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Thursday 23rd, the Council adopted a sweeping 19th package of further 69 individual listings and numerous economic restrictive measures<\/strong>\u00a0targeting key sectors which fuel Russia\u2019s illegal invasion of Ukraine, including\u00a0energy<\/strong>,\u00a0finance\u00a0<\/strong>and the\u00a0military industrial complex<\/strong>. The Council is also strengthening control over the\u00a0movement of Russian diplomats across the EU<\/strong>\u00a0and taking further measures against those responsible for the\u00a0abduction of Ukrainian children<\/strong>.<\/p>\n As part of the package, the Council also imposed further measures on\u00a0Belarus<\/strong>\u00a0to restrict the latter\u2019s support for the Russian war effort.<\/p>\n The package comes in response to Russia\u2019s escalating aggression against Ukraine, in particular the recent brutal military campaign deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, including energy, water and health facilities. These attacks, which have inflicted severe suffering on the civilian population, further underscore Russia\u2019s unwillingness to pursue peace.<\/p>\n We have just adopted our 19th package of sanctions. It targets Russian energy, banks, crypto exchanges, and entities in China, among others. The EU is also regulating the movements of Russian diplomats to counter attempts at destabilisation. It is becoming increasingly difficult for Putin to finance his war. Every euro we deny Russia is one it cannot spend on war. The 19th package will not be the last.<\/p>\n Kaja Kallas, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and chair of the Foreign Affairs Council<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Thursday’s package introduces a ban on imports of<\/strong>\u00a0Russian liquefied natural gas<\/strong>\u00a0(LNG<\/strong>) into the EU,\u00a0starting January 2027<\/strong>\u00a0for long-term contracts, and\u00a0within six months\u00a0<\/strong>for short-term contracts, and tightens the existing transaction ban on two major Russian state-owned oil producers (Rosneft<\/strong>\u00a0and\u00a0Gazprom Neft<\/strong>). The EU is also listing a Tatarstani conglomerate active in the Russian oil sector. In parallel, the EU is taking measures against important third country operators enabling Russia\u2019s revenue streams. This involves sanctioning\u00a0Chinese entities<\/strong>\u00a0– two\u00a0refineries<\/strong>\u00a0and an\u00a0oil trader<\/strong>\u00a0– that are significant buyers of Russian crude oil.<\/p>\n Furthermore, the EU is imposing additional sanctions across the shadow fleet value chain. Specifically, the 19th package includes the listing of\u00a0Litasco Middle East DMCC<\/strong>, Lukoil\u2019s prominent shadow fleet enabler based in the United Arab Emirates. Other listings include maritime registries providing\u00a0false flags<\/strong>\u00a0to shadow fleet vessels, allowing their continued operation by creating a fraudulent impression of compliance with certification requirements. Today\u2019s measures also target the largest port container operator in the Russian Far East, and a leading shipbuilder for Sovcomflot.<\/p>\n An\u00a0additional 117<\/strong>\u00a0vessels<\/strong>\u00a0have been made subject to a\u00a0port access ban\u00a0<\/strong>and a\u00a0ban on the provision of a broad range of services\u00a0<\/strong>related to maritime transport, bringing the total number of designated vessels to 557. These measures target\u00a0non-EU tankers<\/strong>\u00a0that are part of the shadow fleet circumventing the oil price cap mechanism, which otherwise support Russia\u2019s energy sector, or transport military equipment for Russia or stolen Ukrainian grain.<\/p>\n The 19th package also introduces a\u00a0ban on reinsuring vessels belonging to the shadow fleet<\/strong>, further constraining their ability to operate.<\/p>\n Recent activity has evidenced Russia\u2019s increasing use of\u00a0crypto\u00a0<\/strong>in circumventing sanctions. In this context, the stablecoin\u00a0A7A5<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 created with Russian state support \u2013 has emerged as a prominent tool for financing activities supporting the war of aggression. Therefore, today\u2019s package introduces sanctions on the developer of A7A5, the Kyrgyz issuer of that coin, and the operator of a platform where significant volumes of A7A5 is traded. Transactions involving this stablecoin have also been prohibited across the EU.<\/p>\n As of today, eight banks and oil traders<\/strong>\u00a0from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, the UAE and Hong Kong that circumvent EU sanctions are subject to a transaction ban.