of relevant stakeholders on the contextual understanding that the EU has demonstrated through its political engagement and development cooperation.

C5. When equipped with the basis of a comprehensive strategy, the EU has been more influential, responsive and effective in Yemen. For most of the period of this evaluation – and currently – there has not been a comprehensive strategy that links the political, development and regional dimensions of EU cooperation in Yemen. The 2009 document *Towards a Comprehensive Approach* formed the basis of a coherent strategy, underpinning diplomacy during 2011 and strengthening EU profile, influence and responsiveness. It provided a strong example of emergent strategy in the field of EU political dialogue, much of which remains relevant today – despite the fact that it has not since been updated. Current initiatives could be better framed within the context of such a comprehensive strategy. This conclusion is based on comparative analysis of EU cooperation prior to, during and after the period 2009-11. We have viewed this period as a demonstration of a comprehensive strategy based on sound contextual analysis can strengthen relevance and effectiveness. Given the absence of a comprehensive strategy for EU cooperation for most of the evaluation period, we have based our comparison against the fragile states principles.

C6. EU Co-operation with Yemen has suffered historically from the institutional disconnects within and between DEVCO and the EEAS and by the well-documented inflexibilities of EU instruments and programming processes and practices that have in general been poorly suited to the particular context of Yemen and the capabilities present there. Despite the priority given to fragile states in the Agenda for Change, Yemen has had a low profile and priority in Brussels for much of the evaluation period. Its isolation within the EU system has consistently inhibited effective oversight, and affected the coherence of the EU's response. Taken together, Yemen's multiple problems – a declining resource base, a growing population, an unstable government and a deteriorating security environment – pose a formidable policy challenge with few easy solutions. And yet it is precisely for this reason that sustained high-level engagement in Brussels is necessary, in order to improve and maintain the quality of future political dialogue and development cooperation. This conclusion is based on a consistent set of findings from interviews with EU staff, triangulated with Yemeni Government officials, that point to a recognition of historical difficulties in locating Yemen in the EU's institutional architecture; to the current lack of consensus on how it could be better located; and to consistent interview and documentary findings from EU and external sources on the inflexibilities of EU instruments and programming processes.

C7. An effective Delegation is vital to the effectiveness of EU cooperation; its resourcing, location and organisational strength has not been effectively calibrated to the ambitions and realities of EU cooperation in Yemen. The Delegation functions as a network node and is the only piece of the EU institutional jigsaw that is able to understand local needs, build relevance, satisfy internal demands, overcome EU inconsistencies and achieve coherence. Over the period of this evaluation, the EU has not adequately resourced, directed or supported its Delegation to fulfil this necessary role. Neither has it engaged sufficiently in scenario planning or business continuity planning as part of the strategy formulation process. The ability to understand local needs is of particular relevance given the evacuation of international Delegation staff. Notwithstanding that the EU's duty of care extends as much to national as to international staff, by maintaining its reliance on a predominantly international team of staff, the impact of an evacuation on operations and relationships is much greater than would have been the case with a stronger and more senior cadre of national staff. This conclusion is based on consistent interview and documentary findings from EU sources, and our logical inference that the Delegation is only part of the EU organisational landscape on which all Yemen-related threads converge.

These conclusions (C1 to C7) are based on our own data gathering and analysis. It is important to note though that they are consistent with broader findings and conclusions about EU cooperation in fragile states. A recent report²⁶¹ prepared for the European Parliament concludes that:

Key weaknesses of the EU's programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states include insufficient analysis of the root causes of fragility, ineffective early warning systems, and insufficient coordination with other international actors engaged in fragile and conflict-affected states.

These challenges are not dissimilar to those experienced by other international actors. However, the EU's performance is exacerbated by a number of factors that are specific to its organisational and resourcing arrangements. These include the internal fragmentation of policy responsibility at headquarter level, inadequate translation of policy into programming at country level and insufficient instrumental coherence. Investing in expertise in fragility and conflict prevention has not, to date, been a priority, particularly at the operational level.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Consistent with our synthesis of findings to arrive at a set of strategic conclusions we have not sought to formulate detailed operational recommendations here, but to point to what we consider to be the structural opportunities for strengthened EU cooperation. These recommendations are presented as a package and flow in a logical sequence, from leadership to strategy underpinned by analysis, through organisational effectiveness to implementation. If the package as a whole is not implemented, then the top three priorities should be, in order, R2, R3 and R6.

Recommendations for senior management in DEVCO and the EEAS

R1. The senior management of DEVCO and EEAS should agree and communicate a clear leadership position on the shared priority that they accord to Yemen. This leadership position should clarify expectations with regard to the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive approach by the EU and MS; should include a decision on Yemen's location within EU organisational and funding structures in a manner that better reflects its needs and priority. Recognising the grave implications of Yemen's transition to a post-oil economy within the context of an increasingly polarised Middle East, consideration should be given to putting Yemen under 'special measures' within EU structures, bypassing in the short term the complications inherent in relocating Yemen in the EU's legal framework for cooperation. Senior management should be proactive in following up and reporting on progress in delivering to this leadership position.