\u00a0Five additional Russian banks<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 Istina, Zemsky Bank, Commercial Bank Absolut Bank, MTS Bank, and Alfa-Bank \u2013 are targeted using the same measure. Four banks from Belarus and Kazakhstan are also put under a transaction ban, due to their connections to Russian financial messaging and payment systems.<\/p>\n Additionally, the EU is prohibiting its operators from engaging with the Russian National Payment Card System (\u2018Mir<\/strong>\u2019) or the Fast Payments System (\u2018SBP<\/strong>\u2019). Significant restrictions are also imposed on maintaining economic relationships with entities active in nine\u00a0Russian special economic zones<\/strong>. These zones are central to Russia\u2019s industrial and technological capacity, hosting enterprises engaged in the production or development of goods contributing to the Russian war effort.<\/p>\n When travelling across the Schengen area beyond their country of accreditation, Russian diplomats will be\u00a0obliged to inform<\/strong>\u00a0in advance the relevant EU member state. This obligation aims at ensuring the awareness of member states, against a backdrop of increasingly hostile intelligence activities that support Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine. Additionally,\u00a0EU member states may impose an authorisation requirement\u00a0<\/strong>on Russian diplomats for traveling to their territories, based on visas or residence permits issued by another state.<\/p>\n Since the start of Russia\u2019s war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022, Ukrainian authorities estimate that Russia has deported and forcibly transferred nearly 20 000\u00a0Ukrainian children<\/strong>\u00a0into Russia or into Ukrainian territories illegally occupied by Russia. Those children, many of whom are from orphanages or separated from their families, often face forced adoption and efforts to erase their Ukrainian identity through forced assimilation and indoctrination.<\/p>\n Therefore, the EU is reinforcing accountability of those involved in such activities by\u00a0listing 11 additional individuals<\/strong>. In order to streamline future sanctions on persons responsible for the abduction, forced assimilation and militarised education of Ukrainian minors, the Council is also introducing a\u00a0new listing criterion<\/strong>.<\/p>\n The EU is targeting businesspersons and entities forming part of the\u00a0Russian military-industrial complex<\/strong>, and operators from UAE and China producing or supplying military and dual-use goods to Russia. Today\u2019s listings also include a senior\u00a0DPRK military commander<\/strong>\u00a0deployed to Russia in support of the latter\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, and an individual responsible for the\u00a0inhumane treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war<\/strong>.<\/p>\n The Council has identified\u00a045 new entities<\/strong>\u00a0directly supporting Russia\u2019s military and industrial complex by, inter alia, enabling the circumvention of export restrictions on computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools, microelectronics, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other advanced technology items. These entities will be subject to tighter export restrictions with regard to\u00a0dual-use goods<\/strong>, as well as items which might generally contribute to the\u00a0technological enhancement of Russia\u2019s defence sector<\/strong>. 17 of these entities are located in\u00a0third countries<\/strong>\u00a0other than Russia (12 in China, including Hong Kong, three in India and two in Thailand).<\/p>\n The EU has also agreed to expand the existing\u00a0export ban<\/strong>, to include\u00a0electronic components<\/strong>,\u00a0rangefinders<\/strong>,\u00a0additional chemicals<\/strong>\u00a0used in the preparation of propellants and\u00a0additional metals<\/strong>,\u00a0oxides and alloys<\/strong>\u00a0used in the manufacturing of military systems. Salts and ores, articles made of rubber, tubes, tyres, millstones and construction materials will also be subject to more stringent export restrictions. Finally, the 19th package introduces a prohibition\u00a0<\/strong>to purchase, import or transfer\u00a0all acyclic hydrocarbons<\/strong>\u00a0due to the importance of such materials in generating significant revenues for Russia.<\/p>\n Additionally, the EU is listing Russia\u2019s largest\u00a0gold producer<\/strong>, further constraining its revenue sources.<\/p>\n The package makes prior authorisation mandatory<\/strong>\u00a0for all services provided to the Russian government. Furthermore, it restricts the provision of\u00a0AI services<\/strong>,\u00a0high-performance computing<\/strong>\u00a0services<\/strong>\u00a0and\u00a0commercial space-based services\u00a0<\/strong>to Russian entities, including the Russian government.<\/p>\nEnergy<\/h2>\n
Financial measures<\/h2>\n
Russian diplomats<\/h2>\n
Children<\/h2>\n
Military<\/h2>\n
Trade<\/h2>\n
Services<\/h2>\n