R2. The senior management of DEVCO and EEAS should require and support the development of a comprehensive strategy for EU and MS in Yemen, consistent with the Joint Communication of December 2013 (The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises). In the first instance the Delegation should revisit and update the 2009 recommendations on moving towards a comprehensive EU approach to Yemen. The updated recommendations should include a plan for formulating a comprehensive strategy by 2016, within which there should be greater emphasis on joint programming with MS and other donors. The strategy should pay attention to the perspectives of GCC governments. DEVCO and EEAS should actively track progress and achievements against these recommendations through the EAMRs.

R3. The senior management of DEVCO and EEAS should ensure a significantly increased investment in, and use of, contextual analysis and evaluation at national, sector and problem levels. Initially they should provide a clear statement on their shared expectations for contextual analysis and evaluation, clarifying organisational arrangements for the commissioning and use of both. These arrangements should allow for the outsourcing of contextual analysis studies but should ensure its systematic use by EU officials as an integral part of their respective roles in political engagement and development cooperation. Within the parameters set by senior management, the Delegation should invest further in these areas, building up a body of analysis and evidence to strengthen the relevance, responsiveness and

²⁶¹ *EU Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Challenges and Opportunities*, prepared for the European Parliament's Committee on Development, 2013

accountability of EU cooperation and to contribute to more sustainable institutional expertise in fragility. The approach should include the pooling of analysis and the conduct of joint evaluations with MS. Where possible, it should seek to draw on and build national capacity for the same. It should also explore the scope for strengthening beneficiary feedback in contextual analysis and evaluation, to better inform analysis and findings, and to strengthen mechanisms and processes for greater downwards accountability.

Recommendations for the Delegation

R4. The Delegation, with the support of EEAS and DEVCO services in Brussels, should develop an organisational strategy to strengthen the Delegation's capability to play its central role in delivering and coordinating EU dialogue, action and support. This should include concrete proposals on the Delegation's interim location pending its return to Sana'a. Co-location in a regional Delegation should be considered, possibly within a GCC member country. The strategy should also include plans for team-building, skills development and knowledge management within the Delegation and with relevant services in Brussels. The approach to knowledge management should recognise Delegation staff knowledge as an institutional resource, and strengthen contact management across the range of political engagement and development cooperation activities. The Delegation should adopt a more strategic approach to the recruitment of senior national staff in Yemen (whether in a Sana'a-based Delegation or technical office under a regionally-based Delegation) so that operations and relationships can be managed more consistently even under the kind of conditions that currently pertain. DEVCO and EEAS should actively track progress and achievements against the strategy through the EAMRs, paying particular attention to the adequacy of Delegation resources and capability to deliver to the full range of demands of a comprehensive approach.

R5. The Delegation should develop a set of principles for national capacity development consistent with the New Deal. The principles should inform strategy, programming and ensure that the choice of management arrangements is explicitly framed by state-building considerations, with an emphasis on the evolving dynamics of the political settlement. The principles should require explicit recognition of the trade-offs between long-term state-building considerations and the shorter-term imperative to meet human needs. The strategy should include the following elements:

- A clear position on the most appropriate mix of international and national Delegation staff, to strengthen and expand the cadre of national staff who can maintain effective relationships over a longer period of time than the usual rotation of international staff and ensure a greater level of business continuity during times of disruption, taking into account the EU's duty of care to all staff
- A long-term plan for building capacity in government to facilitate and coordinate EU support, through the Executive Agency and/or government ministries acting as implementing partners. The focus here should be on building understanding, trust and accountability for efficient project design, management and reporting
- A long-term plan for building capacity in local NGOs to design and manage EU-funded projects, including through partnerships with international NGOs
- Explicit treatment of the trade-offs between the exigencies of meeting basic human needs in the short term and building national capacity (in government, national NGOs and beneficiary communities and groups) in the longer term in line with fragile states principles. Both approaches are relevant but must be balanced.

National capacity development should become a cross-cutting issue for systematic treatment in all Results-Oriented Monitoring missions and in all strategy and programme evaluations. The principles should be endorsed by DEVCO senior management. The Delegation should review the principles and their application as part of country evaluations and strategy mid-term reviews.

R6. Current development programmes, including those under preparation, should each be reviewed for their conflict sensitivity. Where design weaknesses are identified as a result, these should be addressed by mitigation measures in the case of current programmes, or re-design in the case of programmes under preparation. Assessments of conflict sensitivity should include attention to commodity value chains and procurement channels. In order to capture the interaction between project and context, conflict sensitivity should also be built into the monitoring and evaluation arrangements for all development cooperation

programmes, drawing on the experience and tools that already exist in global best practice and among EU implementing partners.²⁶²

These recommendations are specific to Yemen and are built on the analysis contained in this report and its annexes. But they relate to broader organisational and institutional challenges that the EU faces and that undermine the effectiveness of EU cooperation in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. We note the recommendations of the recent report prepared for the European Parliament²⁶³ that sets out an agenda for more clearly shaping and implementing a whole-of-EU approach to ensure that the EU's objectives are mutually reinforcing across the fields of development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, conflict prevention and international security. The recommendations above should thus be considered within the context of this broader agenda.

²⁶² See for example, Module 3 in Saferworld's resource pack on conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding


²⁶³ *EU Development Cooperation in Fragile States: Challenges and Opportunities*, prepared for the European Parliament's Committee on Development, 2013

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